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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What are Thin and Thick Concepts?
Thick and thin concepts are best introduced by examples. Compare the two
following descriptions of Spieltrieb by Juli Zeh, a Post-modernist German nov-
elist1:
SPIELTRIEB is a (. . .) novel about immorality and its consequences and
it questions the continued validity of traditional principles and values
and poses one of the most signiﬁcant questions of our time: who today
can say what is good and what is evil, and how can they know?
Although this description contains many terms with moral connotations (`im-
morality', `validity of traditional principles and values', `good', and `evil'), it
sets out to describe the plot of the story in a rather neutral fashion (whilst
at the same time also interpreting the essence of the novel). Nevertheless, the
reader is rather informed by a general overview of the novel than being ma-
nipulated into reading this novel by a subversive evaluation of the work, such
as seems to be the aim of the following review:
Set in the heart of the west of the German Republic at a high school
in Bonn in the present day, this is the breath-taking story of students
Ada and Alev and their obsessive dependence on one another: initially
it leads to a readiness  then to a compulsion  to perform acts which
1These two descriptions are taken from the oﬃcial website of the publishing house
"Schoeing". Gaming Instinct is the novel's English title. https://www.schoeffling.
de/foreignrights/juli-zeh/gaming-instinct, August 29, 2017)
1.1. WHAT ARE THIN AND THICK CONCEPTS?
overstep all moral bounds, all human compassion, and are beyond any
form of predictable behaviour. The two youngsters select their teacher,
Smutek, as victim of their ingenious blackmail. A malicious game begins.
The second review is supposed to convince the reader that the book is `good'
and therefore worth reading. The review does more than simply inform the
reader, but praises the novel as a must-read. By comparing the two reviews it
becomes clear that the second one contains a lot of so-called `thick concepts',
such as breath-taking, obsessive, ingenious, or malicious. These adjectives give
a description of the novel, but since they are supposed to be persuasive, they
also evaluate the story and the characters. The reader expects the malicious
game to be gloating, deceitful, or spiteful, and especially he or she expects it to
be `bad in some way'. However, the reader does not really perceive purely non-
evaluative information about the content of the game because these adjectives
express thick concepts. Nevertheless, the reader gets an impression of what this
game is like. The term ingenious appears to give the reader more information
about the blackmail than good would do. Although Ada and Alev are only
teenagers, the blackmail seems to be more than a nasty trick played by kids on
their teacher, but it appears rather gruesome and well-prepared. Furthermore,
the term `ingenious' evaluates the blackmail itself. It can be regarded as a
form of admiration towards the blackmailers.
So far it can be stated that there are adjectives that are more informative
than others. Adjectives that seem not to contain any evaluation are purely
non-evaluative (such as `yellow'), others however are both non-evaluative and
evaluative. They are called thick concepts because they do not only evaluate
a person or an act, but they also embody a thickish informative description of
the person or the act. Purely evaluative concepts (such as malicious, good, or
bad) are called thin concepts.2 Typically they are said to have not much or any
non-evaluative conceptual content because they oﬀer less factual information
about the things described as good, or bad. It only becomes clear that the
person, who describes something as good, likes it or approves of it.
Typical thick concepts, which are referred to in the philosophical debate, are
often ethical concepts, such as just, fair, kind, chaste, discreet, cautious, or
cruel. However, there are also other kinds of thick concepts, such as aesthetic
2Sometimes ought is also said to be a thin concept, but it seems rather normative than
evaluative.
2
or epistemic thick concepts like glamorous, elegant, reliable, or observant.3 In
this study, the nature of thick concepts referring to ethical ideas will be looked
at. Unless mentioned otherwise, the considerations can be transferred to the
other types of thick concepts.
1.2 Concepts, Conceptions and Terms
There is a threefold distinction between possessing a concept, having a con-
ception of a concept and expressing a concept. Concepts are representations
of word meaning, they refer to entities in the world which they represent.4 We
have conceptions of concepts and terms are expressions of concepts. Concep-
tions might be either tacit or conscious.
The advantage of the concept-conception distinction is that one can diﬀeren-
tiate between the `public' or `intersubjective' character of concepts and `sub-
jective' conceptions of concepts. One can possess a concept without having an
adequate conception of the concept. For instance, Sue believes that penguins
are birds, but Dean believes that penguins are ﬁsh. They both possess the
concepts ﬁsh, bird, and penguin, but have diﬀerent conceptions of penguins.5
The meaning of a term is much the same as the content of a concept. In
the following, `sans serif' will be used to indicate concepts and single inverted
commas to indicate terms.
1.3 Diﬀerentiating the Evaluative from the Non-
Evaluative
The debate about thick concepts has often been conducted in terms of the
`evaluative' vs. the `descriptive', the `factual', or the `natural'. In this study
the term `descriptive' will be used to refer to the kind of information that is
communicated when using non-evaluative terms. But it might be odd to talk
about `descriptive properties' as those ascribed by non-evaluative predicates.
The same consideration holds for `factual properties'. In contrast, it seems in-
tuitive to talk about `natural' properties, but to say that thick concepts have
3Cp. Kirchin (2010, 2).
4This study leaves it open to the reader to decide whether concepts are mental represen-
tations, abstract entities, or a combination of both.
5Cp. Ezcurdia (1998, 187-188).
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a `natural element' is similarly odd. Thus, as suggested by Roberts (2011)
and Dancy (2013), in this study the term `non-evaluative' will be used be-
cause it appears a legitimate way of referring to `non-evaluative properties',
the `non-evaluative content' of thick concepts, and `non-evaluative concepts'.
Whenever it becomes clear from the context whether properties or the content
of concepts are referred to, the terms `descriptive', `factual', or `natural' will
be used.
A ﬁrst diﬀerentiation concerns evaluative and non-evaluative concepts. One
common realist strategy is to characterize evaluative or ethical concepts as
concepts that pick out evaluative or ethical properties, whereas non-evaluative
concepts pick out non-evaluative properties.6 The anti-realist denies that there
are evaluative or normative facts. According to an anti-realist view, evalua-
tiveness is a feature of a concept and not a feature of the world.7 For instance,
Michael Smith proposes the following deﬁnition of an ethical concept:
[A] concept is an ethical concept if and only if, if someone believes that
that concept is instantiated, then that person believes that there is a
reason for him to desire that the world be a certain way.8
In the following, I will use a more liberal, minimal deﬁnition which holds for
evaluative thick concepts only: A term `T' represents a thick concept iﬀ `x is
T' contains or entails `x is good in a way (bad in a way)'.
1.4 Diﬀerentiating the Thick from the Thin
Gilbert Ryle was the ﬁrst to use the terms `thin' and `thick description' in
print, in order to diﬀerentiate less detailed from more detailed descriptions.
In Thinking and Reﬂecting he explains the term `thick description' by using
the example of a golfer, who is practising approach-shots. The observer of a
picture showing this man hitting a golf ball might think that he is playing
golf. What the observer does not see in the picture, however, is that the man
is only practising approach-shots by hitting one ball after the other. Since
6Matti Eklund (2013, 162) calls this view the metaphysical view. Cf. also Finlay (2010,
334).
7Cp. Finlay (2010, 334). Gibbard (1992, 268-269) proposes the following informal deﬁ-
nition: "A term stands for a thick concept if it praises or condemns an action as having a
certain property."
8Smith (2013, 105).
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he has no opponent, Ryle says that one cannot say that the man is playing
golf. Consequently, in order to give a `thick description' (that is a much more
detailed description) of this picture, the observer of the pictures needs much
more information than what he or she simply sees on the picture.9
In Thinking of Thoughts Ryle gives a similar example. When somebody says
`Today is the 3rd of February' this is "obviously the thinnest possible de-
scription of what he [is] doing"10, according to Ryle. A `thicker' description
would include the information that this person is actually telling somebody
else the date, or that he or she is trying to communicate a wanted calendar-
information.11 Therefore, the diﬀerence between a thin and a thick description
depends on the amount of information the description conveys. It appears that
thin and thick descriptions only materialise when there are at least two de-
scriptions: It follows that the concepts of thin and thick descriptions are not
absolute, but rather relative.
One of Ryle's students, Bernard Williams, introduced the term `thick concept'
into the debate about ethical knowledge.12 Williams characterizes `thicker no-
tions', such as treachery, promise, brutality, and courage, as notions that "seem
to express a union of fact and value"13. He further explains:
The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like
(for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time,
their application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation,
of persons or actions. Moreover, they usually (though not necessarily
directly) provide reasons for actions.14
To express those two distinct aspects of thick terms, Williams introduces the
notions of `world-guidedness' and `action-guidingness'. He calls thick concepts
both `world-guided' and `action-guiding'. On the one hand, they are guided
by the world because they describe what the world is like, and on the other
9Ryle (1966-7, 465-479) oﬀers a lot more examples.
10Ryle (1968, 484).
11Cp. ibid., 484.
12This should not imply that Williams took the term `thick concepts' from Ryle, although
this connection might be obvious. Compare Kirchin (2013) for further implications about
the connection between Ryle's `thick descriptions' and Williams `thick concepts'. Putnam
(1990, 166), however, stresses that Iris Murdoch was the ﬁrst one to emphasize that there are
two distinct kinds of concepts: abstract ethical concepts (good, right) and more descriptive
concepts (cruel, inconsiderate).
13Williams (1985, 129).
14Ibid., 129-130.
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hand, they are action-guiding because they also involve an evaluation of what
is described.15 A's calling a cake `delicious' might give B a reason for choosing
it over the other cakes.16
Although Williams uses the term `thick concept', he does not use `thin con-
cepts' for right or good. Instead he calls them `most general and abstract'
concepts, which lack world-guidedness.17
As has been indicated, the distinction between thick and thin concepts is rather
gradual than clear-cut. Some evaluative concepts are thicker than others and
vice versa. The distinction is best seen as a continuum.18
Timothy Chappell radically denies that there are any thin concepts:
There are no thin concepts. Or almost none. And those that there are
are like the higher-numbered elements in the periodic table, artefacts
of theory which do not occur naturally and which, even once isolated,
are unstable under normal conditions; they may have some theoretical
interest, but we should expect far less of them than many theorist do.19
Although this study will argue in a diﬀerent way, it also shares Chappell's view
that there are no thin concepts because all of them are at least a bit thick.20
1.5 Theoretical Requirements
There are some more phenomena concerning thick concepts which any theory
about the thick should be able to handle: In some contexts, a thick concept
may have positive colouring, whereas in another context its colouring may be
negative. Moreover, some thick concepts convey values that are not unani-
mously shared by everybody. The former phenomenon is called `evaluative
ﬂexibility'21 or `variability in evaluative valence'22, the latter is referred to as
`objectionability'. For example, brutal actions are most often bad, but in some
circumstances even a brutal action might be somehow judged positively. This
15Cp. Williams (1985, 140-141).
16In this paragraph, these two characterizations are called `aspects' to make it clear that
these two sides do not necessarily have to be two distinct (separable) elements of thick
concepts.
17Cp. Williams (1985, 152).
18This idea is ascribed to Scheer (1987, especially 417-418).
19Chappell (2013, 182).
20Chapter 6 deals with this aspect in more detail.
21This term was coined by Kirchin (2013, 13).
22Väyrynen (2013, 215).
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might be the case when it comes to football games. Some football fans like
the brutality of the sport. In their eyes, it makes football even more attrac-
tive. More examples of this kind can be found in the literature concerning this
discussion, such as: Sometimes it is bad to be honest because one should have
been discreet; cherubic children might be bores; cheekiness is not necessarily
bad;23 or selﬁshness must not always be bad.24
The phenomenon of objectionability occurs, if the use of a thick concept con-
veys an evaluation that some people reject. For instance, religious people might
reproach atheists for using blasphemous insincerely because atheists do not be-
lieve that God exists. Moreover, the atheist might not want to evaluate things
as being lewd, chaste, or sinful because this assumes that he or she shares re-
ligious values which are commonly rejected by atheists. These concepts which
convey rejected evaluations are called `objectionable thick concepts'. Pekka
Väyrynen (2013) even argues that any thick concept is principally open to be-
ing regarded as objectionable. Referring to Kant, Simon Blackburn also seems
to support this thesis in saying that "there is nothing unconditionally good
about courage, temperance and the rest"25.
A third phenomenon is that even clearly non-evaluative concepts may have
evaluative colouring in some contexts. For instance, black, red, or green may
have negative or positive meaning when talking about political parties.
In addition to the characteristics mentioned in the preceding sections, an over-
all theory of thick concepts should be able to explain these three phenomena
as well. In the following, a list with the requirements and questions a theory
of the thick needs to handle will be given:
• Are thick concepts evaluative, or normative in the sense of action-guidingness?
• What exactly is this evaluative and non-evaluative element, if thick concepts
contain both?
• How are these two elements connected or related to each other?
• How is the phenomenon of evaluative ﬂexibility explained?
• How can objectionable thick concepts be included in the theory?
23Cp. Kirchin (2013, 13).
24Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 124).
25Blackburn (1992, 287).
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• Can the theory explain why evaluative concepts are sometimes used in a non-
evaluative fashion? Can it also explain the use of non-evaluative concepts in
an evaluative way?
• Is the diﬀerence between thick and thin concepts a diﬀerence of degree or a
diﬀerence in kind?
• Is the theory connected to any meta-ethical theories?
• Are presumptions on the basis of this theory justiﬁable? Are the possible
implications of this theory desirable?
1.6 Current Theories about the Thick
To begin with, this study sets out to classify the existing theories about the
thick. They can be outlined in the following scheme:
Theories of the thick
Semantic views
Non-
separationism26
Separationism27
Extensionally
descriptive
equivalence28
Non-
(extensionally
descriptive
equivalence)29
Pragmatic views
Cognitivism30 Non-cognitivism31
26Wiggins (1976); Williams (1985); Putnam (2002); Kirchin (2010; 2013); Roberts (2011);
Dancy (1995; 2013).
27Miller (2003); Gibbard (1992).
28Stevenson (1944); Hare (1952, 1981); Foot (1958a, 1958b); Barker (2000).
29Kraft (1937); Elstein & Hurka (2009); Burton (1992).
30Finlay (2004, 2005); Copp (2001, 2009); Strandberg (2012, 2015).
31Blackburn (1984, 148-9; 1992); Väyrynen (2013).
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Basically, the theories distinguish between semantic and pragmatic views. Se-
mantic (or content) views hold that the evaluation is part of the content of a
thick concept. These views can be subdivided into non-separationist and sep-
arationist views. Advocates of the former claim that thick concepts cannot be
separated into distinct elements32, whereas proponents of the latter maintain
that the content can be disentangled into an evaluative element, which may be
reduced to a thin concept, and a non-evaluative element which contains various
non-evaluative concepts.33 Common to extensionally descriptive equivalence
views is the thesis that for any thick concept there is a non-evaluative concept
which is extensionally equivalent to the thick concept. Opposing views deny
this assumption.
Semantic views are dominant in the debate about the thick, but there are also
pragmatic views on the rise. Proponents of these hold that thick concepts
are not essentially or inherently evaluative, that is, the evaluation conveyed
by the use of a thick concept is not part of the semantic content, but rather
some eﬀect of pragmatics. Just like semantic views, pragmatic views are both
compatible with cognitivism as well as with non-cognitivism.
1.7 Plan and Aims
The primary objectives in this study are, ﬁrstly, to summarize and evalu-
ate competitive theories about the thick, secondly, to compare these theories
to theories about non-evaluative concepts, thirdly, to include Victor Kraft's
thoughts about evaluative concepts into the debate and, fourthly, to elaborate
an independent theory about the thick which refers to Kraft's theoretical con-
siderations.
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the current semantic and pragmatic theories which
have been presented above in chapter 1.6. In particular, the questions outlined
in chapter 1.5 will be discussed with reference to both semantic and pragmatic
theories. In doing so, this study deals with these theories in a critical and con-
32This characterization is impartial to both understandings that the elements cannot be
separated a) because they are either deeply entangled or b) because there is only one kind
of element.
33This disentangling procedure could sound peculiar to those unfamiliar with the debate
about the thick. E. g., a separationists might hold that x is courageous is equivalent to x
has done an action in spite of danger and x is good in a way for it. The former part of the
analysis is purely non-evaluative (although it might be admitted that danger is at least a bit
evaluative), whereas the latter part is evaluative.
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structive way. Chapter 2 is twofold: It starts dealing with non-separationism
before it turns to separationist accounts. Having considered semantic theories,
chapter 3 handles pragmatic views. Apart from Simon Blackburn's account, it
is primarily paid attention to Pekka Väyrynen's impressive study about thick
concepts which combines philosophical and linguistic methods to evolve a new
account by completely rethinking the topic.
Chapter 4 takes a step back from the actual problem and looks at it by adopt-
ing a fully diﬀerent perspective: Theories about non-evaluative concepts are
researched to raise awareness of problems that also concern the theories dis-
cussed in chapters 2 and 3. At the end of chapter 4, a proposal how thick
concepts can be captured theoretically will be brieﬂy outlined before it will be
discussed in more detail at the end of chapter 6.
In the 1930s the logical positivist, Victor Kraft, dealt with evaluative concepts
and evaluation despite general reservations of logical positivism. His theory
is introduced in chapter 5, in order to look for interesting and inspiring ideas
to promote the debate about the thick. Though Kraft was one of the ﬁrst to
handle the thick, his account has not been noticed in the current debate.
In the last chapter the ideas developed in the preceding sections of the book
and especially Kraft's considerations will be deployed to elaborate an inde-
pendent approach to the thick. This approach will be hybrid-expressivist and
anti-realist. Moreover, it will be argued that the Kraftian account fulﬁls the
criteria and answers the questions raised in section 1.5.
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Chapter 2
Semantic Views
With regard to concepts, the philosopher's main interest focusses on questions
concerning reference or conceptual content. The relation between concepts
and the entities in the world which the concepts represent strongly fascinates
philosophers. Semantic views deal with the reference and conceptual content
of thick concepts. As the term `semantic' indicates, these views hold that the
evaluation conveyed by the thick is part of the semantic content of thick con-
cepts. This view is intuitively understandable as the following example shows:
a. Max is a bachelor and he is unmarried.
b. Max is a brutal person and he is bad in a way.
Both sentences appear somehow odd. The statements seem to be redundant.
Sentence a. is redundant because the meaning of bachelor already contains
being unmarried. Therefore, it is unnecessary to also state that Max is unmar-
ried. Analogous to a., proponents of a semantic view hold that b. is redundant
because the evaluation that Max is bad in a way is already contained in the
meaning of the thick judgement that Max is brutal. This point has been made
explicitly by Brent Kyle (2011).
Despite the unifying thesis that the evaluation is part of the thick content,
semantic views are wildly heterogeneous: The most important distinguishing
criterion is the disentangleability of thick concepts. Separationists hold that
thick concepts can be disentangled (separated) into two distinct elements: a
non-evaluative and an evaluative one. Non-separationists, however, maintain
that the non-evaluative and the evaluative meaning of thick concepts are so
deeply entangled that they cannot be separated.
2.1. NON-SEPARATIONISM
2.1 Non-Separationism
Non-separationist accounts deny that thick concepts are disentangleable. In-
stead, they hold that thick concepts are not analysable. Any analysis of thick
concepts is therefore circular which means that the analysis itself contains
the thick concept.1 The same argument regarding the colour `red' has been
produced by David Wiggins:
x is red if and only if x is such as to give, under certain conditions
speciﬁable as normal, a certain visual impression.2
An answer to the question `Which visual impression?' would be circular be-
cause it needs to involve that the impression must be an impression of seeing
x red. Similarly, the judgement x is selﬁsh could not be analysed without
itself containing the value of selﬁshness. Hence Debbie Roberts often calls this
account non-reductionism instead because x is selﬁsh cannot be reduced to
an equivalent sentence which only contains a description and an evaluation
reduced to a thin concept.3 If selﬁshness was reduced to a non-evaluative de-
scription and the thin concept good in a way, this circumscription would miss
to express the genuine property of selﬁshness. Likewise, any evaluating de-
scription could by no means express the meaning of selﬁshness equally. As a
result, there is no naturalistic way to analyse thick concepts which means that
there simply are no non-evaluative criteria stating what to count as selﬁsh,
or brutal. Selﬁshness or brutality cannot be grounded by non-evaluative facts
only. Jonathan Dancy puts it slightly diﬀerent: "[T]he similarity between dif-
ferent [for instance] lewd actions will not be entirely natural."4
Roberts says that it would be mistaken to think that thick concepts have eval-
uative and non-evaluative elements of content that are so deeply entangled
in a way that makes disentangling impossible. Rather, to understand non-
separationism, one has to assume that there is only one kind of content which
is evaluative. The question of disentangling, then, does not even arise. So,
evaluative concepts "pick out wholly evaluative features of the world"5 and
1Putnam (2002, 38) says that it is impossible to say what the non-evaluative meaning of
a thick concept is without using the thick concept itself.
2Wiggins (1987, 189).
3In her (2013), she says that her non-reductionist view which she calls `inclusive' view is a
third alternative to semantic and pragmatic views. However, this term could be misleading
because her view simply appears to be a semantic view that denies separability.
4Dancy (1995, 276).
5Roberts (2013a, 684).
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hence create an evaluative world. Dancy takes up the same aspect, but adds
the necessity of an appropriate attitude concerning the given properties. The
following quote also shows that non-separationism  at least in the way he
understands it  is often linked to sentimentalism:
The correct picture (. . .) is not that there are two `really' distinct ele-
ments which by a pseudo-chemical reaction somehow become indistin-
guishable from each other. There are no elements at all, in any normal
sense. There is indeed a property and an attitude (. . .), but these things
are not elements of a concept. They are incapable of being so because
the property is best characterized as being that of meriting the attitude,
and the attitude is best characterized as the appropriate one given the
presence of the property. So there are not two things to amalgamate
 there is not even one which, with the addition of something inca-
pable of independent existence, is somehow transformed into something
other than itself (. . .). The so-called amalgam cannot be disassembled
or dissolved, since there is not enough to dissolve it into.6
The thesis that there are certain properties and an appropriate attitude to-
wards these properties which are not themselves elements of the referring thick
concept is an idea of David Wiggins.7 According to Wiggins, there is a pair
property, response which gives rise to a thick concept. His deﬁnition of x
being ϕ8 is that
x is really ϕ if it is such as to evoke and make appropriate the response
A among those who are sensitive to ϕ-ness.9
It could be objected that it depends on the person, if he or she is sensitive to
ϕ-ness. This would make the account rather relativistic. To avoid this con-
sequence, Wiggins introduces the term `really' to be able to categorize thick
evaluations as either right or wrong. If x really is ϕ, then the correctness de-
pends on the appropriateness of the attitude. The appropriate attitude is the
one we owe to x.10
6Dancy (1995, 268).
7Cp. Dancy (2013, 46).
8ϕ might be a thick concept in his account.
9Wiggins (1987, 205).
10Dancy (2013, 46) uses the term `merit'.
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In Roberts' understanding the irreducible thick says that a thick concept ap-
plies to objects having certain shapeless features in virtue of which the appli-
cation of the thick concept is justiﬁed. These features, in virtue of which the
application of the thick concept is appropriate, are determined in a way that
cannot be speciﬁed and that depends on a case-by-case basis. She suggests the
following analysis:
1. The concept (e. g., tactful) applies to an object in virtue of it having features
of a certain sort, of which we may be able to give a rough purely nonevaluative
characterization, but where there is no nonevaluative shape for the concept.
2. The object has features of that certain sort that ground the relevant property
(e. g., makes it tactful) and thus merits the application of the thick concept.
3. Precisely which features ground the property (e. g., make the object tactful),
and thus make the application of the concept appropriate, are determined, in
a way that cannot be speciﬁed in advance, by evaluation on a case-by-case
basis.11
According to Dancy, when applying a thick concept to a thing or a person, the
thing or the person certainly has `neutrally descriptive' features which make
the application appropriate. However, these features are not part of the con-
cept because their relevance is restricted to the particular case.12 Instead of
the appropriate-relation in the accounts of Wiggins and Dancy, Roberts sug-
gests that evaluative properties which are given by the content of evaluative
concepts are grounded in lower-level non-evaluative properties.13
Simon Kirchin follows a quite diﬀerent path to defend his non-separationist
view. His account is based on Ryle's thick descriptions and a critique of
Williams' characterisation of thick concepts as world-guided and action-guiding.
Kirchin uses ideas of Ryle to show how the thick can be explained in a more
accurate way. He starts with one of Ryle's examples of a thick description.
Ryle imagines two boys contracting their eyelids of their right eyes. The one
boy is involuntary twitching, whereas the other is winking conspiratorially to
an accomplice. The thinnest description of this situation is that the two boys
11Roberts (2011, 511).
12Dancy (1995, 277) agrees with Blackburn that the characterization concerning a thick
concept is a `semantic anchor', that is, a rough characterization of the non-evaluative `con-
tent'.
13Cp. Roberts (2013b, 88-94). This will not be discussed in more detail because Roberts
seems to be vague on this topic herself.
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are contracting their eyelids and there appears no diﬀerence in it. A thicker
description of the second boy's winking is more precise and oﬀers further in-
formation:
(1) had deliberately winked, (2) to someone in particular, (3) in order to
impart a particular message, (4) according to an understood code, (5)
without the cognisance of the rest of the company.14
Ryle points out that the signaller has not done ﬁve separately do-able things,
but rather one complex action. Now imagine a boy who is trying to impress a
girl by parodying a fellow pupil. Then, Kirchin suggests, the boy is doing only
one thing, but this one single action is more complex than just the parody of
the fellow student. He concludes that for Ryle there is no base to describe the
more complex action:
Or, in other words, if one has a range of similar actions, described using
related but diﬀerent thick descriptions, then there is no core that all
have in exactly the same way.15
The common base of the actions of the three boys could be the winking, but
this would not be true for the involuntary twitcher. The only thin description
which is available in all three cases is `the boy contracts his eyelids'. This is
not suﬃcient to give a proper core description in all three cases.
Analogous to thick descriptions, there is no core element available when it
comes to thick concepts. Therefore, Kirchin suggests that thick concepts are
a type of thick description. The contraction of the eyelids can be involuntary,
or used to give a signal to an accomplice, or even to impress a girl. Likewise,
to call someone `honest' can have several intentions: to guide action directly,
to express relief, to voice hope, and many more. The common base in all these
possibilities is the attribution of `honesty'. So, a thick concept can have a lot
of functions and not just the guidance of action, as suggested by Williams.16
As a consequence, Kirchin questions the idea that evaluative concepts always
carry a pro or con evaluation by stating that a concept can be evaluative,
but at the same time it can be used on occasions where it does not convey
any positive or negative point. An evaluative concept which is used without
14Ryle (1968, 481).
15Kirchin (2013, 68).
16Cp. ibid., 72.
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conveying a pro or con point is still an evaluative concept because evaluation
is only one function of evaluative concepts among various functions:
When we use macabre of a story, say, we can indicate pro and con ideas,
such as praise or worry. And, we can imply other ideas that themselves
may be either wholly pro or wholly con, or also ﬂuctuate in this respect:
intrigue and fright come to mind. But, beyond that, perhaps we just
wish to say that the story is macabre and this itself be an evaluation that
is neither obviously pro nor obviously con, and that is, additionally, not
just a recording of some nonevaluative descriptive aspect of the story. I
see no reason to think that lots of thick concepts, including ethical ones,
cannot or do not work in the same way.17
So, according to Kirchin, a non-separationist is not committed to holding that
thick concepts only have the function of evaluating and acting-guiding. These
are only two functions among many.
2.1.1 The Diﬀerence between Thick and Thin Concepts
According to the non-separationist view, both thin and thick concepts are
wholly, or at least primarily evaluative.18 The diﬀerence between them is that
thick concepts are somehow more speciﬁc19, or that they have a more speciﬁed
domain of their application20 or narrower satisfaction conditions21. This means
that there are (almost) no restrictions on the features that make things good
or bad. However, there are restrictions for the application of a thick concept.
The domain, on which these concepts operate is more speciﬁc or narrower.
The diﬀerence between thin and thick concepts is one of degree, not one of
type, and is best seen as a continuum: The narrower the domain of things to
which evaluative concepts can be applied, the thicker the concepts.22 Thick
concepts are more speciﬁc than thin concepts because they "narrow down the
sorts of things that the concept can apply to"23.
17Kirchin (2013, 75).
18According to Roberts (2013b, 87), a concept is evaluative in virtue of directly ascribing
an evaluative property.
19Roberts (2013a, 684).
20Dancy (1995, 277).
21Harcout & Thomas (2013, 23).
22Cp. Roberts (2011, 513).
23Ibid., 508.
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Dancy assumes  contrary to the continuum-view  that the distinction be-
tween thin and thick concepts is not a matter of degree, but of type.24
In summary, both views  that the diﬀerence is one of type and one of degree
 are supported.
2.1.2 Evaluative Flexibility
In the preliminary remarks it became clear that an account of the thick has
to be able to explain evaluative ﬂexibility. That is, it needs to explain why
a thick concept might convey a pro-evaluation in some contexts, whereas it
conveys a con-evaluation in others.
The most fruitful solution is oﬀered by Dancy.25 He unfolds the idea that there
is no single-attitude which is lexically signalled, but rather a `range' of attitudes
which in turn is not lexically signalled because of the ﬂexibility concerning thick
concept. On the one hand, there is no reason why there should be a lexically
signalled attitude at all, on the other hand, there might be an appropriate
attitude and many inappropriate attitudes  at least occasionally. To be a
competent user of a thick term, one requires the ability to also understand the
range of attitudes associated with it.26 Elsewhere, Dancy adds that it might be
acceptable to say that any thick concepts is connected with a "default valence".
However, there might be counterexamples (provocative or seductive).27
2.1.3 Motivations for Non-Separationism
Any philosopher defending non-separationism is a cognitivist about values. So
the truth of cognitivism is a necessary condition for non-separationism to be
true.28 Cognitivism about values is widely held and appears very attractive.
Intuitively, our value experience seems to suggest that evaluative properties
are genuine properties of the world and that it is implausible that there should
be no such properties to which thick terms apply. As Jonathan Dancy puts
it: "[W]e take moral value to be part of the fabric of the world; (. . .) and
24Cp. Dancy (2013, 51).
25Dancy (1995) uses the term `essential contestability' instead of `evaluative ﬂexibility'.
Kirchin (2013) relies on Dancy.
26Cp. Dancy (1995, 270).
27Cp. Dancy (2013, 45).
28For defences of moral realism cf., e. g., Platts (1979), Dancy (1986), Finlay (2004; 2005),
Copp (2001; 2009).
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we should take it in the absence of contrary considerations that actions and
agents do have the sorts of moral properties we experience in them"29. Based
on the mind-independent existence of value facts30, non-separationists oﬀer a
consistent view that has philosophical signiﬁcant consequences. To state that
value judgements are subjective judgements that lack truth value, is unpopular
in philosophy because it immediately faces relativistic objections. The converse
statement appears to be more favoured in philosophy. If someone maintains
that murdering is generally good, it is human to really want to answer that this
judgement is wrong. A further favourable consequence is that the Frege-Geach
objection poses no problem to cognitivism.
2.1.4 Consequences and Problems of Non-Separationism
Non-separationism has four major consequences: i) moral cognitivism is true,
ii) it undermines the fact-value distinction, iii) thick concepts are naturally
shapeless, and iv) thick concepts are unanalysable.
Cognitivism about values has its favourable aspects which the preceding sec-
tion has shown, but clearly it also has its problems. One major problem is that
a cognitivist account has no natural explanation for the action-guidingness of
thick concepts and their link to reasons for actions.31 According to Williams,
thick concepts are action-guiding, and, thus, have motivational force. Assum-
ing cognitivism, judgements containing thick concepts express beliefs about
the world, and according to reason internalism, having a belief and a desire
is necessary for being motivated to do an action. But since value judgements
express beliefs, according to cognitivism, the non-separationist has trouble
explaining the link to action-guidingness. For instance, calling a distribution
`just', provides a reason to prefer it over another unjust distribution. However,
if This distribution is just expresses a belief, then the link to the action-guiding
character of just is not obvious.32
29Dancy (1986, 172).
30Even if cognitivism is based on a single premiss, it is a strong premiss, though, which is
diﬃcult, if not even impossible, to prove.
31There are further arguments against cognitivism. Cf., e. g., Mackie's (1990 [1977])
famous arguments from queerness and relativity.
32Cf. the argument from moral psychology in Miller (2003, 6). In chapter 6 of this study,
it is argued for a separationist account which denies cognitivism about values, that is, it
is assumed that value judgements cannot be true or false. Although chapter 6 assumes
that non-cognitivism is more convincing, it is not argued against cognitivism apart from the
argument that the motivational problem cannot suﬃciently be solved within a cognitivist
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A second consequence of non-separationism is that it wreaks havoc with the
fact-value distinction. Hilary Putnam tries to prove this thesis. He attacks
the ontological distinction between facts and values by showing that i) values
depend on facts, and that ii) facts depend on values. The former appears to be
commonly accepted, whereas the latter is more diﬃcult to prove. Putnam sup-
poses that there are so-called `super-Benthamites' who live on the Australian
continent and share the history, geography and exact science with the rest of
the earth's population, but they contradict in ethics. Furthermore, suppose
that they can measure the `hedonic tone' scientiﬁcally. An act is right, if it
maximizes the hedonic tone of the greatest number. Now imagine, a super-
Benthamite tells a lie because he or she wants to maximise the hedonic tone
of a great number of people. Indeed, some human beings would judge the lie
to be wrong because of its deceitfulness. The super-Benthamites agree with
these humans with regard to all empirical facts, but still they evaluate these
facts in a diﬀerent way. Putnam derives:
And it is not counted as being `dishonest' in the pejorative sense to tell
lies out of the motive of maximizing the general pleasure level. So after
a while the use of the description `honest' among the super-Benthamites
would be extremely diﬀerent from the use of that same descriptive term
among us. (. . .) The texture of the human world will begin to change.
In the course of time the super-Benthamites and we will end up living
in diﬀerent human worlds.33
So, according to Putnam, this example shows that the human world might
change, if facts are evaluated diﬀerently. Putnam concludes that both values
depend on facts, and facts depend on values.
The third and the forth consequence are mutually dependent. In section 2.2.2,
the shapelessness of thick concepts will be evolved. The fourth consequence
that thick concepts are unanalysable means that thick concepts cannot be
expressed by more primitive concepts and hence must be primitive themselves.
This presupposes an atomistic view about thick concepts. More on this issue
in section 4.6.
account. Therefore, a non-cognitivist view is preferred because it can accommodate the
motivational problem naturally.
33Putnam (1992 [1981], 140-141).
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2.2 Separationism
The disputed issue between separationists and non-separationists is the disen-
tangleability of thick concepts. In contrast to non-separationists, separationists
state that the disentangling move is possible.
Before the question of disentangleability will be discussed, it is useful to reca-
pitulate the attractiveness of the disentangling manoeuvre which results from
its ability to solve an important problem.
The problem of disentangling emerged contemporaneously with non-cognitivist
positions becoming popular in metaethics in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury. Non-cognitivists state that facts and values are ontologically distinct
from each other. While facts are typically held to be `genuine features of
the world'34, non-cognitivists claim that values are non-cognitive responses to
facts. The existence of value facts is denied. Hilary Putnam35 says that this
fact-value dichotomy arose from the Humean doctrine that one cannot derive
an `ought' from an `is'.36 Hume observes that non-evaluative and evaluative
propositions are often mixed within thoughts about morality:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have al-
ways remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes obser-
vations concerning human aﬀairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to
ﬁnd, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not.37
Putnam points out that Hume himself never unambiguously says that one
cannot infer an `ought' from an `is', but nevertheless this is what is known as
Hume's law. In his Tractatus Ludwig Wittgenstein takes a similar view: "Der
Sinn der Welt muss außerhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles wie es ist und
geschieht alles wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinen Wert  und wenn es ihn
gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert."38
34McDowell (1981, 144).
35Much of what follows is owed to the thoughts in his essay The Collapse of the Vact/Value
Dichotomy.
36Cp. Putnam (2002, 14). For a detailed account on the fact-value dichotomy and its
genesis cf. ibid., 7-27.
37Hume (2009 [1738], 3.1.1, 302).
38Wittgenstein (1989 [1922], 6.41, 170).
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Wittgenstein who belonged to the periphery of the so called Vienna circle had
inﬂuence on some particular views of the circle's members. This inﬂuence can
be observed in the Wittgensteinian interpretation of logical laws as tautologies
and mathematical theorems as analytical. Following the Carnapian criterion
of cognitive meaningfulness, cognitively meaningful sentences must either be
empirically veriﬁable or analytical in the Wittgensteinian sense. As a conse-
quence of this strong criterion, sentences containing ethical or moral content
are meaningless.
Since ethical statements were said not to be empirically veriﬁable and hence
not cognitively meaningful statements, (meta-)ethical positions emerged that
were compatible with the fact-value dichotomy. Alfred Jules Ayer who is seen
to be supportive of a paradigmatic ethical position of the Logical Positivism,
constructed a non-cognitivist theory that is in accordance with the fact-value
dichotomy. He states that "in so far as statements of value are signiﬁcant,
they are ordinary `scientiﬁc' statements; and that in so far as they are not sci-
entiﬁc, they are not in the literal sense signiﬁcant, but are simply expressions
of emotion which can be neither true nor false"39. Ayer concludes that value
statements are not suitable for truth-value because of the `pseudo'-concepts
they entail.
Although Ayer's emotivism is compatible with both the fact-value distinction
and the criterion of cognitive meaningfulness, thick concepts pose another
challenge. In The Collapse of the Face/Value Dichotomy Putnam claims that
the fact-value distinction is challenged through the sort of fact-value entan-
glement, that can be observed in the use of thick concepts. He uses the bare
`existence' of thick concepts which he says are both normative and descriptive
as an argument against defenders of the fact-value dichotomy.40 And indeed,
thick concepts, which are both non-evaluative and evaluative, appear not to
ﬁt the fact-value distinction at ﬁrst sight. An emotivist or any non-cognitivist
must ﬁnd a solution to handle thick concepts while holding on to the fact-
value dichotomy. This diﬃculty, however, can be overcome by performing one
of two moves. The ﬁrst one may be too simple. It says that thick concepts
39Ayer (1956 [1936], 102-103).
40Cp. Putnam (2002, 34-35). Putnam, like Wiggins, McDowell, Roberts and Kirchin, is a
non-separationist. The non-separationist view, that argues against the fact-value distinction,
is typically a cognitivist realist view because it assumes value facts (see Section 2.1.3 and
2.1.4).
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are plain non-evaluative concepts without evaluative meaning.41 According to
Putnam, this is Hare's response (in the case of rude) and Mackie's (in the case
of cruel). The second move is the classical separationist's move. According to
separationists, moral concepts are neither exclusively emotive nor evaluative,
but they also contain some non-evaluative content which can be entangled
from the emotive or evaluative content.42 Thus, thick concepts contain two
components: a non-evaluative and a distinct evaluative component. If this dis-
entangling manoeuvre is possible, then the distinct separation between facts
and values can be kept up.
Such two-component analyses can be found in the works of Richard Hare,
Charles Stevenson, and Leslie Mackie, but also in writings of current non-
cognitivist such as Simon Blackburn, or Allan Gibbard, or even in writings of
cognitivists such as Christine Tappolet.43
2.2.1 Extensionally Non-Evaluative Equivalence
The extensionally non-evaluative equivalence view holds that for any thick
concept there is a non-evaluative concept which is extensionally equivalent to
the extension of the thick concept.44 In the subsequent sections, the exten-
sionally non-evaluative equivalence view will be developed while the arguments
of the non-separationists against separationist accounts are reproduced. The
extensionally non-evaluative equivalence view is often ascribed to Hare and
Stevenson, but as this study will show scepticism is warranted concerning this
classiﬁcation.
41Dancy (1995, 264) says that a non-cognitivist is committed to denying the existence of
thick concepts. Such a descriptivist view is defended by Brower (1988).
42Cp. Croom (2010, 210).
43The separationist view is often ascribed to non-cognitivists, but as Elstein & Hurka
(2009) point out even cognitivist can be separationsts.
44The extension of a concept is the set of all entities to which the concept applies.
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2.2.2 Arguments against Separationism
McDowell: The Disentanglement Argument (DA)
John McDowell45 develops several arguments against the non-cognitivist anal-
ysis which supports the fact-value dichotomy. The ﬁrst one, which will be
discussed later on, is called the uncodiﬁability argument and a second one is
referred to as the disentanglement argument (DA)46 which he elaborates in a
debate with Simon Blackburn about non-cognitivism and rule-following. Ac-
cording to Roberts, McDowell's remarks about the so-called shapelessness of
thick concepts form a further argument against non-cognitivism47 which is re-
ferred to as shapelessness hypothesis.48
The DA is the most signiﬁcant argument in the literature against the sepa-
rationist view of thick concepts.49 It has been similarly repeated by Bernard
Williams and Hilary Putnam. The following passage is quoted in the literature
as the DA50:
Now it seems reasonable to be sceptical about whether the disentangling
manoeuvre here envisaged can always be eﬀected: speciﬁcally, about
whether, corresponding to any value concept, one can always isolate a
genuine feature of the world  by the appropriate standard of genuine-
ness: that is, a feature that is there anyway, independently of anyone's
45McDowell was not the ﬁrst to question the fact-value distinction. But he may be the
ﬁrst one to formulate a proper argument against the fact-value distinction. Before him, Iris
Murdoch and Bernard Williams already tried to argue for the entanglement of facts and
values.
46The term `disentanglement argument' might be confusing since it is no argument for
but against disentangling.
47It is often said in the literature that the DA is presented against non-cognitivism. Since
Elstein & Hurka show that cognitivists sometimes also support the reductivist view, it is
more correct to comprehend it as an argument against all sorts of reductivist accounts.
48The concept shapelessness was ﬁrst used in print by Blackburn (1981, 167).
49This argument, according to Elstein & Hurka (2009, 519-520), is popular among non-
separationists because it is based upon one premise which is acceptable and compelling,
whereas the uncodiﬁability argument rests on assumptions that themselves are controversial.
50Williams (1985, 141-142) puts this as follows: "An insightful observer can indeed come
to understand and anticipate the use of the concept without actually sharing the values
of the people who use it: this is an important point, and I shall come back to it. But in
imaginatively anticipating the use of the concept, the observer also has to grasp imaginatively
its evaluative point. He cannot stand quite outside the evaluative interests of the community
he is observing, and pick up the concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange
way certain neutral features of the world." Equally it is expressed by Putnam (2002, 37-38):
"[I]f one did not at any point share the relevant ethical point of view one would never be
able to acquire a thick concept, and that sophisticated use of such a concept requires a
continuing ability to identify (at least at imagination) with that point of view."
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value experience being as it is  to be that to which competent users
of the concept are to be regarded as responding when they use it; that
which is left in the world when one peels oﬀ the reﬂection of the appro-
priate attitude.
Consider, for instance, a speciﬁc conception of some moral virtue: the
conception current in a reasonably cohesive moral community. If the dis-
entangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that the extension
of the associated term, as it would be used by someone who belonged to
the community, could be mastered independently of the special concerns
which, in the community, would show themselves in admiration or em-
ulation of actions seen as falling under the concept. That is: one could
know which actions the term would be applied to, so that one would be
able to predict applications and withholdings of it in new cases  not
merely without oneself sharing the community's admiration (there need
be no diﬃculty about that), but without even embarking on an attempt
to make sense of their admiration. That would be an attempt to com-
prehend their special perspective; whereas, according to the position I
am considering, the genuine feature to which the term is applied should
be graspable without beneﬁt of understanding the special perspective,
since sensitivity to it is singled out as an independent ingredient in a
purported explanation of why occupants of the perspective see things as
they do. But is it at all plausible that this singling out can always be
brought oﬀ?51
At ﬁrst, singling out the premisses and the conclusion of the DA in detail is
crucial to comprehend the argumentation52:
(P1) If non-cognitivism is true, then one can isolate a genuine feature of the
world to which a thick concept is corresponding.
(P2) If one can isolate a genuine feature of the world to which a thick concept
is corresponding, then an outsider can apply any thick concept correctly
without comprehending the special evaluative perspective of an insider.
(P3) There is at least one thick concept that the outsider could not mimic be-
cause he or she does not share the evaluative point.
(C) Non-cognitivism is false.
51McDowell (1981, 144).
52For a slightly diﬀerent analysis of the DA cf. Blomberg (2007). His analysis of the DA
comprises even a further premiss.
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(P1) is basend on an auxiliary assumption which says that every two-component
analysis must have a `non-evaluatively determinate two-part form'.53 This kind
of analysis maintains that the non-evaluative content fully determines the ex-
tension of the concept, so that one can isolate a genuine feature of the world to
which a thick concept is corresponding. If the non-evaluative content of a thick
term is fully determined by non-evaluative properties, the term is equivalent
to a pure non-evaluative term.54 For the sake of brevity, this view is called the
`extensionally non-evaluative equivalence' view which was introduced above.
For instance, the pejorative Kraut is extensionally equivalent to German. An
extensionally non-evaluative equivalist holds that for every thick concept there
is such an equivalent non-evaluative concept as in the case of Kraut.
From the second premiss it can be derived, that the evaluative component
must be independent from its non-evaluative component in some way; Other-
wise the outsider could not learn the thick term, unless he or she shares the
evaluative point. Also, McDowell presupposes that a two-component analy-
sis assumes universalizability. Else the outsider could not apply a thick term
correctly. Universalizability means that any moral situation which has certain
non-evaluative features by virtue of which these features are judged to be good
(or bad), these features must be called good (or bad) in any similar situation.
And this thesis of universalizability55 is what McDowell's scepticism about
the disentangling manoeuvre is directed at in (P3).56 Given determinateness
and universalizability, the extension of a thick concept is determined by its
non-evaluative content and it would be possible for an outsider to master the
concept's extension. (C) then follows via modus tollens.57
53This term is owed to Elstein & Hurka (2009).
54According to Williams (1985, 141-142), Hare's prescriptivism assumes that "all the
output into its use [the use of thick concepts] is descriptive" and "all the evaluative aspect
is output". But if the extension of a thick concept could be governed by its non-evaluative
content, then a purely non-evaluative extensionally equivalent concept must be available.
Adopting McDowell's view, Williams doubts that such non-evaluative concepts can always
be found or produced. Therefore, an outsider needs to share the evaluative point in order
to apply a thick concept correctly.
55Hare (1963, 139) characterizes universalizability in the following way: "[B]y calling a
judgement universalizable I mean only that it logically commits the speaker to making a
similar judgement about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original
judgement or like it in the relevant respects." Cf. also Hare (1981, 115).
56Roberts (2011, 502) calls the premise in (P3) Graspability Point. It says that grasping
the extension of a thick term without making any evaluations is implausible.
57Elstein & Hurka (2009) say that the conclusion is that the separationist view is false.
However, the non-cognitivist is committed to separationism. Ergo, any attack against the
25
2.2. SEPARATIONISM
To summarize, the separationist positions that McDowell attacks (these posi-
tions must at least accept (P1) and (P2)) share the following assumptions:
(A1) The non-evaluative component of a thick term fully determines its exten-
sion.
(A2) The evaluative component is independent from its non-evaluative compo-
nent.
(A3) The application of a thick term is universalizable.
If one should try to give an analysis which an extensionally non-evaluative
equivalist agreed to, it would take the following form:
(S1) x is courageous iﬀ (x is D, where D are genuine and determinate features
of the world,
⊕
admiration towards x, though not necessary).58
McDowell doubts that this disentangling is always possible for any thick term.
He considers, for instance, moral virtue-terms whose extension is not deter-
mined by the non-evaluative meaning given. Since the non-evaluative meaning
of virtue-terms such as justice is not fully determined, an outsider could not
assimilate the correct application of justice just by observing non-evaluative
features. Another counterexample that strengthens (P3) is given by Christine
Tappolet:
Let us suppose that courageous actions are done in spite of danger and
involve overcoming fear. Now, it has to be acknowledged that there are
behaviours, such as the attempt by someone who can hardly swim to save
a child drowning in deep waters, which correspond to this description
but which fail to be courageous. Such actions are silly or foolhardy, but
not courageous.59
Putnam (2002) also argues against disentangling60 and Hare's two-component
approach by applying a similar argument. His main argument is that non-
separationist view is also an attack against non-cognitivism.
58The sign
⊕
indicates that the attitude is not truth-conditional for courageousness.
⊕
is not logically identical to any logical operator, especially not to the conjunction. If it were
logically identical to the conjunction, then one could only call x courageous, if x has certain
features and one holds x in high esteem. Those two conditions may not necessarily interrelate
with each other because both conditions could be true coincidentally but nevertheless, both
need to be fulﬁlled. E. g., a naturalistic position might fulﬁl these assumptions.
59Tappolet (2004, 214).
60Putnam uses the term `factorability'.
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cognitivists cannot explain "what the `descriptive meaning' of, say, `cruel' is
without using the word `cruel' or a synonym"61. Cruel does not simply mean
causing deep suﬀering because, e. g., surgeons caused deep suﬀering before the
invention of anaesthesia. Still, it would be inappropriate to call the surgeons
cruel because they did not want to torture the patients willingly. In his book
Reason, Truth and History, which was published in 198162, he also points
out that the meaning of thick terms cannot be translated in the language of
physics:
`X is considerate' (. . .) [is] also not translatable into the language of
`physical theory'. What this means is that, if there are two components
to the meaning of `X is considerate', then the only description we can
give of the `factual meaning' of the statement is that it is true if and
only if X is considerate. And this trivializes the notion of a `factual
component'.63
He concludes that the two-components approach collapses because the deﬁnien-
dum already contains the deﬁniens and the deﬁnition of considerate is therefore
circular. To give it a proper deﬁnition, the non-evaluative meaning of consider-
ate would have to be translated into the language of the physical theory. This,
however, is impossible and hence it is impossible to specify the non-evaluative
meaning of considerate. In the end, the falseness of the two-component ap-
proach follows.
McDowell also draws the conclusion that the separationist account of non-
cognitivism is false.64 But his objection is only directed at two-component
analyses of extensionally non-evaluative equivalists as in (S1). It is widely
held that Hare, Stevenson, and Mackie support such an analysis.65
Before discussing the two-component accounts of Hare and Stevenson and ex-
amining whether it is true that they stand in for the analysis (S1), further
arguments against the separationist (and non-cognitivist) view will be brought
forward.
61Putnam (2002, 38).
62He points out that he criticized the two-component approaches already in Reason, Truth
and History. Cp. ibid.
63Putnam (1992 [1981], 205).
64The objection that equivalent purely non-evaluative do not always exist, is one of the
most popular arguments of the non-separationist. This argument is held also by Williams
(1985), Tappolet (2004), and Putnam (1992 [1981]).
65McDowell's (1981, 159n6) scepticism is directed at Mackie and Hare. Putnam (1992
[1981], 206-211) attacks Stevenson and Mackie.
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McDowell: The Uncodiﬁability Thesis
The uncodiﬁability argument is McDowell's second argument against disen-
tangling.66 In Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? McDowell
argues against Philippa Foot in a debate about moral reasons. According to
McDowell, Foot "sometimes seems to suggest that if someone acts in a way
he takes to be morally required, and his behaviour cannot be shown to be
rational as a case of conformity to an hypothetical imperative, then he must
be blindly obeying an inculcated code."67 McDowell rejects this suggestion by
claiming that moral rules cannot be reduced to codiﬁed rules.68 Similarly, in
Virtue and Reasons McDowell argues against the Socratic thesis that virtue is
knowledge. If virtue is knowledge, then the knowledge must have a stateable
propositional content, thus virtues must be codiﬁable. Yet, McDowell rejects
this possibility.69
The argument of uncodiﬁability is often transferred to the debate about the
thick. Given disentangling, one has to separate a thick concept into a cognitive
and a non-cognitive component. Then, those two components should provide
the same reasons for action as the entangled thick concept. For instance, A's
calling a cake `delicious' might be more convincing for B to chose the cake over
others than A's calling the cake `contains ﬂour, baking, powder, eggs, sugar,
butter and water, you should try it'.70
The persuasiveness of this thesis is given diﬀerent weight: Elijah Millgram
concludes that it fails to show what it is meant to show.71 Elstein & Hurka say
that they "do not see how on its own it bears on the thick/thin issue"72 because
a reductivist position is "perfectly consistent" with uncodiﬁability.73 Roberts
also concedes that a separationist is not necessarily committed to accepting
codiﬁability.74
66For a more detailed discussion of the uncodiﬁability argument cf. Millgram (1995). The
discussion in this study is quite brief because it is close to the shapelessness-thesis which is
i) more comprehensively discussed and ii) has direct bearing to the debate about the thick.
67McDowell (1978, 20).
68Cp. ibid., 20-21.
69Cp. McDowell (1979, 336).
70Cf. Millgram (1995) for a more detailed and more convincing example.
71Cp. ibid., 373.
72Elstein & Hurka (2009, 517).
73Ibid., 518.
74Cp. Roberts (2013a, 681).
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The Shapelessness Thesis
Suppose for a moment that there is a moral outsider, e. g. an anthropologist,
who does not share the community's evaluation of some features in the world.75
The assumption now is that the outsider cannot predict the application of a
thick term because the features or properties to which the term refers cannot
be codiﬁed in non-evaluative terms, that is, thick concepts are shapeless with
regard to the non-evaluative. Consequently, even an insider cannot list all the
items and properties to which a thick term applies. There is no unifying fea-
ture that connects all the items to which the concept employs. And therefore,
the outsider cannot apply a thick term correctly without sharing the reactions
or attitudes of the community to the corresponding properties. Let us recon-
sider Tappolets example of courageous. The deﬁnition of courageous actions
as actions which are done in spite of danger and involve overcoming fear, does
not ﬁt in every situation.76 So, not even this general criterion is a suﬃcient
criterion for an action to be courageous.
The shapelessness hypothesis is vividly discussed in the recent literature by
Roberts (2011), Väyrynen (2014), and Kirchin (2010).77 It roughly states that
the extension of evaluative terms is non-evaluatively shapeless.78 The shape-
lessness thesis is ascribed to McDowell's thoughts about supervenience, but
Blackburn is the ﬁrst one to use the term shapelessness in reaction to McDow-
ell's DA.79 McDowell is sceptical that "however long a list we give of items
to which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the level super-
vened upon, there may be no way, expressible at the level supervened upon,
of grouping just such items together."80 One has to understand why things
are grouped together and for understanding why things are called courageous
it is not enough to understand the supervened level (in the case of coura-
geous, this means features which make an action courageous). Thick terms are
75For the later see, for example, the anthropologist in Gibbard (1992) and the case of
`gopa'.
76Cp. Tappolet (2004, 214).
77The focus of our investigation will not be on Kirchin because he focuses mainly on the
simplest version (S1) which is already refuted by the DA as was shown above. Kirchin (2010,
22) considers other versions of non-cognitivist positions just brieﬂy. And theses remarks do
not help to advance this discussion.
78This characterization is neutral in relation to realist and anti-realist positions. A realist
version of the shapelessness thesis is also that evaluative properties cannot be reduced to
non-evaluative properties.
79Cp. Blackburn (1981, 167).
80McDowell (1981, 145).
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only shapeful with respect to the evaluative but shapeless with respect to the
non-evaluative. According to Kirchin, the list of kind things could continue
"indeﬁnitely". He uses the term `outrunning' to indicate that there can be "an
inﬁnite number of ways in which actions get to be kind"81.
Väyrynen indicates that there are at least two ways of reading the shapelessness
thesis. One reading of the thesis is "that no such non-evaluative classiﬁcations
are built into the meanings of evaluative terms or concepts". A second reading
says "that evaluative terms and concepts have no non-evaluative shapes at
all"82. McDowell's thesis supports the former reading. According to Väyry-
nen, the latter reading is appropriate, "if the relevant notion of understanding
an evaluative term requires not merely grasping its sense but also some fur-
ther not merely conceptual competence"83. He continues that the former fails
to threaten non-cognitivism because non-cognitivists need not claim that the
connection between the evaluative and the non-evaluative is conceptually or
semantically ﬁxed.84 The connection could be pragmatic, as in Blackburn's or
his own view. Therefore, Väyrynen suggests the following deﬁnition:
(ST) The extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren't uniﬁed under in-
dependently intelligible non-evaluative relations of real similarity, not even
as a synthetic a posteriori matter that isn't settled by the meanings of
evaluative terms or concepts.85
Roberts distinguishes the graspability point strictly from the shapelessness
hypothesis. According to her, even if a separationist (reductivist) can support
an analysis which is compatible with graspability, this analysis is still incom-
patible with shapelessness. She says that an evaluative concept is shapeless, if
there is no unifying feature or real resemblance, and concludes:
If evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, then that unifying
feature or real resemblance is not nonevaluative: it is simply that we
lack a term for the nonevaluative feature of the world that we were
nonetheless sensitive to in applying our evaluative concept  it is not
there. Evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, if McDowell is
correct, because the commonality that uniﬁes instances across a range
81Kirchin (2010, 13).
82Väyrynen (2014, 575).
83Ibid.
84Cp. ibid.
85Ibid., 576.
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of cases of the concept's correct application is evaluative.86
So, Roberts supports the second reading of the shapelessness thesis that eval-
uative terms have no non-evaluative shape at all because the unifying instance
is the evaluative commonality. Whether kind applies is independent from the
object having certain non-evaluative properties.87 Whereas graspability poses
a problem for any outsider who does not share the evaluative view of the in-
siders, shapelessness poses also a problem for insiders.
Though the shapelessness thesis is commonly accepted, there are at least two
critical points which are worth considering.88 Firstly, the thesis is an argu-
ment against certain kinds of separationist accounts. But this does not mean
that it is an argument for non-separationism. Blackburn admits that it is no
surprise that a unifying feature for valued things  for example all the comic
things  cannot be found. But, nevertheless, he sees the shapelessness of thick
terms not solely as a problem for a projective theory and he questions why the
shapelessness should be only a problem for non-cognitivism:
Do we really support a realist theory of the comic by pointing out the
complexity and shapeless nature of the class of things we laugh at? On
the contrary, there is no reason to expect our reactions to the world
simply to fall into patterns which we or anyone else can describe. So the
plight of the outsider aﬀords no argument against a Humean theory.89
Secondly, and this is the major objection, the thesis is given too much weight
in the debate about thick concepts, especially since most concepts are some-
how shapeless, or undeﬁnable.90 So, shapelessness might not be a particular
problem of the thick. If this objection should turn out to be correct, (ST) has
no argumentative force in showing that non-separationism is true. This second
objection will be elaborated in detail in chapter 4 of this study.
2.2.3 Conclusion
So far there have been three distinct but interconnected arguments against
separationism: The disentanglement, the uncodiﬁability, and the shapelessness
86Roberts (2011, 505).
87Cp. Roberts (2011, 508).
88Besides from the fact that the truth of the thesis has never been properly proven and
will perhaps never been proven. Cp. Kirchin (2010, 10).
89Blackburn (1981, 167).
90This objection is also made in Millgram (1995, 367) and Väyrynen (2014, 588).
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argument. McDowell's disentanglement argument criticizes the two-component
approach in the simplest form (S1) and it is convincing and its demur should
be accepted. (S1) maintains that the extension of a thick concept is fully
determined by its non-evaluative content. The DA objects that it is not al-
ways possible to produce an equivalent non-evaluative concept with the same
extension. If this was possible, an outsider could grasp the meaning of any
thick concept without sharing the evaluative point. Therefore, DA appears
to succeed against (S1). The argumentative force of the uncodiﬁability thesis
concerning thick concepts has been questioned, and it is also doubtful whether
the shapelessness thesis, even if it is true, is supportive of non-separationism.
In the next section, Stevenson's two-component analysis and Hare's prescrip-
tivist account of the thick will be discussed. Further, the question will be
clariﬁed whether their analyses equal (S1). If this will turn out to be true,
then their analyses will equally be defeated by the DA. In addition, it will
be suggested that any account stating that the evaluation is part of the con-
tent of a thick concept cannot also hold that its non-evaluative content drives
the extension of a thick concept. If a thick concept has the same extension
like its purely non-evaluative equivalent, then the thick concept itself cannot
be evaluative any more. This would show that the DA is no threat to any
non-cognitivist view of the thick as it is often maintained.
2.2.4 Classical Two-Component-Analyses
Charles L. Stevenson
In his book Ethics and Language (1944), Stevenson holds that thick terms91
can be disentangled into two meaning components: non-evaluative and emo-
tive. There are signs and words that have both kinds of meaning and "may
at once have a disposition to aﬀect feelings or attitudes and a disposition
to aﬀect cognition"92. The emotive and non-evaluative meaning components
are interrelated and not two isolated elements. Emotive and non-evaluative
meaning "are distinguishable aspects of a total situation, not `parts' of it that
can be studied in isolation"93. The emotive meaning is dependent from the
91Stevenson (1960 [1944], 71) speaks of signs that have both `emotive' and `descriptive'
meaning, instead of labelling such signs `thick concepts'.
92Ibid.
93Ibid., 76. Elsewhere (p. 210) he says that value terms "involve a wedding of descriptive
and emotive meaning".
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non-evaluative meaning because "a word acquires a laudatory emotive mean-
ing partly because it refers, via its descriptive meaning, to something which
people favour"94. According to Stevenson, a word has emotive meaning in
virtue of its non-evaluative meaning. This means that Stevenson strictly re-
jects the assumption (A2) (see ch. 2.2.2). The non-evaluative meaning can be
altered through persuasive deﬁnition.95 A redeﬁnition of some ethical concepts
is possible because they are vague.96 Although he concedes the vagueness of
language, he maintains that "meaning must not vary in a bewildering way"
and that "some variation must of course be allowed, else we shall end with a
ﬁctitious entity, serene and thoroughly useless amid the complexities of actual
practice".97
Besides from the non-evaluative meaning, the emotive meaning of a thick con-
cept can vary, as well. "Democracy"98  for example  is appreciated by most
Americans but the emotive meaning is not ﬁxed because the emotive meaning
of democracy may vary to at least some degree:
Suppose, for example, that a group of people should come to disapprove
of certain aspects of democracy, but continue to approve of other as-
pects of it. They might leave the descriptive meaning of `democracy'
unchanged, and gradually let it acquire, for their usage, a much less
laudatory emotive meaning. On the other hand, they might keep the
strong laudatory meaning unchanged, and let `democracy' acquire a de-
scriptive sense which made reference only to those aspects of democracy
(in the older sense) which they favoured.99
Stevenson also gives an explicit analysis of value concepts, the so-called second
pattern of analysis denoted (S2):
94Ibid., 71-72.
95Cp. ibid., IX: 2.
96Stevenson (ibid., IX: 1) explicitly calls value terms vague.
97Ibid., 43.
98democracy may not be a typical thick concepts. But Stevenson's analysis of the second
pattern is for concepts like sportmanship, genius, beauty, selﬁshness, or hypocrisy which are
partly mentioned as typical thick concepts.
99Ibid., 72.
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(S2) `This is good' has the meaning of `This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z . . .,'
except that `good' has as well a laudatory emotive meaning which permits
it to express the speaker's approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the
hearer.100
He points out that this pattern is not a deﬁnition of good, but only a for-
mal schema, whose variables have to be replaced by ordinary words.101 His
aim is not to specify the words with which the variables should be replaced
(that would be the aim of an applied ethical theory). But nevertheless he says
that there are "certain boundaries (. . .) between which descriptive meanings
of `good' may be expected to ﬂuctuate, and beyond which they are unlikely to
extend"102. What is important here is that  even if the boundaries are vague
and shadowy  they in some kind are available. With reference to determina-
tion, Stevenson supports the claim that thick concepts are undetermined and
he even refuses to accept (A1). Hence, the DA does not violate his account.
Richard Hare
As has already been mentioned, Hare's two-component account is also explic-
itly attacked by McDowell and Williams.103 Therefore, his account of thin
and thick concepts should be investigated to ﬁnd a response to the question,
if this attack is justiﬁed. It will be suggested that McDowell's picture of a
non-cognitivist's two component analysis does not ﬁt Hare's conception.
In his The Language of Morals (1952) Hare scrutinizes if value-words can be
taught in the same way as purely non-evaluative words. If someone wanted to
teach a foreign philosopher the meaning of red, he or she could show him a lot
of red things and declare that they are red. In the next step the foreigner could
be shown identical things in diﬀerent colours, e. g. green and red tomatoes,
and the teacher could tell him, `This is red ; That isn't red ', and so on. Could
100Stevenson (1960 [1944], 207).
101He calls those terms, for which the pattern holds, persuasive deﬁnitions because one can
be persuaded to believe one deﬁnition of good or another.
102Stevenson (1960 [1944], 208).
103Williams does not criticise Hare for his two-component approach, but also for his pre-
scriptivism. Williams holds that thick concepts are both world-guided and action-guiding,
whereas Hare's prescriptivist account holds that thick concepts contain a non-evaluative and
a prescriptive element. Williams dislikes the role of the prescriptive element in Hare's ac-
count. He criticizes it for being action-prescribing instead of action-guiding (telling someone
to do something is not having a reason to do something). Cp. Williams (1985, 124-125; 130;
141).
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the same procedure also work for the thin concept good?104 Hare remarks that
a foreigner might not be able to call a tennis racket `good', even if he or she
has been taught the criteria of a good chronometer. But anyone familiar with
the evaluative meaning of good is able to apply good to new classes of things
without knowing its criteria of application. Whereas it is suﬃcient to know
the application criteria of red to fully grasp its meaning, this is diﬀerent in the
case of good:
Suppose that someone starts collecting cacti for the ﬁrst time and puts
one on his mantel-piece  the only cactus in the country. Suppose then
that a friend sees it, and says `I must have one of those'; so he sends
for one from wherever they grow, and puts it on his mantel-piece, and
when his friend comes in, he says `I've got a better cactus than yours'.
But how does he know how to apply the word in this way? He has never
learnt to apply `good' to cacti; he does not even know any criteria for
telling a good cactus from a bad one (for as yet there are non); but he
has learnt to use the word `good', and having learnt that, he can apply
it to any class of objects that he requires to place in order of merit.105
good can be applied to cacti because of its evaluative, or prescriptive mean-
ing.106 The non-evaluative meaning of good cannot be taught in general, only
from case to case107, and it is only secondary to the evaluative meaning because
the evaluative meaning is constant for every entity to which good is applied.
However, a motor-car or a strawberry are recommended for diﬀerent reasons
because the non-evaluative meaning of good is variable with regard to diﬀerent
contexts, and even a competent user of good must permanently learn to apply
it in new situations.108
The non-separationists imply that the non-cognitivists hold that an outsider
 or in our case the foreign philosopher  could learn to apply thick concepts
correctly by being shown genuine features of the world. At least in the case of
good, this thesis is obviously wrong concerning Hare's account.109
104Hare calls good a value-word. Taking thin concepts in consideration is important because
some philosophers hold that there are no thin concepts and even good is at least a bit thick.
105Hare (1961 [1952], 96-97).
106Hare (1963, 27) explains why he uses the term `evaluative meaning' ﬁrst and only later
speaks of `prescriptive meaning'.
107Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 6.2: 95-98).
108Cp. Hare (1963, 7.4: 118-121).
109Further evidence is given in 7.2: Hare supposes that there is a non-evaluative word
that has purely informational, but not commendatory function. Let us suppose that such a
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So far only thin concepts have been discussed. It has been shown that thin
concepts are not vulnerable to the DA. So let us focus on thick concepts. Hare
could still be reproached for having the opinion that an outsider could learn a
thick concept without sharing the evaluative point.
Hare makes some remarks about the thick concepts tidy and industrious110,
and honest and courageous111. On the contrary to thin concepts, the evaluative
meaning is only secondary and the non-evaluative meaning is primary112 which
means that the non-evaluative meaning is constant and the emotive meaning
can vary: "[T]he standard to which the word appeals has become conven-
tional"113. This suggests that the non-evaluative meaning of thick terms is
determinate and that Hare accepts (A1).114
In Sorting Out Ethics (1997), Hare directly addresses the DA and the objection
that one cannot apply a thick term correctly without sharing the evaluative
point:
It is often said that if we had just the descriptive meaning of `kind'
we might, indeed, be able to recognize examples of kind people in the
existing descriptive sense of the word, but would be unable to extend
or extrapolate its use to new and perhaps slightly diﬀerent examples.
This seems to me to be simply false. Suppose that I (. . .) can recognize
the qualities that people call kind and esteem, but do not myself esteem
them. And suppose that some new example is produced of a person who
does not have exactly those qualities, but has qualities very like them,
word exists in the case of good. This new word, which has only non-evaluative meaning, is
baptised doog. According to Hare, the understanding and use of doog can be learned just
like `ordinary' non-evaluative words by means of examples for the application of doog. So,
by being shown examples of doog or dab motor-cars, someone could learn the meaning of
doog and dab motor-cars. But as has been shown this is not possible in the case of good.
Therefore, doog and good must have diﬀerent meanings. Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 116-117).
110Ibid., 121.
111Hare (1963, 24).
112Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 121).
113Ibid.
114This appears also to be suggested, when Hare says that the meaning of kind is to
commend someone according to a certain standard. He adds: "The truth conditions of
statements containing the word [kind] are fairly well known, although admittedly not pre-
cise." (1997, 60). In The Language of Morals Hare says that both non-evaluative concepts
such as red and value-concepts such as good might be non-evaluatively loose, "according to
how rigidly the criteria have been laid down by custom or convention". Yet, the exactness or
looseness is no speciﬁc characteristic of value-words. However  he thinks that "the standard
of goodness, like the meaning of red, is normally something which is public and commonly
accepted" (1961 [1952], 114-115). The sentence `A is a good motor-car' provides informative
knowledge only if the criteria for the application of good are known.
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so that people who do esteem them are likely to esteem that person too,
and call him kind. I can see no diﬃculty in my predicting that this is
what they will do. In order to make this prediction I do not myself have
to esteem the qualities or the person; I only have to be conﬁdent that
they will. I ﬁnd it surprising that people should rely on this very weak
argument.115
Hare simply does not share the assumption that the correct evaluative per-
spective is necessary to come to reliable applications of thick terms. He even
seems to accept (A2).116
Hare accepts (A3) as well because he presupposes universalizability. The DA
appears to disprove Hare's two-component approach.117
Yet, the next section will argue that Hare could be read divergently and that
some of his passages even support this kind of reading.
The Classical Approaches, Disentanglement, and Shapelessness
Hare certainly accepts (A1) and (A3), and the quoted section above suggests
that he accepts (A2), too. Even if Hare himself does not oﬀer an analysis of
thick concepts, the following analysis which is similar to the analysis given by
Roberts (2011) and Blomberg (2007) is likely to ﬁt his theory:118
(S3) x is honest iﬀ x is D and is good in virtue of being D, in which D is some
determinate set of non-evaluative properties.119
This analysis suggests that the application of a thick term is only correct, if the
speaker has knowledge of all non-evaluative properties of honest and takes the
relevant evaluative perspective. The knowledge of the non-evaluative meaning
115Hare (1997, 61).
116Blomberg (2007, 72) concludes that Hare does not understand McDowell's objection.
117This conclusion is often drawn in the literature. Cf. Elstein & Hurka (2009, 520) or
Roberts (2011, 501).
118An even more simple analysis could be imaged which is merely conjunctive. But in
spite of the fact that Hare has no adequate formalization himself, it becomes clear from
his remarks about the thick concepts tidy and industrious that his analysis is not merely
conjunctive, but that actions are evaluated in virtue of having certain properties. Williams
oﬀers a second analysis ("this act is such-and-such a character, and acts of that character
one ought not to do.") to strengthen the prescriptivist aspect. Cp. Williams (1985, 130).
119This is the simplest form of a separationist analysis. Christine Tappolet suggests an
even more simple version: "x is courageous iﬀ x is F and x is good (pro tanto)", but she
rejects this analysis because something can only be good (pro tanto) in virtue of being F.
Cp. Tappolet (2004, 214), Roberts (2011, 497-498), and Elstein & Hurka (2009, 518).
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is not necessary and suﬃcient, in order to say that the application of kind is
correct. The evaluative component is part of the truth-conditions. This read-
ing is at least partly suggested by Hare. In his later book Sorting out Ethics
Hare claims that the evaluative meaning of kind can be disentangled from the
non-evaluative:
Suppose now that someone gives much of his money to relieve distress.
Nearly all of us would say that such a person was kind. But there might
be someone who thought that it was not a characteristic of a good person
to do this. This person could agree that someone did this (namely gave
much of his money to relieve distress), but might condemn his doing this.
He would then not be able to use `kind' as a term of commendation. But
he might well be able to recognize the sort of people that the others called
kind. So he would know well the descriptive meaning they attached to
the word. But he would not use it, because it carried an evaluative
meaning to which he could not subscribe.120
The kind-objector cannot call the person who gives much of his money to relieve
distress `kind' because otherwise he or she could not express her disagreement
in attitude.121 So, even if an outsider might be able to go on from one appli-
cation to another by guessing (and almost always being right), the evaluative
element  although it is only secondary  is of fundamental importance for
thick terms. In literal usage, a thick term cannot be uttered without express-
ing its evaluative point. Hence there must be a diﬀerence between making a
prediction about the application and applying a term correctly or, respectively,
understanding the concept. So, it would not be a proper application, if the
outsider applies the term, but does not know or share its evaluative point.122
According to Dancy, "to reject a concept one has to do more than fail to see
its point; one has to know what its point is and reject it for that reason"123.
Why not say the same about the correct application of a thick term?
In (S3) each side implies the other. Thus, the evaluative meaning is, neces-
120Hare (1997, 60).
121In Freedom and Reason Hare (1963, 187-189) also states that one has to give up using
courageous (or at least to use it in inverted commas), if the referring acts are not willingly
evaluated. courageous is a term of recommendation.
122Blackburn (1981, 166) is also expressing his scepticism about the thesis that a non-
cognitivist is committed to holding that an outsider can predict the application of a thick
concept in new cases without understanding the evaluative reaction.
123Dancy (1995, 269).
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sarily, part of the meaning of honest. An outsider who is not aware of the
implicated evaluation might be able to apply the concept to a correct set of
properties and he or she might even predict its application to new cases, but
the concept would still be non-evaluative to the outsider. Although honest and
honest?124 are extensionally equivalent, it should be clear that the meaning of
honest is, according to (S3), diﬀerent from the meaning of honest? because the
evaluation is part of the truth-conditional content of honest. To really apply
a concept correctly, the speaker must know its meaning and, subsequently, its
evaluative perspective.125 Therefore, it is conceivable that Hare would agree
that the evaluative element is much more dependent on the non-evaluative
because it is part of the thick concept's meaning. Consequently, (A2) must be
wrong and the claim of the DA does not succeed.
Alexander Miller makes a similar point in reference to the Fregean distinction
between sense and reference. He writes that "the non-cognitivist can concede
that for the evaluative predicate E there is no non-evaluative predicate E?
with the same sense as E, such that mastery of the sense of E? (ex hypothesi
available to an outsider) will confer mastery of the sense of E"126. Further, he
continues, "[b]ut he [the non-cognitivist] can point out that it is possible for
E and E? to denote the same kind (property, function, extension) even though
they are non-equivalent in sense."127
To conclude: Classical approaches are not necessarily defeated by the DA. But
Hare's account which holds (A1) cannot avoid the force of the shapelessness
thesis, whereas Stevenson's approach even avoids it by postulating vagueness-
ness with regard to the non-evaluative content.
2.2.5 Current Separationist Approaches To The Thick
The thoughts in the preceding section have suggested that a two-component
analyst is not necessarily committed to holding that the non-evaluative com-
ponent of a thick concept must have the same extension as the thick concept.
Instead, it could be claimed that the non-evaluative component only partly
124honest? denotes the non-evaluative counterpart of honest.
125Even Roberts concedes that Hare has never maintained that evaluation does not deter-
mine the extension for thick concepts at all. Cp. Roberts (2013a, 5).
126Miller (2003, 251).
127Ibid.
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determines the extension of the concept.128 So, there must not only be some
speciﬁc non-evaluative features, but it must also be judged as being good in
virtue of having these non-evaluative features to fall under a thick concept.129
A separationist account must give up (A1) and (A2) to avoid the disentangle-
ment argument and the shapelessness thesis, but it may still hold (A3).
Stephan Burton even gives up (A3) by denying universalizability. Answer-
ing McDowell's and Williams' objections against disentangling, Burton inter-
prets thick concepts as "basically evaluations with added descriptive quali-
ﬁcations"130, instead of non-evaluative with added evaluative meaning. He
suggests the following analysis:
(S4) `x is F ' means `(pro tanto) good/bad in virtue of some particular instance
of X, Y , Z, etc.'131
Whether x is F cannot be codiﬁed with respect to the non-evaluative be-
cause only some particular instances of X, Y , and Z are F . Burton rejects
the shapefulness of the thick, and also universalizability because being X, Y ,
and Z is not suﬃcient to be F . Even most realizations of X, Y , and Z are not
F . He concludes:
In sum, this analysis of thick evaluative concepts maintains a strict dis-
tinction between description and evaluation while allowing for the fact
that one may not be able correctly to apply such concepts by means of
purely descriptive criteria alone.132
If an item has features X, Y , and Z, this item is not necessarily F . Only if
the item falls under a thick concept, then it has some of the features X, Y ,
and Z.
In contrast to Burton, Elstein & Hurka give up (A1) and (A2), but keep up
universalizability.133 They accept the key premise of the DA that the extension
128Gibbard (1992, 269-270) emphasizes this point by saying that a thick concept is partly
determined by its properties and partly by ways things feel. Blackburn (2013, 122) oﬀers a
concise example how to understand what it means that the evaluative partly determines the
extension of a thick concept: "So, for instance, you do not call someone `pig-headed' unless
you wish to imply a criticism of them, and this fact goes some way into determining who is
so-called."
129Cp. Roberts (2011, 498) and Tappolet (2004, 214-215).
130Burton (1992, 30).
131Ibid., 31.
132Ibid.
133They say that any non-cognitivist is committed to separationism (reductionism), but
that separationists may also be cognitivists (e. g. Sidgewick and Moore). Their account
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of a thick concept cannot be determined without making some evaluations134.
They assume universalizability135, but deny that it is possible to name an
exact and ﬁnite set of properties in virtue of which these properties fall un-
der a thick concept. Assuming some kind of continuum, they hold that thin
concepts, which are indeterminate regarding their non-evaluative properties,
are at the one extreme and that fully non-evaluatively determinate concepts
(e. g. pejoratives) are at the other extreme. Thick concepts are somewhere
in between because they assume that the non-evaluative component of thick
concepts "only speciﬁes good- or right-making properties to some degree but
not completely"136. The analysis only puts restrictions on the extension of the
non-evaluative properties. So it is possible to claim that the use of a thick
concept that is associated with properties outside a speciﬁc area is a misuse of
the concept.
In their paper, they develop two patterns of a reductive analyses of thick con-
cepts. Their ﬁrst analysis is the following:
(S5.1) `x is distributively just' means137 `x is good, and there are properties
X,Y , and Z (not speciﬁed) of general type A (speciﬁed), such that x has
X,Y , and Z, and X,Y , and Z make anything that has them good.'138
This analysis escapes the DA because evaluating judges are required to deter-
mine which unspeciﬁed properties X, Y , and Z of type A are the good-making
properties that determine the extension of the thick concept completely.139
And therefore, it would be impossible for an outsider to imitate the use of
a thick concept without sharing the evaluative point because (S5.1) excludes
that it is ever possible to give a non-evaluatively equivalent term to the non-
evaluative properties.
As an illustration of this analysis, Elstein & Hurka discuss the concept just. A
defender of the analysis (S3), who is committed to holding a fully determinate
two-component analysis, must say that a desert-theorist and an egalitarian use
diﬀerent concepts, and therefore, cannot have a genuine disagreement because
is neutral, that is, is may be held by cognitivits as well as non-cognitivists. Cp. Elstein &
Hurka (2009, 517).
134Cp. ibid., 519-520.
135Cp. ibid., 521.
136Ibid.
137Roberts (2011, 501) equate `means' with the biconditional `if and only if'.
138Elstein & Hurka (2009, 521).
139Cp. ibid.
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they talk past each other. Elstein & Hurka want to avoid that consequence.
In their analysis both the desert-theorist and the egalitarian make use of the
same concept, but they disagree about the application of that concept. The
egalitarian and the desert-theorist disagree about the good-making properties
of distributions. In order to specify these properties of distributions and to
know the actual extension of the term, "we must know which properties in fact
make distributions good"140. Since their account is supposed to be impartial
concerning non-cognitivism and cognitivism, they avoid to substantiate this
assumption.
The ﬁrst pattern can be used for many thick concepts, but not all can be anal-
ysed in this way. For virtue-concepts such as courageous and kindly, which are
central in the debate about disentangling, no two-part analysis is available: A
three-part analysis is needed. Contrary to the ﬁrst pattern, which involves a
global evaluation, that is, an evaluation which governs the whole concept, the
second pattern involves an embedded evaluation that is embedded within the
`non-evaluative' content. This second analysis is the following:
(S5.2) `x is courageous' means `x is good, and x involves an agent accepting harm
or the risk of harm for himself for the sake of goods greater than the evil
of that harm, where this property makes any act that has it good.'141
In this pattern, the global evaluation `x is good' is supplemented with the
embedded evaluation in the second conjunct. Elstein & Hurka state that "we
cannot determine the extension of the thick concept without determining the
extension of the embedded thin one, that is, without making some evalua-
tions"142. So, in the case of courageous, one has to know what to count as
`good goals', in order to specify the deﬁnition. They admit, however, that
there can be disagreement about the good goals as well.
An opponent might protest that there are no or only few thick concepts that
have an analysis as in the ﬁrst pattern and that there are no non-evaluative
properties that can be inserted in the placeholders. 143 According to Kirchin,
honest may be deﬁned as `providing information to others in a way that al-
lows them to know or achieve what one thinks they wish to know or achieve'.
Here, allow is itself evaluative in some way. So, the thickness goes all the way
140Elstein & Hurka (2009, 522).
141Ibid., 526.
142Ibid.
143This point is made by Harcourt & Thomas (2013, 32).
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down.144
Comparing the analysis of courageous given by Elstein & Hurka with the anal-
ysis given by Tappolet, the man, who wants to save the child from drowning,
though he cannot swim, is not courageous because the goods are not greater
than the harm. Thus, the analysis of Elstein & Hurka appears convincing in
many cases.
Critique on Elstein & Hurka's Account
It is commonly accepted that the analyses (S4) and (S5) escape the DA be-
cause the non-evaluative content only partly determines the extension of the
concept, whereas it is much more diﬃcult to decide whether these approaches
also escape the shapelessness thesis. Roberts (2011) holds that if irreduction-
ism (non-separationism) is true, then thick concepts are shapeless. This does
not exclude the possibility that separationism could be true, even if shape-
lessness was true. So, at least according to Roberts, the shapelessness-thesis
does not necessarily defeat separationism. But Roberts seems to want to imply
that Elstein & Hurka's account is false because of the shapelessness of thick
concepts.145 Indeed, Elstein & Hurka's analysis does not presuppose that thick
concepts are shapeful because the good- or bad-making properties are unspeci-
ﬁed properties of some speciﬁed sort. This speciﬁed sort is very general, it only
restricts the extension of the thick concept. Besides, Roberts herself maintains:
If thick concepts are irreducibly thick, however, this is nonetheless con-
sistent with there being some rough but not extensionally equivalent
purely nonevaluative characterization of the sort of things the concept
applies to. (. . .) The defender of irreducible thickness could thus say
`x is tactful if x is of nonevaluative sort T,' where `T' means `having
something to do with having or showing concern for other feelings.'146
So, at least a rough characterisation is available. Being of sort `T', in this
formula, is even suﬃcient for being tactful. But, as she points out, something
can be of sort `T' and, nevertheless, not be tactful because it also depends on
evaluation.147 Roberts' and Elstein & Hurka's analyses appear not to be much
144Cp. Kirchin (2013, 74).
145Cp. Roberts (2011, 507-508).
146Ibid., 508.
147Roberts emphasizes that in some cases not even a rough characterisation must be avail-
able. That would mean that not every thick concept is shapeless, only those, for which no
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diﬀerent from each other  with regard to the restriction of the thick concept's
extension. At least, there seems to be no big diﬀerence in stating that one can
only give a `rough characterisation' or that one can give a `speciﬁed charac-
terisation that needs to be supplemented by further features to give it a more
concrete analysis'.
Either Roberts must concede that such a rough characterization cannot be
given148 or else she has to drop the thesis that the shapelessness-thesis threat-
ens the analysis of Elstein & Hurka.
Dancy is also aware of this problem. He asks, "how can we have description
without descriptive meaning?", and adds "[t]his seems an almost insoluble
puzzle"149. His answer is that the domain of the application of a thick concept
can be speciﬁed, but this speciﬁcation is not the non-evaluative meaning of
the thick concept: "Locating a thick concept by specifying the domain of its
operation is diﬀerent from giving even a vague speciﬁcation of its content."150
This seems to imply that Dancy proposes that thick concepts do not have se-
mantic structure. This, however, has diﬃcult consequential claims which are
hard to defend as will be shown in section 5.6.
2.2.6 The Evaluative Element
Comparing the list of theoretical requirements from the introduction with the
knowledge gained in this section, there are still some open questions concerning
separationism. First, it must be noticed that the speciﬁcation of the evaluative
element depends on the metaethical theory that the respective proponents of
the theory favour. Exempli gratia, the evaluative element in Hare's theory is
not purely evaluative, but rather prescriptive, whereas the evaluative element
in Elstein & Hurka's analyses is literally evaluative because it can be reduced to
good and bad. Expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, how-
ever, say that thick judgements are informative because of their non-evaluative
component, but also express attitudes (Blackburn), or warranted feelings (Gib-
bard). Expressing an attitude or a feeling includes an evaluation because if
someone expresses his or her attitude or feelings, then a pro- or con point
rough characterisation is available.
148Christine Tappolet (2004, 215), e. g., doubts that all instances of a thick concept fall
under a speciﬁcation, whatever that rough speciﬁcation is.
149Dancy (1995, 276-277).
150Ibid., 277. Cf. also Dancy (2015, 46-47).
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is also conveyed. Thus, both the expressivist's assumption that thick judge-
ments express an attitude or a feeling, and the prescriptivist's supposition
that thick judgements are action-guiding are stronger assumptions than that
thick judgements convey bare evaluations. This assumption is stronger be-
cause a thick judgement could convey an evaluation, even if the speaker does
not have the corresponding attitude or feeling, or if the speaker's own judge-
ment does not motivate him or her to act respectively. This diﬀerence is not
suﬃciently emphasised in the debate, although it has severe consequences. To
say that the evaluative element has prescriptive character is a way stronger
assumption than to say that it is solely evaluative and reducible to some thin
concepts. If the evaluative element is said to be prescriptive, a robust link
to action-guidingness is assumed. A prescriptivist account must explain how
judgements such as Football is brutal, but I don't mean to imply that you should
stop playing it seems acceptable, although this suggests that the link between
a thick judgement and action-guidingness is not as robust as prescriptivism
might suggest.
Another open question is how separationist accounts deal with evaluative ﬂex-
ibility, although Kirchin holds that evaluative ﬂexibility is less a problem for
separationists than for non-separationists because the thin concept is easily
added to the non-evaluative.151 Yet, this does not explain in a satisfactory
way in which contexts or circumstances a pro- or con-evaluation should be
added. Further, not much is said about objectionable concepts. One way to
accommodate them is to claim that they are evaluative, thus convey a pro- or
con point, but someone who objects against the evaluative point cannot use
them for this reason.152
151Cp. Kirchin (2013, 13).
152This strategy is for instance adopted by Gibbard (1992, 279), or as outlined above also
by Hare (1997, 60).
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Chapter 3
Pragmatic Views
The main interest of semantic views are questions about reference. Pragmatic
views are interested in the linguistic use of value concepts, however, less at-
tention is devoted to questions concerning reference. In contrast to semantic
views, pragmatic views are not prevalent in the debate about the thick, al-
though in recent years there have been a few attempts to establish pragmatic
hybrid-expressivist accounts.1 Pragmatic views hold that the evaluation con-
veyed by an utterance containing a thick concept is only pragmatically linked
to the semantic content. Hence, it is concluded that thick concepts are not
that important for an ethical theory as is often maintained.2 The connection
between thick concepts and evaluation consists in mimics or gestures, accord-
ing to Blackburn, and it consists in conversational mechanisms, according to
Väyrynen. The motivation for a pragmatic account is based on evaluative
ﬂexibility which pragmatic theories can easily accommodate.
3.1 `There are no Thick Concepts'-View
In Through Thick and Thin Simon Blackburn holds that it depends on the
context whether a thick concept expresses a positive, a neutral, or even a
negative attitude: "We can easily hear any of these terms, except perhaps `good
sense' negatively."3 He points out that there are only few lexical conventions of
the standard attitude which we typically connect with a certain thick concept
1Chapter 6 will deal in more detail with these accounts.
2Cp. Blackburn (1992, 285) and Väyrynen (2013, 2-3).
3Blackburn (1992, 286).
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and that evaluation must not be part of its meaning.4 Vice versa `neutral'
concepts diﬀerent from thick concepts can be used to express condemnation
or praise. If the speaker expresses an attitude depends on "pitch, length and
loudness of parts of an utterance" which "subserve diﬀerence of stress, accent
and rhythm"5. He illustrates this thesis with the following example:
Suppose, for instance, that the word `gross' is correctly entered in the
dictionary as applied to fat people and derog.. The fattist can get by
without it, by using the word `fat' instead, with the right kind of sneery
tone.6
The `fattist' (someone who dislikes fat people) can use the neutral term `fat'
with a sneer.7 The evaluative meaning of the concepts can be changed by
intonation. The attitude expressed by a thick concept can therefore not be
codiﬁed because the attitude is not part of the dictionary meaning.8
As Blackburn is an expressivist, his account of the thick is expressivist in spirit.
In chapter 2.2.6 attention was caught of the diﬀerence between evaluation and
attitude. Blackburn does not seem to distinguish evaluating from having an
attitude.9 He mixes `good/bad' with `condemnation/praisal'.
Further, Blackburn points out that "dictionaries typically have no term sig-
nalling a convention of approval"10 concerning thick concepts. Thus, his ac-
count is not about evaluation, but about the attitude which are commonly
connected with the use of thick concepts. But, to evaluate something pos-
itively/negatively does not presuppose to have a certain attitude. Actions
might be called `cruel', `just', or `fair' without sincerely meaning it. As a
typical example, consider a wife asking her husband whether he likes her new
dress. The husband really dislikes the colour, but does not want to upset his
wife. Therefore, he calls her dress `beautiful'. The husband might even say
this with enthusiasm in his voice, so that his wife beliefs him. By calling her
dress beautiful he evaluates it positively without having a praiseful attitude.
4He refers to Kant who has shown that virtues such as courage or temperance can turn
to bad. Cp. Blackburn (1992, 287).
5Ibid., 287-288.
6Ibid., 290.
7Blackburn denotes this with `fat↓'.
8Cp. ibid., 287.
9It could even be claimed that evaluation and the having of an attitude are often mixed
in the whole debate about the thick. Dancy speaks about evaluating in one breath along
with having an attitude throughout his paper. Cp. Dancy (1995).
10Blackburn (1992, 286).
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So, one might agree with Blackburn that attitudes are not lexically signalled
concerning thick concepts and  as a consequence  do not belong to the mean-
ing of thick concepts but still hold that the evaluation is lexically signalled. In
chapter 6.3, the point will be picked up again.
3.2 `Evaluation isn't a Matter of Semantics'-View
In his book The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty Pekka Väyrynen holds a prag-
matic view. His main thesis is that thick concepts are not `inherently eval-
uative' in their meaning of content, but that evaluation is a matter of the
pragmatics of their use. Although semantic views are widely held, there is
a lack of evidence that this is the correct picture because it is commonly as-
sumed that evaluation is part of the semantic content, but it has never been
proven explicitly.11 Väyrynen wants to give evidence in favour of a pragmatic
view. A pragmatic theory meets the challenge of Grice's razor not to make
unnecessary semantic postulations.12 Further, he states that thick concepts
lack philosophical signiﬁcance, if the pragmatic view is true. According to
him, thick concepts do not have signiﬁcant consequences in the (meta-)ethical
debate because the evaluation conveyed is only a matter of pragmatics. Only
if thick concepts are inherently evaluative, they may for instance have an im-
pact on the fact-value distinction and on issues concerning the objectivity of
value judgements. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, they lack
this impact.13
The central question in his book is the Evaluation Question (EQ):
(EQ) How are thick terms and concepts related to the evaluations they may be
used to convey?14
Väyrynen admits that thick concepts are related to evaluation, but he main-
tains that this relation can be explained without having to assume that thick
concepts are inherently evaluative. His view is also supposed to explain why
non-evaluative terms, such as athletic or painful, can carry evaluations in cer-
tain circumstances.
11Cp. Kyle (2013, 1).
12Grice's Razor (1967, 47-48) is a principle of parsimony that postulates conversational
implicatures rather than semantic implicatures, or semantic presuppositions.
13Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 2-3).
14Ibid., 7.
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Methodologically, Väyrynen focuses on linguistic tests and investigates how
thick terms are typically used in everyday contexts. With the use of linguis-
tic tests and especially by calling attention to `objectionable' thick concepts
(especially lewd, lascivious, and chaste), he wants to scrutinise various (most
often semantic) views about the thick.
3.3 Linguistic Prerequisites
Väyrynen uses linguistic methods and data to explain certain linguistic phe-
nomena of thick evaluations. In order to oﬀer a proper understanding of his
theses, ﬁrst of all the linguistic prerequisites necessary to understand his ar-
guments are outlined. The reader who is familiar with these linguistic notions
is free to skip this section.15 It is started with all kinds of implications of
language use.
3.3.1 Semantic Entailments
Some advocates of the semantic view claim that evaluations are semantic, con-
ceptual, or analytical entailments of utterances containing thick evaluations.16
This means that value utterances somehow semantically entail evaluations. A
semantic entailment is closely connected to logical implications. If a proposi-
tion semantically entails another proposition, this entailment is not cancelable.
For instance, (2) is a semantic entailment of (1). Yet, (3), in which (2) is can-
celled, is contradictory17.
(1) Max is a bachelor.
(2) Max is unmarried.
(3) ] Max is a bachelor, but he is married.
3.3.2 Conversational Implicatures
Implicatures are diﬀerent from logical implications. The theory of conversa-
tional implicatures is established by Paul Grice in his William-James-Lectures
15This study does not presuppose that any philosopher is familiar with the diﬀerent kinds
of entailments.
16Cp. Kyle (2013).
17Contradictory or infelicitous statements are usually marked by ]
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on Logic and Conversation in 1967.18 Grice introduces the term implicature
as opposed to implication. What is meant with implicature is best explained
by an example from Grice19:
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, Max, who started
working in a bank:
A: How is Max getting on in his job?
B: Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison
yet.
B says that Max has not been to prison yet, but what he actually implicates
or means is distinct from what he says. B suggests that Max might "yield to
the temptation provided by his occupation", or that his "colleagues are really
very unpleasant and treacherous people, and so forth"20.
There is a diﬀerence between what is said (expression meaning) and what is
meant (speaker's meaning). This diﬀerence leads to the semantics and the
pragmatics of an utterance. Hence a general question is how it is possible
that speakers mean more than they actually say, and that they understand
one another, although what is meant often diﬀers considerably from what is
actually said. Grice's assumption is that there is a general principle which all
participants follow non intentionally:21
Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
The Cooperative Principle is complemented by four more speciﬁc conversa-
tional maxims under which submaxims fall:
Maxim of Quantity:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the cur-
rent purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
18Published in Grice (1989).
19Cp. Grice (1967, 24).
20Ibid.
21Cp. ibid., 26-27.
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1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.
Grice assumes "that talkers will in general (ceteris paribus and in the absence
of indication to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles pre-
scribe"22 because participants in talk exchanges have a common interest or
goal which can be reached only if all participants act rationally. For instance,
a communication could not be made reasonably, if all participants of a talk
assumed that everyone wants to mislead one another by not telling the truth
or talking in riddles. So, assuming that all speakers follow the Cooperative
Principle unconsciously, the hearer infers that something else must be meant
by the speaker if one of the maxims is violated. Consequently, implicatures
often arise when a maxim is violated. In the initial example, B patently vio-
lates the maxim `Be relevant'. Hence, A must infer that B means something
diﬀerent. Yet, implicatures may not only arise by a violation of the maxims
as the following example suggests:
(4) A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner.23
According to Grice, B made the conversational implicature (5):
(5) The garage is open and has petrol to sell.
This example shows that a maxim need not necessarily be violated to give
rise to a conversational implicature, it can also arise by exploitation of the
corresponding maxim. The utterance of B suggests that the garage is open. If
B believed the garage to be closed, B would violate the maxim of relevance.
22Grice (1967, 28).
23Ibid., 32.
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Thus, A must infer that B implicates that (5) is true.
Conversational implicatures can arise by four mechanisms: i) violating a maxim,
ii) opting out from the operation of the maxim and of the Cooperative Princi-
ple, iii) facing a clash between two or more maxims, or iv) ﬂouting a maxim.24
Properties of Conversational Implicatures
Grice identiﬁes a range of features of implicatures which can be tested easily.
The most important features will be illustrated with help of example (6).25
(6) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner.
↪→ You can get food in the supermarket.
If `You can get food in the supermarket' is a conversational implicature, it
has the following features:
(a) Calculability Paul said that there is a supermarket around the corner.
Anne assumes that Paul follows the Cooperative Principle and the corre-
sponding maxims. Paul could only have said that there is a supermarket
around the corner, if he believed it to be open. Otherwise he would have
violated the maxim of relevance. Since Paul did not behave as if he at-
tempted to trick Anne, she concludes that she must be able to get food
in the supermarket for Paul's utterance to be cooperative. This shows
that the conversational implicature is calculable.
(b) Variability Conversational implicatures are variable, that is, the same
utterance might give rise to another implicature in a diﬀerent context.
(7) Anne: I have forgotten to take a toothbrush.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner.
6↪→ You can get food in the supermarket.
Paul's utterance has diﬀerent implicatures depending on context. Thus,
implicatures are variable with regard to the context in which they are
uttered.
24Grice (1967, 30). For further examples of implicatures and maxims cf. Grice (1967,
31-37).
25(6) is similar to the example in Finkbeiner (2015, 27-28).
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(c) Cancelability Furthermore, conversational implicatures are cancelable,
that is, the speaker may cancel the implicature without making the ut-
terance contradictory:
(8) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner, but I'm not sure if
it is open.
6↪→ You can get food in the supermarket.
By adding I'm not sure if it is open the implicature is cancelled, but
Paul's utterance is not contradictory.
(d) Reinforceability and Non-Detachability Conversational implicatures
can be reinforced without being redundant.26 Paul could also answer
There is a supermarket around the corner where you can get food.
Last but not least conversational implicatures are non-detachable. Grice
says that the conversational implicature content is connected to what is
said and is not implicated by the the way it is said. So, "it is not pos-
sible to ﬁnd another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks
the implicature in question"27. This means that Paul's utterance does
not depend on its exact wording. He could have said There is a food
store around the corner, which would have given rise to the exact same
implicature.
3.3.3 Conventional Implicatures
Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are part of the
conventional meaning of an expression and belong to semantics. According
to Christopher Potts, "conventional implicatures (. . .) are entailed by lexical
and constructional meanings but distinct from the regular at-issue content of a
sentence"28. Grice's example for a conventional implicature is the following29:
1) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.
2) His being brave is a consequence of his being an Englishman.
3) He is an Englishman and he is brave.
26Cp. Potts (2007a, 669-670).
27Grice (1967, 39).
28Potts (2014, 27).
29Grice (1967, 25).
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1) and 3) are logically equivalent. Yet, the consequence implied by therefore
is a conventional implicature. Grice's introduces `conventional implicatures',
but misses to deﬁne them properly.30 A minimal deﬁnition of conventional
implicatures is oﬀered by Potts:
Meaning p is a conventional implicature of phrase S if, and only if:
1. p is a conventional (endcoded) property of a lexical item or con-
struction in S
2. p is entailed by S
3. p's truth or falsity has no eﬀect on the at-issue content of S31
One further characteristic is that the alleged conventional implicature content
is hard to articulate in propositional content and that it is context-dependent.32
There might be more conventional implicatures than Grice might have as-
sumed. Inter alia Potts lists the following: Adverbs (almost, already, even,
barely, only, still, and yet), additive particles (too, also, either), anaphoric
epithets (the jerk), connectives (but, nevertheless, so, therefore), diminutives,
implicative verbs (bother, conscend, continue, deign, fail, manage, stop), racial
epithets, swears, and subordinating conjunctions (although, despite (the fact
that), even though).33
Properties of Conventional Implicatures
(a) Non-Cancelability and Non-Reinforceability Since conventional im-
plicatures are part of the semantic meaning of an utterance, they cannot
be cancelled (9) nor reinforced (10) without sounding redundant.
(9) ] Lisa is poor but pretty. I don't mean to imply that there is a
contrast between being poor and being pretty.
(10) ] Lisa is poor but pretty, and there is a contrast between being poor
and being pretty.34
30Cf. also Potts (2014, 28).
31Ibid., 28.
32Cp. ibid., 30.
33For an extended list cp. ibid., 29.
34Kyle (2013, 8) points out that many linguists are reluctant to generalize that conven-
tional implicatures are not reinforceable. For instance, Smith has not arrived yet, but he
is expected and Even Bill passed the test, and he was among the least likely both appear
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(b) Detachability The conventional implicature content does not aﬀect the
truth-conditions of `Lisa is poor but pretty'. Thus, conventional impli-
catures are detachable.
(11) Lisa is poor and pretty.
6↪→ There is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.
d) Behaviour under Projection Conventional implicature content does
not belong to the at-issue-content of an utterance, and therefore, projects
under entailment-cancelling operators such as negations, questions, pos-
sibility modals, or antecedents of conditionals, as is illustrated in (12):
(12) a. Lisa isn't poor but pretty.
b. Is Lisa poor but pretty?
c. Lisa might be poor but pretty.
d. If Lisa is poor but pretty, she may be happy anyway.
↪→ There is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.
3.3.4 Presuppositions
A presupposition (nlat. praesupponere `presuppose') is an assumption which
a speaker makes in a conversation without speaking it out loud. Suppose, A
tells B Julia stopped reading `The Lord of the Rings'. A assumes that Julia
has previously read The Lord of the Rings, but does not say it explicitly. Fur-
thermore, A assumes B to know that Julia has previously read this book. So,
Julia has previously read `The Lord of the Rings' is a presupposition of Julia
has stopped reading `The Lord of the Rings'. Roberts Stalnaker deﬁnes presup-
positions as "the propositions whose truth he [=the speaker] takes for granted
(. . .). They are the background assumptions that may be used without being
spoken  sometimes without being noticed"35.
Terms as in (a)-(f)36 give rise to a presupposition and are called presupposi-
tiontriggers :
(a) Aspectual verbs
Julia stopped reading The Lord of the Rings. ( Julia previously read The
felicitous. In footnote 53 of this chapter, it will be illustrated that there are cases with
evaluative utterances containing thick concepts, where the reinforcement is also felicitous.
35Stalnaker (1973, 447).
36These are the most common triggers for presuppositions. However, the list is not com-
plete.
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Lord of the Rings.)
(b) Factive verbs
Peter regrets not having said goodbye. ( Peter didn't say goodbye.)
(c) Deﬁnite noun phrases
The Bundeskanzler is old. ( There is a Bundeskanzler.)
(d) Implicative verbs
John managed to leave. ( John tried to leave)
(e) Temporal clauses.
Since I know what you have done, I can't sleep. ( I know what you have
done.)
(f) Counterfactual conditionals
If I didn't know what you did, I could still sleep. ( I know what you did.)
Properties of Presuppositions
Presuppositions behave similar to conventional implicatures in many respects:
Presuppositions are also non-cancelable and non-reinforceable.37 A further
central feature of presuppositions is their behaviour under projection. Julia
stopped reading `The Lord of the Rings' has at least the following implications:
(i) Julia stopped reading The Lord of the Rings, and (ii) Julia previously read
The Lord of the Rings. (ii) but not (i) is constant under entailment-cancelling
operators in b.-e.:
(14) a. Julia stopped reading The Lord of the Rings.
b. Did Julia stop reading The Lord of the Rings?
c. Julia didn't stop reading The Lord of the Rings.
d. If Julia stopped reading The Lord of the Rings, she surely started read-
ing another book.
e. Julia might have stopped reading The Lord of the Rings.
The projective behaviour distinguishes presuppositions and conventional im-
plicatures from semantic entailments and conversational implicatures which
37Presuppositions are not reinforceable without being redundant: ] Julia stopped reading
`The Lord of the Rings'. Indeed, she read `The Lord of the Rings'. In unembedded contexts,
cancellation of presuppositions is infelicitous: ] Julia has stopped reading `The Lord of the
Rings', but I don't want to imply that she previously read `The Lord of the Rings'.
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both do not project (e. g. under negation):
(15) a. Max is a strong man.
⇒ Max is strong.
b. Max is not a strong man.
6⇒ Max is strong.
Max is strong is a semantic entailment of a., but it is not a semantic en-
tailment of b..
Unlike conventional implicatures and presuppositions, conversational implica-
tures do not project. Compare (16):
(16) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There isn't a supermarket around the corner.
6↪→ You can get food in the supermarket.
Pragmatic and Semantic Theories about Presuppositions
Potts diﬀerentiates semantic from pragmatic presuppositions.38 The latter are
"purely speaker actions" whereas the former "trace to conventional aspects of
the meanings of speciﬁc words and constructions"39.
Pragmatic presuppositions The theory of pragmatic presuppositions was
developed by Robert Stalnaker (1973; 1974), Lauri Karttunen (1974), David
Lewis (1979) and Irene Heim (1983). A common feature of pragmatic pre-
suppositions is that they are not presupposed by propositions but rather by
the speakers themselves. According to Stalnaker, for instance, "the basic pre-
supposition relation is not between propositions or sentences, but between a
person and a proposition"40. The speaker takes the truth of the presuppo-
sitions for granted. Hence they belong to the background assumptions of a
conversation. Mutual public knowledge, or norms of turn-taking in dialogues
belong to these background assumptions.41 Pragmatic presuppositions cannot
be traced to speciﬁc words or phrases. Rather, they arise from the context
and the expectations of the participants in talks.42
38It is a major issue within presupposition theory whether presuppositions are pragmatic
or semantic or whether both kinds occur. This study wants to stay neutral on this question.
39Potts (2014, 3).
40Stalnaker (1973, 447).
41Cp. Potts (2014, 3).
42Cp. ibid.
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Semantic presuppositions Semantic (conventional, lexical) presuppositions
are independent from context and therefore part of the encoded meaning of
speciﬁc words and constructions (presupposition triggers).43
The standard deﬁnition of semantic presuppositions is based on the constance
of presuppositions under negation44:
Semantic presupposition A proposition p presupposes semantically
another proposition q iﬀ:
(a) whenever p is true, q is also true;
(b) whenever p is false, q is true.
The relation of semantic presuppositions can then be identiﬁed with the logical
implication which suggests following deﬁnition:
A proposition ϕ presupposes (semantically) another proposition ψ iﬀ:
(a) ϕ implies semantically ψ (that is ϕ⇒ ψ), and
(b) ¬ϕ implies semantically ψ (that is ¬ϕ⇒ ψ).45
This deﬁnition poses a problem for the bivalence of logic because the falseness
of the presupposition ψ is excluded. If ψ were false, ϕ would (according to
modus tollens) be true and false at the same time which is a contradiction to
the law of the excluded middle. This, however, is inappropriate because some
presuppositions can indeed be false. For instance,
a. The King of France is bald.
b. There exists a King of France.
b. is a presupposition of a., but b. is false. As a consequence, the classical bi-
valent logic must either be rejected, or a many-valued logic must be introduced
which drops the law of excluded middle.46
3.4 Väyrynen's Theory of the Thick
After having set out the prerequisites, it is time to reiterate the data Väyrynen
employed to establish his pragmatic view.
43Cp. ibid., 4.
44Cp. Levinson (1989 [1983], 175).
45Cp. ibid.
46Instead there could be three truth values: true, false, neither-true-nor-false. Cp. ibid.,
175-6.
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3.4.1 The Data
Behaviour of Global T-Evaluations under Projection
Väyrynen calls value judgements containing thick concepts `T-utterances' or
`T-sentences', and evaluations conveyed by these `T-evaluations'. His ﬁrst ar-
gument against the semantic view is that T-evaluations cannot be semantic
entailments because they satisfy projection.
Imagine, some lewd -users47 are talking about Madonna's upcoming show. It
is likely that one utters (1):
(1) Madonna's stage show is lewd.
According to Väyrynen, this implicates something like (2) or (3):
(2) Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad
in a certain way.48
(3) If Madonna's show involves overt display of sexuality that transgresses con-
ventional boundaries, then it is bad in a certain way.
(2) and (3) both survive under projection:
(3) a. Is Madonna's stage show lewd?
b. Madonna's show might be lewd.
c. {Maybe/it is possible that} Madonna's show will be lewd.
d. {Presumably/probably} Madonna's show will be lewd.
e. If Madonna's show is lewd, the tabloid press will go nuts.49
Since (2) and (3) satisﬁes projection, Väyrynen draws two conclusions: i)
Global T-evaluations belong to the background information, are not part of
the main point of a T-utterance, and cannot be semantic entailments. ii) These
data will not refute the semantic view at all because semantic presuppositions
and conventional implicatures also satisfy projection.
47People who are somehow prudes and evaluate things as lewd are typically called lewd -
users. People who reject the valued embodied in lewd are called lewd -objectors. This
nomenclature is owed to Brent Kyle (2013, 13).
48The non-evaluative description Madonna's stage show is an overt display of sexuality
that transgresses conventional boundaries is only an approximation because there a no an-
alytically suﬃcient application conditions to express thick concepts. Cp. Väyrynen (2013,
58-59).
49All of them are uttered by a lewd -user.
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The conclusion that the global T-evaluation is an implication of a T-utterance
other than a semantic entailment also explains the behaviour of global T-
evaluations when embedded in the complements of I'm sorry to hear. Compare
(4) and (5):
(4) I'm sorry to hear that Israel and Palestine aren't managing to form a
two-state solution.
⇒ Isreal and Palestine aren't managing to form a two-state solution.
 Israel and Palestine are trying to form a two-state solution.
(5) I'm sorry to hear that Madonna's show is lewd.
⇒ Madonna's show is an overt display of sexuality that transgresses con-
ventional boundaries.
 Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are
bad in a certain way.
In both (4) and (5) the speaker is neither sorry to hear that Israel and Pales-
tine are trying to form a two-state solution nor that overt displays of sexuality
that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in a certain way. They are
not sorry for the backgrounded information, but for the information which is
at-issue (the at-issue content is marked by ⇒.).
Global T-Evaluations and Deniability
Suppose, a lewd -objector enters the conversation about Madonna's upcoming
show. The objector cannot show his or her disagreement about the negative
evaluation of overt displays of sexuality by directly denying (1) (Madonna's
stage show isn't lewd) because this would imply  at least in a conversation
among lewd -users  that he or she is thinking that Madonna's stage show is
not sexually explicit enough to count as lewd. Instead, the lewd -user must an-
swer something like (6) which means that he or she must deny the background
information:
(6) a. Nuh uh, things are in no way bad just for involving overt sexual display
that transgresses conventional boundaries.
b. No it isn't, its involving explicit sexual display doesn't mean that it's
bad in any way.50
50Väyrynen (2013, 70).
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c. Hey, wait a minute! Things are in no way bad just for involving overt
sexual display that transgresses conventional boundaries.
d. Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it's not bad in any way
distinctive of explicit sexual display.
e. Whether or not Madonna's show involves explicit sexual display, it would
be in no way bad for that.
Väyrynen expresses his doubts if 6a. and 6b. are felicitous. Instead, he
thinks that 6d. and 6e. are better replies to the statement that Madonna's
stage show is lewd. It will be discussed in more detail in the last chapter of
the book which reply might be best.
The lewd -objector negates the evaluation which belongs somehow to the back-
ground information of lewd -users. A similar behaviour is shown by presuppo-
sitions. Compare (7), where Anne communicates that Julia stopped reading
The Lord of the Rings :
(7) Anne: Julia stopped reading The Lord of the Rings.
Paul: No, she didn't.
Frederick: No, impossible. Julia has never read The Lord of the Rings,
just now she's reading Lord of the Flies. You must be mistaken
about the title.
Paul saw Julia reading The Lord of the Rings just before the conversation
started, so he protests that Julia did not stop reading The Lord of the Rings
by directly denying the at-issue-content. Frederick, Julia's room-mate, is ab-
solutely sure that Julia never read The Lord of the Rings. In c. he protests
against the presupposition that Julia previously read The Lord of the Rings
by indirectly negating the presuppositional content.
Evaluative content as well as presuppositional content cannot be directly de-
nied. This is further evidence that global T-evaluations must somehow be-
long to the background information and cannot be semantic entailments of
T-utterances.51
Väyrynen aims to undermine the semantic view as a whole and hence he may
have missed to see that these ﬁndings highly suggest that the separationist
analyses considered in the previous chapter cannot be correct because they
implicitly share the assumption that evaluative content is at-issue-content.
For instance, consider the following analysis of lewd in the way of (S3):
51Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 67).
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(8) `x is lewd' means `x involves overt displays of sexuality that transgress
conventional boundaries and x is bad in a certain way in virtue of involving
overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries'.52
(¬8) `x is not lewd' means `x does not involve overt displays of sexuality that
transgress conventional boundaries or x is not bad in virtue of involving
overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries'.
As (¬8) illustrates both the non-evaluation and the evaluative content can
be directly denied. Yet, this is implausible concerning the given data. If the
evaluation belongs to the semantic content of an T-utterance, then it must be
secondary not-at-issue content.
Global T-Evaluations, Cancelability, Reinforceability and Detacha-
bility
In this section, it is tested whether T-evaluations are cancelable, reinforceable
and detachable.
• Cancelability and Reinforceability Consider (9) and (10):
(9) ] Madonna's stage show is lewd, but I don't mean to
imply that it is bad in any distinctive way for its overt
and transgressive sexual display.
(10) ≡ (1) ∧ (2) ] Madonna's stage show is lewd, and indeed it is bad in
a distinctive way because of its explicit sexual display.
If uttered in a conversation among lewd -users, it would be odd and in-
felicitous to utter (9) because there is an obvious contradiction and,
likewise, it would be odd to utter a conjunct of (1) and (2) because it
sounds redundant. Therefore, T-utterances are neither cancelable nor
reinforceable.53
52The same argument could be made against the indeterminate analysis of Elstein &
Hurka, and against the analysis of Burton.
53Cp. Väyrnen (2013, 101; 104). Kyle (2013, 3) also holds that T-evaluations are neither
reinforceable nor cancelable. His conclusion is that T-evaluations cannot be conversational
nor conventional implicatures. As was shown in footnote 34, he states that sometimes con-
ventional implicatures are reinforceable, but that T-evaluations always are non-reinforceable.
But imagine, Nancy's fellow workers are discussing whether Nancy is good in a way because
she is dishonest, aggressive, unkind, and the like. The colleagues all agree that she has the
listed character traits. But then one of them realizes: `Nancy is generous, and giving more
money than is expected is good in a way.' So, in this context, the utterance is not redun-
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• Non-Detachability? Unlike pejoratives, thick concepts are said to be
non-detachable because there is no neutral counterpart coextensive with
the thick term.54 But this move might seem ad-hoc because the non-
evaluative component of pejoratives can also not always be detached.
For instance, the non-evaluative component of Pavarotti is a wop can be
detached, whereas the non-evaluative component of Pavarotti is a jerk
is not detachable.55 This diﬀerence is reﬂected in value terms, as well.
The non-evaluative component in Madonna's stage show is lewd can be
detached more easily than in Stealing is wrong. One possible way to
cope with the poverty of our language is to ﬁnd non-evaluative equiva-
lent non-natural linguistic phrases.56 Another strategy is to claim that
thick terms can be used in inverted commas to indicate that one does not
share the evaluative perspective. E. g., the utterance Madonna's stage
show is "lewd" indicates that the speaker does not evaluate the display
of sexuality negatively, although the use of lewd assumes a negative eval-
uation.57
T-Evaluations and Presuppositions
So far, Väyrynen's tests have suggested that T-evaluations are neither seman-
tic entailments nor conversational implicatures. One remaining possibility is
that T-evaluations are presuppositions. This possibility is likely to be true
because T-evaluations share all kind of diﬀerent features that are also fea-
tures of presuppositions: T-evaluations are noncancelable, non-reinforceable
and non-detachable58. Let us call a view which holds that T-evaluations are
presuppositions the presupposition view.59
dant, too. This shows that such utterances need not always be redundant. In both cases
(T-evaluations and typical examples of conventional implicatures as but), there are examples
where a reinforcement is not redundant and, hence, acceptable. Thus, Kyle's objection fails
to show that T-utterances cannot be conventional implicatures.
54For a deﬁnition of non-evaluative detachability cp. Hay (2011, 455).
55Cp. ibid., 454-455.
56This strategy is often adopted: Hare's (1961 [1952]) doog for good (see chapter 2.2.4),
Kaplan's (1978) dthat-operator, or Copp's (2009) "has the property that would be ascribed
by saying it is `morally wrong'" for morally wrong.
57This strategy is defended by Copp (2001, 35-36). For a discussion cf. also Hay (2011,
454-8).
58For instance, consider Julia gave up reading `The Lord of the Rings'. This has the same
presupposition.
59Väyrynen diﬀerentiates between the semantic presupposition and the pragmatic presup-
position view. Since he rejects both of them, we do not go into detail what diﬀerentiates
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Väyrynen rejects the presupposition view, ﬁrstly, because of the `triggering
problem', and, secondly, because of the `appropriateness problem'. With re-
gard to the former, an advocate of the presupposition view needs to explain
why thick concepts work as presupposition triggers, especially since they do
not fall into any category of typical triggers. Regarding the latter problem,
the deﬁnition of presuppositional content as background information of con-
versations which is taken for granted is not appropriate for objectionable thick
terms. According to Väyrynen, a lewd-user should not call things lewd in the
presence of lewd -objectors because in such situations, the T-evaluation that
explicit sexual display is bad in any way is not in the common ground of the
conversation.60 The last chapter will comment on these arguments.
T-Evaluations and Conventional Implicatures
Though the tests suggest that T-evaluations cannot be conversational implica-
tures, they might still be conventional implicatures. If they were conventional
implicatures, they would belong to the semantic meaning of a T-utterance.
Väyrynen's most important argument against the CVI (ConVentional Implicature)
view is that (11) seems to be acceptable, even to lewd-objectors, whereas (12)
seems to be generally unacceptable.61
(11) Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it would be in no way
bad for that.
(12) ] Whether or not life is short but sweet, there would be no contrast be-
tween life being short and life being sweet.
This argument and the `whether or not'-test are uncommented unless chap-
ter 6 where arguments for a presupposition and especially for a conventional
implicature view will be discussed.
3.4.2 Väyrynen's Conclusions from the Data
Väyrynen claims to have proven that T-evaluations i) satisfy projection, are
ii) non-cancelable, iii) non-detachable, iv) not triggered by thick terms and
v) not shared by participants in conversations. i)-iii) are presuppositional
those views and only illustrate his arguments against the presupposition view. Gibbard's
(1992) account sometimes appears to be a presupposition view.
60Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 112-113).
61Cp. ibid., 104.
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features, iv) and v) diﬀerentiates T-evaluations from presuppositions. i)-iii)
determine that T-evaluations somehow belong to the background information
of the conversation or not to the `main point'. Therefore, T-evaluations are
`not-at-issue' in a talk which means that they are not under scope of negation,
questions, modals, etc. The not-at-issueness explains the behaviour under
projection. Entailment cancelling operators do not eﬀect implications that are
not at-issue. The notion at-issueness is deﬁned by Mandy Simons et al. (2010).
Not-at-issueness applies to all kinds of implications that satisfy projection.
Implicatures, presuppositions or other types of implications are not-at-issue,
as well.
But the observation that T-evaluations are not-at-issue in talks is no defeating
argument for a pragmatic view. Therefore, Väyrynen additionally states that
a further characteristic of T-evaluations is that they arise conversationally
and not semantically (conventionally). The following quote summarizes his
pragmatic view:
Global T-evaluations are implications of T-utterances which are nor-
mally "not at issue" in their literal use in normal contexts, and which
arise conversationally.62
3.5 Critical Appraisal
In her review of The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty, Roberts praises Väyrynen's
study:
This book articulates and defends a novel view of thick concepts ex-
tremely carefully and rigorously. It is an excellent example of how
method and theory from other areas, in this case philosophy of lan-
guage and linguistics, can be brought fruitfully to bear on debates in
metaethics. And it takes on a topic with a deserved reputation for being
obscure and performs much needed clariﬁcations. In short, The Lewd,
the Rude and the Nasty makes considerable advances not only in the
thick concepts debate but in metaethics and metanormative philosophy
in general.63
62Väyrynen (2013, 122).
63Roberts (2015, 910).
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It must be agreed with everything Roberts says about the book wherefore
Väyrynen's theses are dwelt on for so long. Especially, Väyrynen's discovery
that T-evaluations are not at-issue in talks is fundamentally important. But
it is appropriate to also have reservations about his theory. Firstly, it might
be irritating to say that T-evaluations are not conversational implicatures,
but some other kind of conversational implicating "we don't have a dedicated
name for"64. It might be more promising to support a pragmatic presupposi-
tion view, especially since the data supports such a view.
Secondly, Väyrynen admits that the relation between thick terms and con-
cepts and global evaluation is "robust"65. To explain that robust relationship
semantically is relatively simple because it follows immediately from the `in-
herently evaluative' claim. A pragmatic view, however, needs to explain why
thick terms are linked to certain evaluations in normal contexts although T-
evaluations only arise conversationally. For instance, why the use of cruel
usually implicates a negative evaluation. Väyrynen's argument is the follow-
ing:
T-evaluations won't need any speciﬁc contextual features to arise even
if they are pragmatic implications insofar as they are suﬃciently `gen-
eralized'. What the Pragmatic View needs for this explanation to get
going is that T-evaluations won't need to be worked out from scratch in
each particular context but can be detected on the basis of the general
knowledge that the licensed users of a given thick term or concept widely
and robustly share certain evaluations. What Parochiality [that is, the
application of a (paradigmatic) thick term or concept tends to derive
its point or interest from the term's or concept's relation to the evalua-
tive perspective reﬂected in its application] suggests is precisely that the
mutual acceptance of T-evaluations is this kind of a robust fact about T-
utterances. In that case T-evaluations can become routinely associated
with the linguistic expressions that trigger them in all ordinary contexts,
and thereby part of the default interpretation of T-utterances, even if
they are pragmatic. But that is what it is for an utterance implication
to be generalized.66
The pattern of usage of a thick term and concept becomes common knowledge
64Väyrynen (2013, 123).
65Ibid., 128.
66ibid., 130-131.
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and the evaluation can become a `mutually accepted generalized pragmatic
implication'. If someone uses lewd without holding the evaluative point 
negative evaluation of the sexually explicit  the user violates conversational
norms. But `generalized' appears to be just another term for `conventionalized'
 at least the diﬀerence is only marginal.
Väyrynen often maintains that the Pragmatic View oﬀers a simpler explana-
tion.67 Yet, it might, nevertheless, be simpler to posit that thick concepts are
inherently evaluative than trying to explain this robust relation between thick
concepts and evaluation in such a somehow cumbersome way.
67Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 149-150; 157-158).
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Chapter 4
Theories of Concepts
Investigating theories about purely non-evaluative concepts is helpful, to oﬀer
some new perspectives and gain new insights into the debate about value con-
cepts, particularly since thick concepts are said to have some non-evaluative
content. As will become clear, there are arguments against certain types of
conceptual analyses which can be brought forward against some analyses of
thick concepts as well. Therefore, it is of great value to take those theories
into perspective. The method of this chapter will mainly be exegetical.1
The debate about thick concepts is primarily a philosophical debate. Thus,
questions concerning conceptual content are the most interesting in the de-
bate. Besides from these questions, theories of concepts also deal with concept
acquisition, categorization, and the productivity of concepts.2
Both philosophers and psychologists have been interested in theories about
concepts. Accordingly, the development of these theories is often dialectical:
Arguments against the ﬁrst philosophic theory of the empiricists, the so-called
classical theory, are mainly psychological. On the basis of this criticism, sev-
eral further psychological theories originated: prototype theories according to
which concepts are analysable in terms of typical features or exemplars, and
theory-theories which hold that concepts are constituents of theories. These
theories, however, have been reattacked by philosophers, especially by Saul
Kripke and Hilary Putnam. Since all the theories stating that concepts have
semantic structures failed, a radical alternative view (conceptual atomism)
1For a more detailed summary cf. Laurence & Margolis (1999), `Concepts,' by Earl, The
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Smith & Medin (1981).
2According to Susan Carey, psychology students are more interested in the categorization
behaviour and concept acquisition, whereas philosophy students name the accounting for
reference as their main interest. Cp. Carey (2009, 489).
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emerged which, likewise, has its own weaknesses. Consequently, two-factor
theories were developed that try to combine philosophical and psychological
perspectives and eliminate the weaknesses of both.
4.1 The Classical Theory of Concepts
The classical theory3 was the prevailing view up to the second half of the twen-
tieth century before it was challenged in the 1950s in philosophy.4 Proponents
of this view hold that for any (lexical) concept there are speciﬁed conditions
for their application which are (i) singly necessary and (ii) jointly suﬃcient.5
The conjunction of the listed necessary conditions form a suﬃcient condition
for belonging to a certain concept. If all those necessary conditions which are
jointly suﬃcient are listed up, one gets an analysis of the corresponding con-
cept.6 Every mathematical or logical deﬁnition is an example for this view.
For instance, an equilateral triangle can be deﬁned as follows:
i) A triangle is an equilateral triangle if and only if all three sides of the triangle
are equal.
Equivalently, it could also be said:
ii) A triangle is an equilateral triangle if and only if all three angles of the triangle
are equal.
The condition that all three sides of the triangle must be equal is a neces-
sary (and suﬃcient) condition for a triangle to be equilateral. A triangle must
have three equal angels or sides to be an equilateral triangle. And vice versa
an equilateral triangle necessarily has three equal angels or sides.
3Laurence & Margolis (1999, 9-10) emphasize that it is an oversimpliﬁcation to speak of
the classical theory because there is a family of theories defending the classical view. Yet,
they have the idea in common that concepts have deﬁnitional structure. What we call the
classical theory is an idealized theory.
4The classical theory has a long history. For instance, Laurence and Margolis (1999,
9-10) ascribe a classical theory to Plato, or John Locke.
5These conditions are often structural features, but even functional features are not
necessarily excluded. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 26-27).
6There are further conditions for an analysis: It must not be circular, which means that
the analysis must not contain the concept itself in the list of the necessary conditions, and
it must not be more complex than the concept to be analysed. Cp. `Concepts,' by Earl,
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Another example, which is often recited, is the concept of being a bachelor.7
A bachelor is not married, male, and an adult. These three features form a
set of representations of bachelor. So, if a man is called a bachelor, it can be
derived that he is unmarried. The concept bachelor analytically entails the
concept unmarried. Earl sums up: "A classical analysis is then a proposition
that speciﬁes such a logical constitution by specifying individually necessary
and jointly suﬃcient conditions."8 These propositions are sometimes said to
be deﬁning ones.
A classical theory holds most concepts to be complex and hence composed
of simpler representations. These simpler representations might be equally
composed of even simpler representations, or they are primitive undeﬁneable
representations. According to the classical view, there is a process of reference
determination: The reference of the deﬁning concept is determined by the ref-
erence of its deﬁnition. However, the process of reference determination must
come to an end and some concepts must be reached which form the primitive
base.9 According to the empiricists (e. g., John Locke), these concepts of the
primitive base are derived from sensations or perceptions.10.
According to the classical theory, a concept can be acquired by assembling the
necessary and suﬃcient features. Laurence & Margolis compare the process of
categorization with "a process of checking to see if the features that are part
of a concept are satisﬁed by the item being categorized"11. To know a concept
is to know all necessary and suﬃcient features belonging to the concept. E.
g., A is B's `sister' if and only if A is B's `female sibling'. In the process of
concept acquisition, a child might think that a girl can only be a sister if she
is an elder female sibling because the child may only have an elder sister. By
experience, the concept sister may then be adapted in so far as sisters might
be younger as well.
The classical view is very attractive: In philosophy, the truth of sentences is un-
ambiguously determined by the concepts involved in the sentence and the the-
7Cp. `Concepts,' by Earl, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or Laurence & Mar-
golis (1999).
8`Concepts,' by Earl, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
9Cp. Pitt (1999, 140).
10David Pitt, defender of the thesis that concepts have deﬁnitional structure, argues that
there can be an alternative account to the empiricist theory to explain the primitive base.
He (ibid., 143) suggests that "one might, alternatively, take the operative relation between
primitive (hence any) terms and their extensions to be instantiation: primitive terms refer
to the things that instantiate the properties expressed by their associated concepts".
11Laurence & Margolis (1999, 11).
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sis that some concepts are semantically structured has been used to explicate
the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements12. In logic, classi-
cal analyses are used to explain non-logical inferences13 and subset-relations
between concepts14, and in linguistics and psychology, it oﬀers explanation to
language acquisition and categorization.15 Further, the classical theory accom-
modates synonymy (bachelor and unmarried man), redundancy (male bachelor),
and autonomy (male and female).16
4.1.1 Classical Analyses of Thick Concepts
A classical analysis of a purely non-evaluative concept, such as equilateral tri-
angle, is as follows:
(CA) x is an equilateral triangle ⇔ All three sides of x are equal.
The condition that all tree sides of the triangle x must be equal is both nec-
essary and suﬃcient for x to be an equilateral triangle. The analyses of thick
concepts are often formulated equally as if they were deﬁnable in terms of
the classical theory. For instance, consider the following reductive analyses of
tactful suggested by Roberts:
(RA1) x is tactful ⇔ x is T and is good in virtue of being T .
(RA2) x is tactful ⇔ x is good, and there are properties X,Y , and Z (not
speciﬁed) of general type A (speciﬁed), such that x has X,Y , and Z, and
X,Y , and Z make anything that has them good.17
Comparing (CA) with these two analyses, it becomes clear that they both
assume the classical theory to be correct. Both analyses suggest that a per-
son's being good and having certain properties that make anything that has
them good are necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions for x to be tactful.
Consequently, these types of analysis face at least the objections aiming against
12Cp. Pitt (1999, 139), or Putnam (1979 [1975], 72-77).
13The classical theory can explain why it is valid to infer Petra died from John killed Petra
by deﬁning kill as cause to die.
14If a concept x is a subset of a concept y, then the deﬁning properties of x must be a
subset of the deﬁning properties of y. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 24).
15Cp. Pitt (1999, 139).
16Cp. ibid., 149-150.
17Cp. Roberts (2011, 496; 507).
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the classical theory. These objections will be topic in the following section.
4.1.2 Intuitive Criticism against the Classical Theory
Two objections against the classical theory arise immediately: First, according
to its assumptions, it should be possible to classify any entity in the world and
to assign a concept to it. But there are ambiguous cases where it is not clear
whether a thing belongs to a certain concept or not.18 For instance, it may
not be clear whether carpets are furniture, belts are cloths, or tomatoes are
fruits.19 A proponent of the classical view can object in two ways. Firstly, he
or she might respond that the deﬁnitions are unambiguous, but the deﬁning
necessary and suﬃcient conditions are not. For instance, an animal must be
both black and a cat to fulﬁl the criteria of the concept black cat. However,
it may not be unambiguously decidable whether a cat that looks dark-grey in
the sun and black in the shadow is actually black. Secondly, the advocate of
the classical theory might reply that, e. g., the analysis of the concept furniture
is not unambiguously deﬁned, if in doubt about carpets being furniture.
A second objection against the classical theory is that many concepts lack def-
initions. When it comes to philosophical concepts, such as knowledge, justice,
or free will, a deﬁnition in terms of suﬃcient and jointly necessary conditions
is either not available or has at least not been detected in the past.20 This ob-
jection has not only been risen against philosophical concepts, but also against
everyday concepts. For instance, Smith & Medin try to come up with a deﬁ-
nition of cup:
(1) concrete object, (2) concave, (3) can hold liquids, (4) has a handle,
and (5) can be used to drink hot liquid out of21
But these properties seem not to be true of every cup. Teacups used in Chinese
restaurants typically do not have a handle, but are still called `cups'. If we
18Putnam (1979 [1975], 23) calls such entities `fuzzy'.
19Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 29-30).
20Laurence & Margolis (1999, 14) refer to this as Plato's problem. So-called Neoclassical
theories have tried to avoid Plato's problem by giving up the assumption that the conditions
are necessary and jointly suﬃcient. Instead, they only hold that for every complex concept
C, C has individually necessary conditions for something to fall into its extension. The idea
of the neoclassical theory is that concepts only have partial deﬁnitions, i. e. there has to be
at least a necessary core that has to be fulﬁlled by any instance of a given concept. Though
neoclassical theories avoid Plato's problem, they face other problems. Cp. Laurence &
Margolis (1999, 54-59).
21Smith & Medin (1981, 2).
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give up (4), the deﬁnition also holds for certain kinds of Thermos bottles.22
A similar objection against the classical theory is Wittgenstein's thesis that
there are not even features which are common to all instances of a concept,
but rather family resemblances, such as similarities or relationships.23
4.1.3 Transferring the Critique to Thick Concepts
The second objection (Plato's Problem) might remind the reader on the shape-
lessness thesis according to which thick concepts are shapeless with regard to
the non-evaluative. In the section about shapelessness, it was concluded that
the thesis is likely to be true. Shapelessness, however, does not seem to be a
particular property of thick concepts because non-evaluative concepts  espe-
cially philosophically interesting ones  are also criticized for being shapeless
because of their lack of deﬁnitional structure. Also adequate classical analyses
can often not be found. Thereupon, a defender of the shapelessness thesis
might object that the evaluative component within the thick concept guaran-
tees that thick concepts have deﬁnitional structure. Although the conditions
expressed in non-evaluative terms are not suﬃcient for x to be tactful, jointly
with the evaluative condition it could become suﬃcient and necessary. How-
ever, this move only seems to postpone the issue: The non-evaluative compo-
nent would still have to be fully determinate which is against the assumption
of shapelessness.
One conclusion drawn from the discussion of the classical theory is that the
shapelessness thesis appears highly overestimated in the debate about thick
concepts because shapelessness is no particular characteristic of thick concepts.
22Although there are concepts that lack deﬁnitional structure, the classical theory might
still be true of scientiﬁc concepts, as Rudolf Carnap suggests: "In the case of many words,
speciﬁcally in the case of the overwhelming majority of scientiﬁc words, it is possible to
specify their meaning by reduction to other words (`constitution,' deﬁnition). E. g. "`arthro-
podes' are animals with segmented bodies and jointed legs." Thereby the above-mentioned
question for the elementary sentence of the word `arthopode,' that is for the sentence form
`the thing x is an arthropode,' is answered: it has been stipulated that a sentence of this
form is deducible from premises of the form `x is an animal,' `x has a segmented body,' `x
has jointed legs,' and that conversely each of these sentences is deducible from the former
sentence. By means of these stipulations about deducibility (in other words: about the
truth-condition, about the method of veriﬁcation, about the meaning) of the elementary
sentence about `arthropode' the meaning of the word `arthopode' is ﬁxed. In this way every
word of the language is reduced to other words and ﬁnally to the words which occur in the
so-called `observation sentences' or `protocal sentences.' It is through this reduction that
the word acquires its meaning." Carnap (1932, 62-63).
23Cp. Wittgenstein (1978 [1953], no66).
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4.1.4 The Psychologists' Objections
Contrary to the arguments against the classical theory in section 4.1.2, the
following objections do not refute the classical theory because of the lack of
deﬁnitional structure, but because psychological studies showed that deﬁni-
tions of concepts are irrelevant to psychological processes concerning our use
of concepts.
A ﬁrst objection is that even if some concepts have deﬁnitional structure, then
the deﬁnitional structure is not psychological real.24 In several experiments it
has been proven that the psychological complexity of lexical concepts does not
depend on their deﬁnitional complexity. For instance, Jerry and Janet Dean
Fodor, and M. F. Garrett (henceforth FFG) name four types of negatives in
semantic representation: explicitly negative free morpheme (e. g. not), bound
morphemes (e. g. in-, un-, im-), implicitly negative morphemes (e. g. any,
much, give a damn, etc.), and pure deﬁnitional negatives (PDNs) which have
a negation as part of their deﬁnitions (e. g. bachelor).25 Stating that "if it can
be shown that their [=the PDNs'] linguistic representations do not contain
`negative', that would argue for the unreality of deﬁnitions"26 they want to
show that PDNs do not contain negatives. For the tests sentences containing
one of the four types of negatives are used. Then the test compares explicit
negative vs. morphological negative, explicit negative vs. implicit negative,
and explicit negative vs. PDNs. For instance, the following two sentences are
compared:
1) If practically all of the men in the room are not married, then few of the men
in the room have wives.
2) If practically all of the men in the room are bachelors, then few of the men
in the room have wives.
Then the reaction time to a correct evaluation is measured to draw conclu-
sions regarding the validity of the working hypothesis.27 As most interesting
result FFG found out that "the diﬀerence between PDNs and explicit negatives
was signiﬁcantly greater than the diﬀerence between explicit negatives and ei-
ther implicit or morphological negatives"28. They conclude that the result
24Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 17) and Gonsalves (1988).
25Cp. FFG (1975, 520-521).
26Ibid., 521.
27Cp. ibid.
28FFG (1975, 522).
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suggests "that PDNs do not act as though they contain a negative element in
their linguistic representation; and therefore, that PDNs are not semantically
analyzed at any level of linguistic representation"29. These results militate
against the classical view.30
The major attack on the classical theory, however, has to do with its theory
of categorization.31 In researches psychologists proved Ludwig Wittgenstein's
claim that concepts have family resemblance structure which is one of the most
inﬂuential arguments against classical theories.32
In a series of experiments Eleanor Rosch found out that some members of
certain categories are more representative than others. But, according to the
classical theory, any member of a category33 is an equally good member be-
cause all members are instantiations of the necessary and suﬃcient properties.
In studies, however, it has been proven that strawberries are less typical mem-
bers of the category nut than peanuts or walnuts. Thus strawberries are not
as typical members as peanuts.
In a further experiment Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn Mervis wanted to ﬁnd out
the characteristics and attributes which people typically connect with diﬀer-
ent kinds of everyday objects. Subjects had a minute and a half to list as
many characteristics as they could think of. Then, the researchers listed all
attributes mentioned by the subjects and credited them  depending on how
often they were mentioned. As result, they found out that there were only
few, or even none properties that were attributed to all members of a super-
ordinate category.34 So, there is hardly a common attribute of all members
of the categories.35 Additionally, they had the subjects rate the items on a 7-
point scale to ﬁnd out which items are most representative of a category. They
found out that "the degree to which a given member possessed attributes in
common with other members was highly correlated with the degree to which it
29Ibid.
30Gonsalves (1988) gives the results a diﬀerent kind of explanation and does not agree
with the conclusion of FFG.
31There is a series of experiments which cannot exhaustively be discussed. For a summary
of these experiments cf. Smith & Medin (1981).
32Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 24).
33The terms `category' and `concepts' are used synonymously in this chapter.
34Superordinate categories were furniture, vehicle, fruit, weapon, vegetable, and clothing.
Examples of all categories were chair, car, orange, gun, peas, and pants. For the whole list
cf. Rosch & Mervis (1975).
35For two third of the categories, there was one combining item; for the rest, there was
none. When there was a common feature, it was no deﬁning feature (e. g. "is edible", or
"has four legs"). Cp. ibid.
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was rated prototypical (representative) of the category name"36. For instance,
robins possess quite many attributes that other birds also have, and therefore,
robins are more representative members of the category bird, whereas chickens
are less representative members.
A further objection against classical analyses can be derived from the mean re-
action time for veriﬁcation of category membership. Subjects were told either
a superordinate category (e. g. musical instrument, or a basic level category
(e. g. guitar), or a subordinate category (e. g. classical guitar). Then, they
were shown pictures of objects and had to signal whether they think that the
object on the picture belongs to the heard category. Rosch et al. found out
that the mean reaction time was the fastest when the subjects heard basic
level category names before. Superordinates and subordinates did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from each other.37
These results pose problems for the classical theory because proponents of
the classical theory cannot give an adequate explanation to these results. All
members of certain categories should be equally representative and hence they
should share the same necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions. Hence it
should not be possible that an item is a "better" or "worse" member of a cat-
egory.38
From these decimating results new views have emerged which will be discussed
in the next sections.39
4.2 Prototype Views
Prototype theories were developed in order to give an explanation of the psy-
chological data which have been collected during the 1970s.40 There are two
36Ibid., 584.
37Rosch et al. (1976).
38Smith & Medin discuss a classical-view model for simple typicality eﬀects. Roughly, it
states that typical members have fewer features than atypical ones. They deﬁne typicality as
an "inverse measure of complexity". Therefore, more time is needed to compare the features
of atypical members. However, they reject the complexity model because it cannot explain
why it takes no longer for an atypical probe to be conﬁrmed that it is not a member of
category than it takes for a typical probe. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 36).
39Smith & Medin (1981, 60) discuss further developments of the classical theory, but
conclude that all of them still face insoluble problems.
40An important book by Edward Smith and Douglas Medin (1981) summarizes the psy-
chological response to the empiricist's theory and diﬀerent varieties of prototype views.
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main kinds of prototype theories: exemplar41, and probabilistic, or statistical
views. Exemplar views hold that concepts are represented by their exem-
plars.42 The core idea behind all probabilistic theories is that the extension
of a concept cannot be given in necessary and suﬃcient conditions, but that
the structure of a concept rather encodes a probabilistic analysis of the fea-
tures which members of the concept tendentiously have.43 In contrast to the
classical view, a member of a concept may have a feature, but the member
does not necessarily have it because it is only maintained that members have
the encoded features with statistical certainty. An item might be classiﬁed as
belonging to a concept, although it only has a suﬃcient number of features be-
cause not all features are weighted equally. For instance, penguins or chickens
are birds, although they cannot ﬂy. The ability to ﬂy is a feature tendentiously
subscribed to birds, yet, a member of the bird-category need not necessarily
have this ability. This also explains why some birds are classiﬁed more easily
than other birds: They have more of the features subscribed to a category.
The following ﬁgure exempliﬁes these considerations including features with
their statistical appearance:44
41For a detailed discussion of the exemplar view cf. Smith & Medin (1981). In this study,
it is paid little attention to the exemplar view.
42Cp. ibid., 143.
43Smith & Medin (1981) emphasize that not all proponents of a prototype theory have
used features to describe concepts, but favoured dimensional or holistic patterns instead.
However, both the dimensional and the holistic approach raise serious doubts. The dimen-
sional approach is closely linked to the assumption of a metric space in which all items are
somehow represented by a point in the metric space. As will be shown, Tversky (1977)
doubts that the corresponding metric distance function is a proper function to measure the
similarity between two represented items. The holistic approach cannot make sense to talk
of templates for philosophical concepts such as justice or truth.
44This tabular is taken from Smith & Medin (1981, 63).
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Fi
Xi Robin Chicken Bird Animal
F1 moves moves moves moves
P(F1|X1)=1.0 P(F1|X2)=1.0 P(F1|X3)=1.0 P(F1|X4)=1.0
F2 winged winged winged
P(F2|X1)=1.0 P(F2|X2)=1.0 P(F2|X3)=1.0
F3 feathered feathered feathered
P(F3|X1)=1.0 P(F3|X2)=1.0 P(F3|X3)=1.0
F4 ﬂies ﬂies
P(F4|X1)=1.0 P(F4|X3)=0.8
F5 walks walks
P(F5|X2)=1.0 P(F5|X4)=0.7
F6 sings sings
P(F6|X1)=0.9 P(F6|X3)=0.6
F7 small size small size
P(F7|X1)=0.7 P(F7|X3)=0.5
F8 medium size
P(F8|X2)=0.7
F9 large size
P(F9|X4)=0.5
These results also explain the process of learning a concept. A young child
who encounters a robin, ﬁrst learns its features F1, F2, F3, F4, F6, and F7. Then
the child may learn that a chicken which has features F1, F2, F3, F5, and F8 is
also a bird. F1, F2, and F3 which have occurred in both cases are more likely
to become representatives of the concept bird.
The most attractive aspect of the prototype theory is its treatment of cate-
gorization.45 Categorization in prototype theories is modelled as a similarity
comparison process as proposed by Amos Tversky in Features of Similarity46,
45Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 29).
46Tversky develops a new set-theoretical approach to similarity which supersedes geo-
metric models of similarity that have been rejected. The most common geometric model
deﬁnes similarity as a metric distance function, δ, that assigns to every tuple of points,
(a, b) a non-negative number. δ fulﬁls minimality (i.e. δ(a, b) ≥ δ(a, a) = 0), symmetry
(i.e. δ(a, b) = δ(b, a)), and the triangle inequality (i.e. δ(a, c) ≥ δ(a, b) + δ(b, c)). Tversky
lists empirical evidence against all of the three axioms. For instance, from the axiom of
symmetry follows that statements of the form a is like b and b is like a should be judged
true equally. So if someone judges a is like b to be true he or she should likewise b is like
a judge to be true. However, there is empirical evidence that most commonly either a is
like b is more often judged to be true than b is like a or the other way around. Therefore,
the geometric model is said to be insuﬃcient to give a proper explanation to appearances
of similarity. Cp. Tversky (1977, 328). Tversky's (1977) new approach describes similar-
ity as a feature-matching process. Given a set ∆ = {a, b, c, . . .} of objects under study.
Further, ∆ is represented by a set of features or attributes containing A,B,C, . . .. The
set of features A,B,C . . . refers to the objects a, b, c, . . .. Then, the similarity, s, of a and
b is deﬁned as s(a, b) := F (A ∩ B,A \ B,B \ A), where F is the matching-function that
measures the cardinality of common and distinctive features. F has three arguments: the
common features of both A and B, the features that belong to A but not to B and those
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or as a process described by an accumulator model :
To determine that the instance is a member of the concept of fruit,
one proceeds as follows: One ﬁrst ﬁnds a feature match between two
representations (either directly if the concept's feature is perceptual,
or via identiﬁcation features if the concept's feature is abstract), next
takes the weight of the matching feature and puts it in an accumulator
or counter, and then repeats this process over other features until the
counter reaches some criterion value.47
The attractiveness of prototype theories lays in its appropriateness for the
explanation of the problems the classical theory is faced with. For instance,
typicality eﬀects can be suﬃciently explained. Typical members are catego-
rized faster than atypical ones because they have more common features shared
with their parent concept. A simple explanation can be given to the ﬁnding
that typical features of concepts are listed more often than atypical ones: The
features of the prototype are listed ﬁrst. However, prototype theories face
numerous problems as well.
belonging to B but not to A. (The similarity function s has two features: s is mono-
tone (That is: A ∩ C ⊂ A ∩ B,A \ B ⊂ A \ C,B \ A ⊂ C \ A ⇒ s(a, c) ≤ s(a, b))
and is independent. That is, the ordering of the joint eﬀect of any two components
is independent of the ﬁxed level of the third factor.)According to Tversky, similarity is
a proximity relation, but there are other proximity relations such as prototypicality or
representativeness. So let P (a,Λ) be the degree of prototypicality of an object a with
regard to a category Λ which has cardinality n. The prototypicality P is deﬁned as
P (a,Λ) = pn(λ
∑n
i=1 f(A ∩ Bi) −
∑n
i=1 f(A \ Bi) −
∑n
i=1 f(Bi \ A))), where Bi ∈ Λ
∀i = {1, . . . , n}. The constant λ determines the weights of the features and pn describes
the eﬀect of category size on prototypicality. A member a of a category is a prototype, if
it maximizes P (a,Λ), that is its features are highly common to the features of the mem-
bers of the category and a has only few features that diﬀer from the features of the other
members. Tversky points out that Rosch and her collaborators have missed the importance
of family resemblance which has been detected by Wittgenstein (1978 [1953]). Family re-
semblance can be understood as a network of similarity relations between various members
of a category. To measure the degree of family resemblance, Tversky suggests the following
deﬁnition: R(Λ) = pn(λ
∑n
i,j=1 f(Ai ∩Bi)−
∑n
i,j=1 f(Ai \Bi)−
∑n
i,j=1 f(Bi \Ai))). What
distinguishes this deﬁnition from the deﬁnition of prototypicality is that the summations are
over all elements ai, bj of category Λ. A member of a category is not only compared to all
other members, but any member is compared to all other members of that category. Family
resemblance equals the average similarity between all members of Λ. Cp. Tversky (1977,
348).
47Smith & Medin (1981, 65).
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4.2.1 Problems for the Prototype Theory
Sharon Armstrong, Lila and Henry Gleitman (1983) revised three of the ex-
periments of Rosch and her collaborators. They question the thesis that con-
cepts are non-deﬁnitional, if the responses to exemplars of certain concepts are
graded. If this thesis was true  they argue  it would also be true (by contra-
position) that responses to exemplars of concepts must not be graded, if these
concepts were deﬁnitional. When repeating the experiments of Rosch and
her collaborators, Armstrong et al. did not only include everyday categories
of objects (furniture, vehicle, fruit, weapon, vegetable, and clothing), but also
well-deﬁned categories such as even, and odd number, female, or plane geome-
try ﬁgure. These well-deﬁned concepts ought not  according to the assumed
hypothesis  yield graded responses. Yet, the results showed otherwise. The
psychologists found out that both prototype and well-deﬁned categories yield
the same result. Subjects ﬁnd it natural to rank exemplars of both categories
depending on how typical they think these exemplars are as members of the
category. For instance, apple is a better exemplar of the category fruit than
olive, and 3 is a better example for odd number than 501.48 They concluded,
that the thesis that concepts are non-deﬁnitional because of graded responses
to their exemplars is wrong.
4.3 Theory-Theory
A second type of theory which was developed as answer to the psychologists'
objections are so-called theory-theories. According to a theory-theory, there
is a relation between language and thought. A child's acquisition of an early
concept can be seen analogous to a philosophy student hearing a scientiﬁc term
like `meta-physics' for the ﬁrst time. The development of an understanding of
concepts and the ability to apply the corresponding terms correctly equals the
forming of a theory.
48In a second experiment Armstrong et al. (1983) tested the veriﬁcation times for good
and poorer exemplars of several prototype and well-deﬁned categories. The results of Rosch
et al. were reproduced. In a third experiment, subjects said whether they believe that
membership in a certain category (the same categories were used as in the ﬁrst experiment)
is graded or categorical. Then, the subjects who answered that well-deﬁned categories are
categorical, that is the members of the category cannot be graded, participated in the ﬁrst
experiment. Although they agreed to the thesis that well-deﬁned categories are categorical,
the experiments yielded approximately the same results.
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The theory-theory view states "that concepts are organized within and around
theories, that acquiring a concept involves learning such a theory, and that de-
ploying a concept in a cognitive task involves theoretical reasoning, especially
of a causal-explanatory sort"49.
Theory-theories originated from diﬀerent roots: Firstly, developmental stage
theories (e. g. Piaget and Vygotsky) were rejected. Theory-theorists such as
Carey (1985), Gopnik and Meltzoﬀ (1997), and Keil (1989) provided empirical
evidence that was not in favour of developmental stage theories.50 They started
to form an alternative view of how cognitive development proceeds. A second
root is the general critique of the prototype theories which were predominate
in the 1970's. Murphy and Medin argued that these theories "are insuﬃcient
to provide an account of conceptual coherence" because these accounts rely
on the notion of similarity relationships and are inadequate to explain intra-
and inter-concept relations.51. A third root is the Kuhnian approach to the
philosophy of science.
There are two varieties of theory-theories: The concepts in theories view and
the concepts as theories view. The former view holds that concepts are con-
stituents of theories. This view is defended by Carey (1985; 2009) as well as
by Murphy & Medin (1999). Carey seems to hold a strong version of the con-
cepts in theories view: "Concepts must be identiﬁed by the roles they play in
theories."52 In (1999) she states:
Concepts are constituents of beliefs; that is, propositions are represented
by structures of concepts. Theories are mental structures consisting of a
mentally represented domain of phenomena and explanatory principles
that account for them.53
The idea of Carey is that there is some body of knowledge similar to a scien-
tiﬁc theory. The concepts which occur within these bodies of knowledge are
individuated by their cognitive roles.54 The concepts as theories view holds
49`The Theory-Theory of Concepts,' by Weiskopf, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy.
50Carey (1985) focused her research on how children understand things diﬀerently from
adults in biological domains, such as animals, living things, etc.
51Murphy & Medin (1985, 289). Murphy & Medin (1985, 291) hold that similarity is
rather a by-product of conceptual coherence and not its determinant.
52Carey (1985, 198).
53Carey (1999, 460).
54Cp. also Laurence & Margolis (1999, 44).
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that concepts are identiﬁed with miniature theories of a particular domain.55
A question that any theory-theory has to answer is how the notion of a men-
tally represented theory is to be understood. Carey (1985) reduces theories
to their explanatory power: "[A] theory is characterized by the phenomena in
its domain, its laws and other explanatory mechanisms, and the concepts that
articulate the laws and the representations of the phenomena"56. Further, ex-
planation is fundamental to theories and explanatory mechanisms distinguish
theories from other types of cognitive structures.57 Gopnik & Meltzoﬀ oﬀer a
detailed and strict characterization of what a theory is.58 Murphy & Medin
oﬀer a more liberal interpretation of theory:
When we argue that concepts are organized by theories, we use theory
to mean any of a host of mental `explanations', rather than a complete,
organized, scientiﬁc account. For example, causal knowledge certainly
embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts may contain an implicit
theory of the entailment relations between mundane events; knowledge
of rules embodies a theory of the relations between rule constituents;
and book-learned, scientiﬁc knowledge certainly contains theories.59
An advantage of the theory-theory concerning categorization is its close rela-
tion to psychological essentialism. According to essentialism, people are apt to
represent categories as if they contained some kind of hidden property rather
than obvious properties. Instead of checking a list of properties, people cate-
gorize objects regarding its hidden unobservable essence.60
4.3.1 The Problem of Stability
The theory-theory is holistic, that is, the knowledge and use of a concept
includes all propositions and relations involving that concept.61 When a men-
tally represented theory changes, this gives rise to a change of the concept. So,
concepts may change over time. Concepts are unstable. However, concepts
55Cf. for instance Keil (1989, 281).
56Carey (1985, 201).
57Cp. ibid., 200-201.
58Cp. Gopnik & Meltzoﬀ (1997, 32-41).
59Murphy & Medin (1985, 290).
60There is not only evidence that adults categorize objects regarding its hidden properties,
but also that children think so. Gelman and Wellman (1991) have found evidence for
essentialism emerging in childhood.
61Cp. Murphy & Medin (1985, 297).
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should be more stable than this because people should possess more or less
the same concepts. The same problem arises even within individuals because
individuals also change their mentally represented theory over time. So con-
cepts possessed by an individual also change from time to time.
There are mainly two replies to this objection. i) It need not be implausible
that sometimes adults, or children and adults do not understand each other
because they have diﬀerent concepts.62 ii) Nevertheless, there might be some
kind of core that remains stable over time.63
4.3.2 The Philosophers' Response to the Psychological
Theories
Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam oﬀer diﬀerent arguments against classical and
prototype views. Putnam argues that prototype structure is not constitutive
for the reference of the concerning concept because meanings are not in the
head.64 Putnam illustrates this thesis with his famous example of the Twin
Earth. Suppose that elsewhere in our universe there is a planet which is
exactly like our Earth, that is, it equals our earth in all relevant aspects, the
`Twin Earth'. The only diﬀerence between our Earth and the Twin Earth is
that the chemical formula for water on Twin Earth is not `H2O' but `XYZ'.
Nevertheless, both liquids share the same properties (density, boiling point,
colour, etc.). Now imagine the year 1750 where the chemical formula for water
was undetected, yet. Then the water experience of people on Earth and Twin
Earth would be identical and the mental states of residents of the Earth and
of the Twin Earth would also be identical. But when an earthling says `water',
he or she refers to H2O, whereas when the twin earthling says 'water', he
or she refers to XYZ. Thus, the extension of waterEarth and the extension of
waterTwinEarth are not equal. Putnam concludes that mental states are not
suﬃcient to determine the reference of concepts.65
A similar argument why prototype or deﬁnitional structure does not determine
a concept's reference is that it might be the case that a speaker possesses a
concept, thus has a prototype conception of the concept, but is mistaken about
the conceptual content:
62This objection is  for instance  made by Carey (2009, 378).
63This is the basic idea of dual-factor theories. See section 7 of this chapter.
64Cp. Putnam (1979 [1975], 37).
65Cp. ibid., 31-34.
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Even if cats turn out to be robots remotely controlled from Mars we will
still call them `cats'; even if it turns out that the stripes on tigers are
painted on to deceive us, we will still call them `tigers'; even if normal
lemons are blue (we have been buying and raising very atypical lemons,
but don't know it), they are still lemons (and so are the yellow ones.)66
The example of the robot-cat or the blue lemon might be far-fetched. Let
us instead think of thunder. In the ancient world, people used to think that
thunder was a sign of angry gods. Although the people in the ancient world
were mistaken about the nature of thunder, the term `thunder' referred to the
same phenomenon than it refers to nowadays. So, the theory about thunder
that the people in the ancient world had is not constitutive for the concept's
reference.
4.4 Fodor's Conceptual Atomism
Fodor's Conceptual Atomism is a radical alternative to all theories just men-
tioned, but it handles the criticism raised by Putnam and Kripke. One of
Fodor's starting thesis is the compositionality of concepts because concepts
are the constituents of thought and thought is compositional. The classical
theory has the potential to explain compositional meaning, prototype theories
and the theory-theory, however, cannot handle the phenomenon of composi-
tionality of concepts.67 Fodor & Lepore point out:
There is a standard objection to the idea that concepts might be pro-
totypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): because they are productive,
concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so
concepts can't be prototypes.68
The main idea is that inﬁnitely many (complex) concepts can be constructed
by composition of more primitive concepts because of the their productivity.69
66Putnam (1975a, 143).
67For objections against this thesis cf. Osherson & Smith (1988), and Kamp & Partee
(1995).
68Fodor & Lepore, (1996, 253-254). It is consensus that productivity of concepts is a real
phenomenon. Cp. Fodor & Lepore (1966, 257). A similar formulation of the compositional-
ity constraint can be found in Robins (2002, 2): "The content of a complex (i.e., non-lexical)
concept is exhaustively determined by the contents of its constituent concepts and the rules
governing the combination of those constituents."
69Fodor & Lepore (1996, 254).
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For instance, pet ﬁsh is a composition of pet and ﬁsh. According to the classical
theory, the mental representation pet ﬁsh is the intersection of the set of pets
with the set of ﬁshs. Given compositionality, there should also be a prototype
analysis of pet ﬁsh in terms of pet and ﬁsh. However, if we list all typical
features concerning pet and ﬁsh and if we take the intersection of both sets of
features, we do not get a list of typical features of a pet ﬁsh. Or, according to
the exemplar view, a goldﬁsh is an atypical exemplar of pet and an atypical
exemplar of ﬁsh, but it is quite a good exemplar of pet ﬁsh. It could be
objected that prototypes are idioms and pet ﬁsh is mentally represented by its
own prototype description. Then, however, there would be indeﬁnitely many
prototype descriptions. A further response to this problem is that concepts
must only be compositional in principle, not in practice.70
The theory-theory has also problems accommodating the compositionality of
concepts. Fish might be a constituent of a biological theory and pet might be
part of a theory about social behaviour. However, the knowledge about pet
ﬁsh is not determined by the knowledge about ﬁsh and pets. A pet ﬁsh is kept
in bowls and fed with ﬂakes. Neither of this knowledge can be derived from
existing theories about biology and social behaviour.71
Closely linked to the compositionality is what Laurence & Margolis call the
missing prototype problem.72 Fodor takes the Boolean operators and, if, then,
or, and not into consideration. His thesis is that "for indeﬁnitely many Boolean
concepts, there isn't any prototype"73. For example, the concept isn't a cat
obviously has no prototype. Furthermore, many complex concepts also lack a
prototype representation:
There may, for example, be prototypical American cities (New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles), but there are surely no prototypical American
cities situated on the East Coast just a little south of Tennessee. Simi-
larly, there may be prototypical grandmothers (Mary Worth) and there
may be prototypical properties of grandmothers (good, old Mary Worth).
But there are surely no prototypical properties of grandmothers most of
whose grandchildren are married to dentists.74
70Cp. Prinz (2002, ch. 11), or Robbins (2002).
71Cp. `The Theory-Theory of Concepts,' by Weiskopf, The Internet Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy.
72The same argument could be made against the theory-theory.
73Fodor (1996, 260).
74Fodor (1981, 296-297).
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These examples show that the problem of missing prototype is not an isolated
problem of a few concepts, but that it refers to many concepts.
Based on these objections Fodor develops an atomistic view by adopting an
informational semantics, instead of an inferential role semantics.75
Fodor rejects the common assumption of all theories just mentioned that lexical
concepts have a semantic structure:
Informational semantics denies that `dog' means dog because of the way
that it is related to other linguistic expressions (`animal' or `barks', as
it might be). Correspondingly, informational semantics denies that the
concept DOG has its content in virtue of its position in a network of con-
ceptual relations. So, then, the intuition that there are other concepts
that anybody who has DOG must also have is one that informational
semantics can make no sense of.76
The atomistic view is mainly a negative view. But if the content of concepts
is unstructured, an explanation of how reference can be determined is needed.
Fodor holds that the content of a primitive concept is determined by the con-
cept's standing in an causal-cum-nomological relation to things in the world:
I'm going to assume that what bestows content on mental representa-
tions is something about their causal-cum-nomological relations to the
things that fall under them: for example, what bestows upon a mental
representation the content dog is something about its tokenings being
caused by dogs.77
A major advantage of atomism is that one does not need to have a concept
in order to have another concept. For instance, one can have the concept dog
without having the concept animal. A further beneﬁt is that neither the prob-
lem about ignorance and error nor the problem about stability arise. Unless
the mind-world nomic relation between the mental representation dog and the
entity `dog' is robust, it does not matter what beliefs someone has about dogs,
or if the beliefs are wrong, or if people share diﬀerent beliefs about dogs.
Despite its beneﬁts, at least the strong version of atomism has been under seri-
ous attack. If a strong version of atomism is true, then radical nativism about
75An informational semantics claims that the conceptual content is constituted by a causal
mind-world relation, whereas an inferential role semantics claims that the conceptual content
is constituted by the inferences it is involved in. Cp. Park (2008, 61-64).
76Fodor (1981, 73-74).
77Ibid., 12.
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concepts is true. Radical nativism means that all concepts are innate which is
a counterintuitive claim. Consider, for instance, the concept doorknob (Fodor's
example) which we intuitively would not think to be innate.78 Therefore, the
atomist view has often been rejected.
4.5 Dual-Factor Theory
Any theory about concepts which assumes that concepts have a structure (be it
a classical, prototype, or a theory structure) are mainly theories about complex
concepts. The problem of these theories is that they  except from the classical
view  oﬀer no proper theory of primitive concepts. If these theories want to
avoid an inﬁnite regress or circularity, they have to assume the existence of
primitive concepts and also oﬀer a declaration concerning their existence. So,
even if one is not willing to accept the claim of strong atomism that all concepts
are primitive, the atomistic view seems to have its justiﬁed role in a theory of
concepts.79
We have seen that all theories of concepts have their beneﬁts, but also have
their drawbacks. The classical theory has trouble with fast categorization,
but can accommodate compositionality naturally. Fast categorization can in
turn be explained by the prototype theory. On the other hand, the prototype
theory has trouble with the compositionality of concepts. So, why not assume
that a single type of theory of natural kind concepts cannot explain all of
these phenomena and suppose that natural kind concepts have multiple types
of structure? Laurence & Margolis' dual theory connects atomistic cores with
prototypes and theory structure. The atomistic cores are i) compositional, ii)
determine reference, iii) act as the "ultimate arbiters" of categorization, and
iv) provide stability.80 Such an account allows that concepts have prototype-
structured identiﬁcation procedures and that, e. g., explanatory inferences
depend on theory structure. Other non-natural kind concepts (mathematical
or logical concept) which are well-deﬁned may have a deﬁnable core, but as
the study by Sharon Armstrong and Lila and Henry Gleitman (1983) suggests
they may also have prototype structure concerning identiﬁcation procedures,
78Cp. Fodor (1981, 135).
79Cp. Park (2008, 62-65).
80Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 74).
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but this prototype structure is not constitutive for the reference.81
4.6 Inferences for Thick Concepts
Thick concepts are complex and hence non-natural kind concepts, but still
they might have deﬁnitional cores.82 Conceptual analyses have a long tradition
in philosophy, but as William Ramsey (1992) suggests it is unlikely that any
philosophical concept has deﬁnitional structure because of the long-term failure
to ﬁnd proper deﬁnitions. Although philosophical analysis has been and still
is fruitful to deepen our understanding, the claim that thick concepts have a
well-deﬁned structure is hard to prove.83
Jussi Jlkkä observes:
The strategy of conceiving of philosophical terms as natural kind terms
is even less plausible in the case of concepts like justice, virtue, or
good. The long history of failure to deﬁne philosophical concepts sug-
gests that these concepts also lack deﬁnitions. It is improbable that
they are prototypes or exemplar sets either, since the long history of
philosophical study suggests that they involve much more complex, the-
oretical aspects than simple prototypes or sets of exemplars would. An
account of a prototype or exemplar concept could be given basically
in terms of a list of the features which are more or less typical of the
category members, but it seems that philosophical concepts cannot be
captured this easily. How, then, are philosophical concepts structured?
If the theory-theorists are correct in claiming that even artefact concepts
involve theoretical elements, it is well possible that so do philosophical
concepts (note that this does not necessarily mean that they should have
deﬁnite concept cores).84
Chapter 6.5 will try to outline a proposal how the theory structure of thick
concepts could be explained within a theory of the thick.
81Cp. Jylkkä (2008, 55-56).
82Certainly a nonseparationist might claim that they are natural kind concepts even if it
appears diﬃcult to prove.
83Cp. Jylkkä (2008, 57-59.) for similar thoughts.
84Jylkkä (2008, 59).
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Chapter 5
Victor Kraft's Two-Component
Analysis
The question of (dis)entangleablity is often directly tied to whether someone
is a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist about values. Cognitivists most often hold
that thick concepts cannot be disentangled and, therefore, support a non-
separationist view, whereas non-cognitivists are separationists because they
take thick concepts to be separable.
The debate about thick concepts and their role in the discussion between cogni-
tivist and non-cognitivists dates back to the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.
Hence immersing deeper into the discussion between these two opposing posi-
tions one might ﬁnd interesting ideas which may still be relevant and of high
interest for the ongoing debate. Inspiration might even be found in the works
of philosophers from whom one would least expect it: the logical positivists.
The members of the Vienna Circle whom are called logical positivists at least
agree upon one issue  the critique of metaphysics which absolutely denies
metaphysics in its most radical version. This critique does not only bear on
sentences of metaphysics, but on all sentences which are not veriﬁable accord-
ing to the veriﬁability principle. These sentences also include all ethical and
moral sentences as has already been remarked in section 2.2. Let us bear in
mind the following quote from Carnap, in order to additionally illustrate the
alleged `paradigmatic' position of the logical positivists concerning the status
of ethical and moral sentences:
Further, the same judgement must be passed on all philosophy of norms,
or philosophy of value, on any ethics or aesthetics as a normative disci-
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pline. For the objective validity of a value or norm is (even on the view
of the philosophers of value) not empirically veriﬁable nor deducible
from empirical statements; hence it cannot be asserted (in a meaningful
statement) at all. In other words: Either empirical criteria are indi-
cated for the use of `good' and `beautiful' and the rest of the predicates
that are employed in the normative sciences, or they are not. In the
ﬁrst case, a statement containing such a predicate turns into a factual
judgement, but not a value judgement; in the second case, it becomes a
pseudo-statement. It is altogether impossible to make a statement that
expresses a value judgement.1
This quote which is taken from The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Log-
ical Analysis of Language is possibly the most cited statement of a member
of the Vienna Circle on the status of ethical and moral sentences. Often it is
also employed to show that the logical positivists had no interest in questions
concerning ethics and morals. According to critics, Carnap's position leads
to a moral nihilism. Carnap himself reports that Oskar Kraus who is such a
critic portrayed Carnap as dangerous for morals. Kraus even wanted to report
Carnap's `nihilist position' to the authorities.2
The thesis that the logical positivists were not interested in questions concern-
ing ethics and moral is regarded as outdated what is shown by the contributions
in Siegetsleitner (2010).
Regarding the meaninglessness of ethical judgements, the conceptualisation
of normative ethics seems diﬃcult to achieve. The prejudice that the logical
positivists held all kinds of normative ethics as an absurd endeavour appears
to be a logical consequence of the postulated meaninglessness of all ethical
sentences. The attempt of Victor Kraft3 (1880-1975), a member of the Vienna
Circle4, in his Foundations for a scientiﬁc analysis of value (Die Grundlagen
einer wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre)5 is all the more remarkable when taking
1Carnap (1932, 77).
2Carnap (1993, 128).
3Victor is sometimes written with `c' and sometimes with `k'. As a matter of uniformity,
Victor will be written continuously with `c', even if it will have to be adjusted in quotes.
4Kraft did not belong to the hard core of the Circle. Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], xi).
5In 1981 an English translation of the Grundlagen has been published by Henk L Mulder.
The quotations cited are taken from the English translation. Whenever the literal expression
seems important, it will also be quoted from the 1951's edition in German. Furthermore, it
will be complied with the English translation of certain expressions. The 1951's edition is a
revised edition of the 1937's edition. In the second edition, Kraft added the section about
the system of values and supplemented the second part of the book.
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into account this postulated meaninglessness of ethical sentences:6 In contrast
to Ayer's emotivism, Kraft aims to show that ethical sentences must not be
non-cognitively meaningless despite their cognitively meaninglessness.7
After having studied geography and history at the University of Vienna, Kraft
ﬁrst graduated with an epistemological book, Die Erkenntnis der Außenwelt
(1903), and then habilitated with Weltbegriﬀ und Erkenntnisbegriﬀ (1915).
But throughout his life, he worked on a possibility to ﬁnd a proper justiﬁca-
tion of moral norms which was quite unusual for a logical positivist.8 Although
Kraft had to retire after the forced incorporation of Austria by Nazi Germany
because of the Jewish origin of his wife and though he lost his venia legendi9,
he stayed in Vienna and tempted to revive the logical positivism. However,
the discussions about the logical positivism were proceeded in England and in
the USA and Kraft's work has not been noted for a long time.10 Only recently
there has been new interest in Kraft's work and two studies (Vollbrecht 2004;
Radler 2006) were published which treat both his epistemological and his eth-
ical writings.
In this chapter Kraft's thoughts about thick concepts and value judgements
will be elaborated because many interesting and helpful ideas can be found to
promote the debate about the thick. In the last chapter of this study, his ideas
about the thick will be includes into the debate.
6In his introduction of the English translation, Topitsch indicates that in English-speaking
countries Kraft is especially known for being a member of the Vienna Circle. Cp. Kraft
(1981 [1951], xi).
7This point has also been made by Hegselmann (1970, 29).
8Rutte even holds the opinion that Kraft developed his philosophical works concerning
morals en passant. Cp. Rutte (1986, 162).
9Cp. Stadler (1997, 717).
10Vollbrecht traces this back to catastrophic circumstances. A year after the publishing of
Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre the Nazis invaded Austria. According to
Kraft, all exemplars of the Grundlagen had been burnt under their dictatorship. After the
Anschluss Kraft was in scientiﬁc isolation because he was the only member of the Vienna
Circle who stayed in Vienna. The other members interested in practical questions (Schlick,
Neurath and Zilsel) were not alive any more. The publication of Der Wiener Kreis did
neither succeed in regaining Kraft's reputation nor in reviving the logical positivism. On
the contrary: Kraft strengthened the impression that the Vienna Circle was not interested
in moral and ethical question because he focused on theoretical issues. For further reasons
why Kraft has not been received for a long times cf. Vollbrecht (2004, 6-8), and also Kraft
(1981 [1951], xiv).
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5.1 In Between Subjectivism and Realism
In Kraft's time, there were two predominant positions in metaethics: subjec-
tivism (such as the emotivism supported by Ayer (1956 [1936]))11 and real-
ism about values (intuitionism of Scheler (1954 [1913]) and Hartmann (1962
[1926])). Emotivists state that value judgements are mere expression of feel-
ings lacking cognitive content, whereas intuitionists maintain that there are
absolute values which can be detected through intuition. According to Top-
itsch, "[t]here seemed to be scarcely any prospects in the inter-war period for a
theory of value with an empiricist basis", on the other hand, "that only made
one all the more necessary"12.
Kraft rejects both subjectivism and objectivism. Considering his belonging to
the Vienna Circle, it is a natural thing to understand why he rejects Scheler's
intuitionist realism about values. According to the logical positivists, intuition
is not an adequate type to come to genuine knowledge. Kraft follows this line of
argument: "Die Intuition trägt noch nicht die Gewähr ihrer Richtigkeit in sich,
eine emotionale noch weniger als eine intellektuelle, sie verbürgt noch keine
sichere Erkenntnis."13 Intentional feelings and emotions only constitute per-
sonal insight. If, however, intuition is supposed to constitute super-individual
legitimation, then any individual intuition of value must coincide for all evi-
dent value judgements.14 This is obviously not the case. Kraft admits that
"there is something attractive about this [intuitionist] analysis of value, with
its consistency and the novel conception it employs to sweep away all past dif-
ﬁculties"15. Furthermore, he thinks that it is attractive to be able to ascribe
objectiveness to values. Yet, he criticises the relation between values as ideal
essences and their realization in the world:
If values, as timeless ideal essences, are contrasted to empirical reality,
it becomes impossible to understand how they can stand in any relation
to reality. This relation is supposed to consist in the fact that values
`realize' themselves in empirical things and persons, that they `attach'
themselves to these, thereby `lending' them value. Yet, as ideal essences,
11Ayer's emotivism is in accordance with the claims of the logical positivists. His position
is often seen as a paradigmatic ethical position of the logical positivism, although he never
belonged to the Vienna Circle.
12Kraft (1981 [1951], xiv).
13Kraft (1963, 26).
14Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 154).
15Ibid., 4.
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values cannot make a transition into reality or connect themselves with
reality without losing their character as ideal essences and becoming
something other than values, viz., empirical reality.16
In accordance with logical positivism, he thinks that the assumption that val-
ues are platonic abstract objects is unfounded metaphysics (haltlose Meta-
physik)17.
Otherwise, he does not want to be exposed to what he calls an `unrestricted
subjectivism'18. He objects against Ayer that value judgements are not like
interjections because they have a signiﬁcant content. Value concepts are not
mere `pseudo'-concepts.19
Instead, he wants to ﬁnd a third way in between subjectivism and realism
which he constitutes in his Foundations for a scientiﬁc analysis of value. On
the one hand, he works analytically, on the other hand, some of his ﬁndings
are empirical. His methodology is therefore in consistency with the demands
of the logical positivism. His claim that the rejection of absolute moral facts is
not necessarily linked to a moral subjectivism is one of his central motives.20
5.2 Analysis of Value Concepts
In his Foundations Kraft analyses value concepts21 to reveal the elements of
which their content is constituted. At ﬁrst he distinguishes between values
and bearers of value (valuable things). A bearer of value is an entity to which
a value is ascribed. Bearers of value "may be material or spiritual or men-
tal, a remedy or a character trait of a person or a poem, something real or
something ideal, a meaning. Bearers of value may be things or persons."22
Goods are not identical to values, but have value. Values, however, are "uni-
versal conceptual contents [which] are presented in value concepts"23, values
16Ibid.
17Kraft (1968, 100).
18Kraft (1981 [1951], xvii).
19Cp. ibid., p. 48 and footnote no. 119.
20Cp. Vollbrecht (2004, 21).
21Kraft uses the term `value concepts'. Value concepts can be both thick and thin concepts.
Kraft does not diﬀerentiate between these two. Even if he does not use the terms thick and
thin concepts, sometimes these terms will be used to be able to distinguish between both.
22Kraft (1981 [1951], 6).
23Ibid., 6-7.
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are "uniﬁed and timeless"24, this is, "ideal units of meaning"25. The ideality
of values is not ontological, but conceptual.26 Thus, his meaning of ideality is
diﬀerent from Hartmann's "Being-in-itself". Instead, Kraft understands val-
ues as "something that can be pointed to as identical among the wealth and
variety of evaluations"27. According to him, values only `exist' insofar as they
are ascribed to a bearer of value. This means, values are dependent from an
evaluating subject and do not exist independently. Consequently, values are
not genuine phenomena. A thing or person receives a qualiﬁcation that char-
acterizes the relation between the evaluating person and the bearer of value.28
Evaluation is a relation between an individual and a thing or another person.
If this relation holds, the thing or person becomes a bearer of value for the
individual.
Value concepts are expressed by value predicates, e. g. x is sinful, x is a sin, or
x sins.29 Value concepts have in common that they indicate whether something
is valuable or valueless. What diﬀerentiates value concepts from each other is
their belonging to certain general categories. Kraft distinguishes between the
following spheres and value concepts:
• moral sphere (conscientious, honourable), the aesthetic sphere (harmonious,
dissonant, lovely, ill-proportioned);
• value concepts concerning utility (helpful, obstructive, advantageous, disadvan-
tageous);
• religious sphere (pious, holy, sinner, heretic), value concepts concerning law
and justice (just, usurious, negligent, slander, crime);
• biological sphere (healthy, ill, salutary, withered, degenerate, barren);
• value concepts denoting abilities (industrious, lazy, clever, stupid, sharp-witted,
gullible, ingenious, foolish, (mal)adroit, well (ill)-considered, deft, energetic, fee-
ble);
• value concepts concerning emotions and endeavours ((un)pleasant, pleas-
ing, displeasing, enchanting, abhorrent, satisfying, attractive, boring, captivating,
repellent, repulsive, unbearable, (un)comfortable, embarrassing);
24Kraft (1981 [1951], 7).
25Ibid.
26Cp. Kraft (1963, 26).
27Kraft (1981 [1951], 6).
28Cp. ibid., 41.
29Cp. ibid., 10.
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• value concepts that express the nature of an object in relation to our
needs ((im)perfect, adequate, insuﬃcient, deﬁcient, scanty); and
• value concept of the most general sort (good, bad, excellent, valuable, worth-
less, well, evil, praiseworthy, blameworthy.).30
Krafts classiﬁcation is much more diﬀerentiated as those proposed in the
current literature. Usually, only three spheres are distinguished: the moral or
ethical, the prudential or epistemological, and the aesthetic sphere.31
Kraft emphasizes that the sole characteristic common to all value concepts is
the function of valuation. The diﬀerentiating feature is their non-evaluative
`material or factual' content that is speciﬁc in every value concept (except in
the general thin concepts). This logical analysis of value concepts reveals that
thick concepts contain two components: a non-evaluative `purely factual' and
the distinguishing evaluative component.
Value Concepts
Specialized (Thick Concepts)
Emotional
Value Concepts
Standard-setting
Value Concepts
Moral Biological Religious Utility etc.
General (Thin Concepts)
Kraft calls his two-component analysis an analysis of "fundamental signif-
icance" because it shows that value judgements have  in contrast to the
assumption of subjectivism  non-evaluative content. But his analysis also
"signals the collapse of the main thesis of absolutism with respect to values:
30Cp. ibid., 10-6.
31Cf. FitzGerald & Goldie (2012); Kirchin (2010). FitzGerald & Goldie point out that
some thick concepts belong to more than one sphere (e. g. aesthetical usage of crude as
applied to an artwork, or ethical usage as applied to humour).
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that values are unitary qualities which are immediately perceived and which
therefore must simply be accepted as they are"32.
Kraft's account is one of the ﬁrst separationist two-component analyses. What
distinguishes him from other classical separationists, as for instance Hare or
Stevenson, will become clear in the next sections.
5.3 Psychological Analysis of Evaluations
As has been explained by Kraft, thick concepts are diﬀerentiated by their non-
evaluative content. What they have in common is their evaluative character.
The evaluative character, that is "the ultimate ground of value"33, can neither
be analysed logically nor conceptually because "the pure evaluative meaning is
logically ultimate, non-derivative, and cannot be reduced to, constructed from,
another concept"34. The evaluative element of a thick concept has no truth
value and is cognitively meaningless. Yet, Kraft does not stop his investigation
at this point. According to him, a psychological analysis of the evaluative
character is still possible: "We must investigate the way in which distinction
comes into being, the means whereby it is related to other phenomena and the
way in which it diﬀers from them, in which it is delimited."35 Kraft points out
that the methods of psychology are empirical because psychological knowledge
is factual knowledge.36 He is interested in the psychology of the relation of
evaluation.
5.3.1 Methodological Approach
Older representatives of psychological value theory (Ehrenfels, Meinong, and
Kreibig) do not attract interest in Kraft because their investigations have se-
rious methodological defects.37 Investigations using methods of scientiﬁc psy-
chology which have been justiﬁed by the Würzburg group are also rejected.
Kraft criticises that they have tried "to investigate such a complex act as eval-
uating by means of the simple schema of reaction experiments"38. However,
32Kraft (1981 [1951], 14).
33Ibid., 22.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Cp. Kraft (1950, 22).
37Ibid.
38Ibid., 23.
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the value character is a complicated matter which cannot be investigated in
experiments without any preparing theoretical considerations. Therefore, "[a]
thorough analysis of the phenomenon of value must be made before the sit-
uation becomes ready for the application of experimental methods"39. The
psychological analysis must start with a genetic analysis, that is, it must in-
vestigate how evaluations emerge and come into being.40 To understand the
emergence of valuations during childhood development, Kraft employs records
of continuous observations of particular children41, statements and autobio-
graphical observations of adolescents and school children, questionnaires and
essays about issues concerning values or diary entries42, as well as biographical
and autobiographical material. Kraft's analysis should rather be understood
as a preparatory work because the empirical data on which he refers is not
suﬃciently scientiﬁc and should be supplemented with further experimental
ﬁndings. His psychological analysis is to be understood as a "preliminary
analysis and an explication of value phenomenon"43.
5.3.2 Evaluating and Adopting an Attitude
Firstly, Kraft diﬀerentiates evaluative attitudes from neutral attitudes towards
objects. A neutral behaviour is a behaviour which lacks any emotional colour-
ing (ira) and any direct intention or endeavour with a deﬁnite orientation
(studium). If, otherwise, something concerns us, then it triggers emotions and
feelings and at the same time an endeavour to avoid or to maintain it, or to
treat something in a friendly or hostile fashion. The endeavour may be reduced
to a sole acceptance or repulsion. This two-sided pair of emotion, endeavour
constitutes the adoption of an attitude. A neutral behaviour is characterised
by the absence of the pair emotion, endeavour.
The adoption of an attitude of acceptance or rejection ﬁnds expression in prais-
ing or blaming which is involved in value concepts. But positive and negative
attitudes cannot be reduced to acceptance or rejection: "Agreement or denial,
friendly or hostile  these are intended as only very general descriptions of the
orientation of an attitude. The nature of positive or negative attitudes may
39Ibid., 24.
40Cp. ibid., 27.
41Cf. Preyer (1912). A classics which has been published in a 9. edition.
42Cf. Bühler (1927) and Bühler (1967).
43Kraft (1981 [1951], 28).
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vary considerably, depending upon the nature and intensity of the elements of
emotion or endeavour particularly involved."44
But evaluation is not merely adopting an attitude.45 This identiﬁcation would
be to simplifying because sometimes (e. g. when indicating that something is
valuable for someone else or if a speaker utters a conventional value judgement
which he himself or she herself does not support), the speaker does not have
the corresponding emotions or feelings.46 So, the adoption of an attitude is
not even necessary for an evaluation, and also, adopting an attitude alone is
not suﬃcient for an evaluation. If this was the case, it would already be an
evaluation, if a young child not even having the ability to speak shows that
it dislikes something. For instance, it would be an evaluation, if the young
child showed a preference for certain foods, pet animals, toys, or for going on a
walk. But, according to Kraft, evaluations are necessarily linked to a conscious
use of language. One cannot speak about evaluations unless someone has the
ability to speak. To make an evaluation, which is distinct from sole attitude
adoption, one has to have a deeper understanding of thick and thin concepts:
"We cannot speak of evaluating before a child has any comprehension of value
concepts."47
Kraft diﬀerentiates three steps in the development of evaluation. In the ﬁrst
step, a child perceives an object as pleasant or painful. The child expresses
his pleasure or pain towards the perceived objects (e. g. through an interjec-
tion, smiling, or crying). The second step is that the child shows feelings, if
reminded of the things it likes/dislikes. It does not need to perceive the object
to feel pleasure or pain. Rather, the imagination of the object is suﬃcient
for feeling pleasure or pain. Finally, the child utters an evaluation through a
value concept.48 Kraft exempliﬁes this with an example. Imagine a one year
old boy who sees a beautiful sunset. The boy might interject "Oooh!" and
pointing towards the sunset while his face expresses admiration. At the age
of four the same boy sees a sunset again. However, the sunset does not lead
44Kraft (1981 [1951], 45).
45Cp. ibid., 30.
46Cp. ibid. For instance, outsiders to moral communities, or FitzGerald & Goldie's
(2012) example of the `dispute arbitrator' who judges that someone's behaviour was oﬀensive
without feeling any oﬀence or resentment herself. Prinz (2006, 32) mentions psychopaths
who treat wrong as if it were congruent to prohibited by local authorities. He concludes that
psychopaths cannot be adequate moral judges.
47Kraft (1981 [1951], 31).
48According to Kraft, this takes place during the second or third year of a child's life. Cp.
ibid.
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him to make an interjection, but rather a value judgement like "It's beautiful!
It's like ﬁre!". In the ﬁrst case, the boy adopts an attitude, which is expressed
through the interjection, and in the second case, the boy even utters a value
predicate. His application of `beautiful' shows that he has learned the semantic
content of beautiful. If a child learns the meaning of good or bad and in which
situation to use them, something new is entering his conciousness: By uttering
a value judgement the speaker consciously ascribes a particular qualiﬁcation
or characterization to an object. What diﬀerentiates an evaluation from an
attitude adoption, is the conciousness of value, its sense of praise and blame.
The question remains how the conciousness of value emerges. Towards the end
of the second year, Kraft reports, a child starts to use thin concepts (nice, good,
bad). In the third year, the child employs further quite general value concepts
(naughty to imply that something is bad). Value concepts are learnt contempo-
raneously with concepts in general. The child learns to classify the phenomena
in concordance with its belonging to certain categories, that is, the child learns
the semantic meaning of the concepts. The evaluations which are employed by
the use of thin concepts are connected to the pleasant or unpleasant colouring
attaching to an object. For instance, a food is called `good' or `bad' depending
on its taste. The child experiences pleasure and displeasure as something that
exists simultaneously with the perceived object: "From the element of pleasure
or pain, the object takes on, for the child's consciousness, a new characteriza-
tion, similar to a property: it is designated as 'good' , 'nice', and so forth."49
A child ascribes a value concept to an object as a non-evaluative property. A
little child cannot separate the subjective from the objective, yet. The child
gives a rather objective than a subjective characterisation. The process of
understanding the subjective starts to develop at the age of four. And "[o]nly
when the child comes to remark the actually distinctive position of the sources
of pleasure and pain and to single it out does a conscious distinction result.
Only when he becomes conscious of the special character of objects connected
with pleasure and pain does value emerge."50
The distinction is a process of abstracting. A child learns that all the things
he likes (e. g. chocolate, cats, going on a walk, bananas) have something in
common which is not a genuine feature of these things. What they have in
49Ibid., 36.
50Ibid., 40.
101
5.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIONS
common is their "pleasant quality"51.
To summarize, at the beginning a child uses a value term without comprehend-
ing its evaluative point. For instance, the family of the child might always talk
about the `good grandmother'. The child might refer to his grandmother when
speaking of the `good'. The child uses `good' as the grandmother's name.52
The child reaches the stage of value comprehension when it understands that
a value term is used to form a distinction, but it does not quite get the special
sense, its value nuance, of the corresponding value term. For instance, uttering
the thick concepts `magniﬁcent', `vile' or `heavenly' a two-year-old child only
assimilates adults. It comprehends that the term expresses an evaluation, but
it does not grasp its value nuance because the value terms are too diﬀerentiated
for its age. The diﬀerentiation and full comprehension of value concepts arise,
ﬁnally, through the linking of the value characteristic to richer non-evaluative
contents.53
To conclude: Evaluating is adopting an attitude consciously and actively. The
diﬀerence between the two lies in the conciousness of value. However, it is not
the case that an objects gains a further feature, but rather a special qualiﬁ-
cation or colouring that characterizes its relation to us.54 Concerning values,
Kraft is a subjectivist. According to him, values are not genuine features of
objects, but they only exist in relation to a perceiving subject.55 This distin-
guishes him clearly from realists about value, who hold that values are real
features of objects.
Regarding a descriptive-psychological view, the characteristic of value is some-
thing speciﬁc and ultimate. Therefore, it is non-reducible to any concept.
The sense of the evaluative element of a thick concept is the signiﬁcance and
implications for our behaviour56:
The characteristic of value consists in an object's being known as dis-
tinguished under a speciﬁc characterization, 'distinction' referring to
the special function of being an immediate determinant of an attitude.
The distinction conferred on an object by a value predicate stems from
51Kraft (1981 [1951], 46).
52A similar example is given by FitzGerald & Goldie (2012): The selﬁsh toddler, who uses
selﬁsh to show his dislike and anger towards other children, but is not mature enough to feel
the complex emotions of guilt and resentment that are connected to the use of selﬁsh.
53Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 34-35).
54Cp. ibid., 41.
55Cp. ibid., 36-37.
56Cp. ibid., 44.
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its characterizing the object's relation to our attitude. It pertains ulti-
mately to the diﬀerence between what moves us to adopt an attitude and
what leaves us indiﬀerent. Thus value predicates are entirely diﬀerent
in kind from the predicates ascribing properties to an object.57
Thick concepts are diﬀerent from neutral adjectives: Ascribing a value pred-
icate to an object often means that the speaker is moved to adopt a certain
attitude, whereas the use of neutral predicates means that the speaker is rather
indiﬀerent. However, a speaker must not necessarily be moved to adopt an at-
titude when applying a thick concept. As became clear at the beginning of this
section, value predicates can be used without having the appropriate attitude.
5.3.3 Sources of Distinction
The impression could arise that Kraft holds a hedonistic theory of action sim-
ilar to Moritz Schlick.58 Kraft admits that the hedonistic motivating forces
play a signiﬁcant role in evaluation. Yet, Kraft doubts that pleasure and pain
are the sole sources for distinction because many evaluations seem to be more
complex. It might even be possible that an object is excelled although it does
not evoke any pleasure or pain.
Are there any other sources from which a distinction might stem? This ques-
tion already implicates that Kraft's answer will be `yes'. In what follows, these
diﬀerent sources of distinction distinguished by Kraft will be presented.
(a) Pleasure-pain Pleasure and pain are sources of distinction when sense
qualities such as smells and tastes, light and color, or notes and sounds
are concerned. An object is distinguished in virtue of being pleasant or
unpleasant within itself.59
Sense qualities might also occur in "simultaneous or sequential complexes
(. . .) as linear ﬁgures or patchworks, as corporeal forms, as rhythms and
melodies, as harmonies of color and tone"60. The sense qualities of which
57Ibid.
58Cp. Vollbrecht (2004, 54). Schlick's (1984 [1930], 80) moral philosophy is based on
the assumption that pleasure and pain are the sole sources of distinction: "[V]on den als
Motive wirkenden Vorstellungen setzt sich die schlieslich am meisten lustbetonte oder die
am wenigsten unlustbetonte durch und verdrängt die übrigen, und damit ist die Handlung
eindeutig bestimmt."
59Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 53-54).
60Ibid., 54.
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the complex consists need to be harmonic or proportional to evoke plea-
sure and pain. A disharmonic composition does not evoke pleasure, but
rather pain. According to Kraft, the distinction is based upon "elemen-
tary aesthetic emotions"61.
Pleasure and pain might not necessarily rest upon sense qualities, but
might also accompany bodily or mental activities. This so-called "func-
tional pleasure" might for instance result from sports or mathematical
riddles. It exists only when the activity itself causes pleasure or pain
and not the result of the activity. This excludes all kinds of pleasures
resulting from the achievements or consequences of an activity. Func-
tional pleasure is pursued for the sake of the pleasure gaining from the
activity. One might also think of the Aristotelian connection between
pleasure and activities.62
Yet, Kraft argues that hedonism has never attempted to establish its
thesis in detail, that pleasure and pain are the only sources of distinc-
tion. Kraft relies on Heinrich Gomperz's critic on hedonism which "has
received far too little attention"63. According to Gomperz, there is a
variety of motivational sources such as habit, imitation, suggestion, or
compulsion.
(b) Feelings and emotions The dichotomy of pleasure and pain is not
enough to cover all phenomena to which values are assigned. Kraft,
therefore, analyses the relation between a distinction and aﬀective emo-
tions which have also been held to explain distinctions. Especially Scheler
and Hartmann64, and pupils of Brentano, Meinong and Ehrenfels have
declared feelings as the "empirical-psychological basis of value"65. And
also in recent papers, the role of emotions concerning the usage of thick
concepts is considered to be important. Chloë FitzGerald and Peter
Goldie (2012) say that emotional responses are tightly connected to the
thick, Allan Gibbard (1992) speaks of `warranted feelings' which are in-
volved in thick judgements, Christine Tappolet (2004) holds that thick
concepts are related to aﬀective states, and Jesse Prinz (2006) claims
61Kraft (1981 [1951], 54).
62Cf. books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.
63Kraft (1981 [1951], 51).
64According to Scheler, the emotional feeling possesses evidence and is a cognitive method
which equals the theoretical comprehension.
65Kraft (1981 [1951], 60).
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that there is an equivalence relation between emotions and moral judge-
ments.66 Kraft points out the importance of emotions concerning the
usage of value concepts, but he claims that the explanatory force of
feelings is overestimated: Often the arousal of feeling is simply a phe-
nomenon resulting from the fact that one is confronted with something
that he or she already distinguishes or values. The distinction in virtue
of feelings and aﬀective emotions is only secondary. For instance,
[i]t is not gratitude that bestows value upon the donor, the helper,
the provider; that he has already. Even where the gratitude is
lacking, where the gift, the act of kindness is accepted without a
murmur, the donor or helper may very well be distinguished, if
only as the source of these welcome services, available for repeated
exploitation. Thus the attribution of value to donor or provider does
not in the least depend upon the gratitude he evokes in the recipient.
He is distinguished by the fact of having caused enjoyment, by
having bestowed something that was desired; gratitude is simply a
consequence.67
The distinguishing function of emotions becomes clear when turning to
cases where the distinction is primary. As an example, Kraft takes the
story of a sixteen-year-old girl:
When my brother had scarlet fever, I had to spend seven weeks with
my dear grandmama. How I love to think about that time! It was
in winter, as it happened, and every evening in the twilight, when it
was still too early to light the lamp, grandma sat behind the stove.
I used to sit at her feet, with my head in her lap, and she'd tell me
about 1864 and 1866, and about the revolution of 1848. I listened,
enthralled, while she told me how she had to put the geese in the
attic and the lamp in the oven so that the Russians wouldn't notice
anything. Then, after the oil lamp had been lit, my grandma would
66Kraft would deny that emotions are necessary for a moral judgement because a moral
judge might utter a moral judgement insincerely without having the associated emotion.
It is needless to say that, in principle, a sincere moral judge needs to have the disposition
to have emotions. Kraft would certainly agree with Prinz that a psychopath cannot make
genuine moral judgements.
67Ibid., 62).
105
5.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIONS
sit on the sofa and knit; usually I would read to her from the Bible.
Such happy times  I wish they had never come to an end!68
The distinction of the girl is based on the mood of the whole situation,
primarily on the feeling of happiness. Feelings and emotions can occur
as primary sources of valuations when emotions are identiﬁed as a basis
for a distinction which is the case when calling something `wonderful',
`enchanting', and `lovable', or `abhorrent', `horrible', `frightful', `pitiable',
and `miserable'.69
Some cases might suggest that feelings and emotions could be reduced to
pleasure and pain70, but  as Kraft conﬁrms  this is not always possible.
Firstly, not all feelings contain pleasure or pain. E. g., esteem, gratitude,
or admiration are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Secondly, "in some
instances in which feelings are aroused, it is not the element of pleasure
or pain attaching to the object that determines the attitude towards it,
but the aﬀective excitement itself."71 According to Kraft, this is the case,
when an adventurer or a gambler seeks excitement as such. The seeking
of excitement also explains why horror or drama ﬁlms are distinguished
positively. Indeed, it could be objected that horror or drama ﬁlms are
valued because the release and quiescence following the suspense are
experienced as pleasant. Kraft argues that the pleasure emerges only
after the entire ﬁlm and that it would be quite unbelievable that one
only watches drama or horror ﬁlms for the pleasure of being released
from the torture and fear.72
(c) Other sources of distinction According to Kraft, other sources of dis-
tinction, which will be summarized below, "come to the fore principally
where the element of pleasure or pain is too weak and incidental for us
68Kraft (1981 [1951], 62).
69Cp. ibid., 63. FitzGerald & Goldie (2012) further mention shameful (feeling of shame),
disgusting (feeling of disgust), dangerous (feeling of fear), embarrassing (feeling of embarrass-
ment), infuriating (feeling of fury), and unjust (feeling of anger and resentment).
70Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 64). Kraft illustrates an example in which a two-year-old girl
sees a pair of doll's eyes. She was frightened by this object because she did not recognise it
as doll's eyes. Encouraged by her parents, she touched them and ﬁnally recognised them as
doll's eyes. Her fear vanished, she laughed and called the eyes `good little peepers'. In this
case, the distinguishing function of the emotions, then, can be reduced to the distinguishing
function of pleasure and pain.
71Ibid., 65.
72Cp. ibid., 66.
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to adopt an attitude towards an object because of it"73.
As a further source of distinction Kraft indicates the satisfaction of nat-
ural drives (unconscious and conscious):
We have thus uncovered a new and diﬀerent source of distinction:
the satisfaction of an unconscious need, of a drive. (. . .) Anything
that satisﬁes such a need thereby takes on special signiﬁcance for our
attitude, and when this special signiﬁcance is brought suﬃciently
into relief, then the thing is marked out, distinguished, in just the
way that other features are marked by their pleasantness." 74
The satisfaction of needs and drives is source for several valuations, e.
g. poisonous. Further instinctive drives which give rise to valuations are
organic needs: the need for nourishment, rest, physical functioning, sex-
ual and erotic needs, or social needs.75.
Equally, distinctions emerge by the satisfaction of conscious drives: de-
sires. For instance, medicine has positive value because it helps to fulﬁl
the desire to be healthy. If it would not be a means to an end, it might
lack the positive valuation. The value of medicine cannot be explained in
virtue of pleasure and pain because the medicine might have bitter taste
and hence it might be unpleasant. But the medicine is taken because an
ill person hopes to get healthy.
As a further source of distinction Kraft names habit: "The habitual be-
comes valuable simply by virtue of being the habitual."76 And vice versa:
Things are evaluated negatively when somebody is not used to them. For
instance, sometimes one might think that the new haircut of a friend is
unhandsome because it seems unusual at ﬁrst sight. When used to it,
this evaluation might change.
Last but not least, Kraft names derivative and adopted distinctions. For
instance, a widow might evaluative a shirt positively because it belongs
to her deceased husband, although she might have wanted him to throw
the shirt away when he was still alive. The distinction is derived from
the distinction of the husband. An adopted distinctions occurs when
73Ibid., 85.
74Ibid., 84.
75Cp. ibid., 85.
76Ibid., 97.
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something has been evaluated by someone else and this distinction is
adopted without scrutinising the evaluative point.77
5.4 Meaning of Value Judgements
Kraft's philosophy of values is subjective. This section will show that his the-
ory of value judgements is diﬀerentiated from a mere subjectivist point of view.
In the preceding section it has been shown that distinction is an individual phe-
nomenon: "It invariably emerges for one particular person only, existing, for
the nonce, solely for the person whose attitude is determined by the object that
is distinguished. (. . .) Distinction (. . .) exists only subjectively, for the individ-
ual."78 The subjective distinction ﬁnds expression in the personal opinion of
the subject. Subjective distinctions are expressed from a personal standpoint.
Regarding value judgements, however, there is a shift of perspective. Value
judgements are expressed from an inter-subjective standpoint. The distinction
which is expressed in value judgements is not individual, but impersonal.79
When forming a value judgement, the distinction is detached from subjective
experience. Rather, the value judgement is expressed to make others also agree
on the judgement. When uttering x is beautiful it is intended to say more than
just x pleases me.80 Rather, the speaker intends to express a challenge or an
instruction for the hearer to also adopt a certain attitude. A value judgement,
therefore, has two important characteristics: Value judgements are i) propo-
sitions about actual determinations of attitudes, and ii) general guidelines for
attitudes. For instance, if Anna says, The Mona Lisa is such a beautiful paint-
ing, she does not only want to say that she thinks that the Mona Lisa is a
beautiful painting and the she has a certain attitude towards the Mona Lisa,
but from an inter-subjective perspective she wants to say that the Mona Lisa
is a beautiful painting and she wants everyone to agree on her judgement.
Hence the meaning of an inter-subjective value judgement is to be understood
independently from the attitude of the speaker. Even if uttered by an indi-
vidual, a value judgement is to be understood as transcending the individual
opinion.81 There is a diﬀerence between Anna's utterance and the utterance of
77Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 102).
78Ibid., 129.
79By inter-subjective Kraft means that it holds for indeterminate persons. Cp. ibid.
80Cp. ibid., 130.
81Cp. ibid., 129.
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I think that the Mona Lisa is a beautiful painting. The latter is expressed from
a personal point of view, whereas the former is somehow demanding : It claims
to be objective in some way because "we regard it as inappropriate if others
form valuations disagreeing with ours; we simply contradict them". Further,
"[w]e consider our own valuation to be the correct one, that is, the one that is
binding for everyone"82. So, by uttering a value judgement, the speaker wants
everyone else to agree. Value judgements are precepts that ought to be recog-
nized, and instructions to adopt certain attitudes.83 However, the recognition
of the hearer cannot be forced and is always a personal act.
Although value judgements are more than the expression of an individual atti-
tude and often contain tick concepts that refer to some non-evaluative content,
value judgements are not objective in the way ordinary statements are because
of the value conveyed:
[A] value judgement may also include a factual content; indeed, value
concepts generally include a factual content in addition to their value
characteristic. But insofar as it expresses a value, with respect specif-
ically to its value signiﬁcance, a value judgement does not assert any
factual content.84
Value judgements cannot be true in the sense of "ﬁtting the facts".85 Yet, a
value judgement can be false in virtue of its non-evaluative content. Consider
the following example:
Petra: Mrs. Miller is such a nice person because she just brought me some
ﬂowers.
Paul: No, she isn't because she only brought you the ﬂowers because she thinks
that they are ugly and she didn't want them.
Paul has knowledge (that Mrs. Miller thinks that the ﬂowers are ugly) that
Petra does not have. In fact, Mrs. Miller does not have the kinds of features
which are necessary for a person to be called nice. For a value judgement to
be false it is a suﬃcient condition that the state of aﬀairs it assumes is false.86
82Ibid., 138.
83Cp. ibid., 199.
84Ibid.], 139.
85Ibid., 138.
86Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 140). The state of aﬀairs it assumes can be expressed by a
non-evaluative statement because of the separability of thick concepts. The non-evaluative
statement is veriﬁable.
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Although value utterances "take on an objectivity analogous to that of purely
descriptive propositions"87, truth cannot be assigned to them. Instead, Kraft
says that value judgements are either valid or invalid.88 Validity also applies
to any sort of rules, norms or laws. Valid rules of a game are binding and must
be followed, they are precepts or commands. As opposed to being, validity
always includes an ought. Kraft says:
The validity of a proposition is something other than its truth. (. . .)
Validity (. . .) pertains to the treatment of the proposition in our mental
actions: it is a normative consequence of its truth, bearing on our actual
behaviour. Truth does not consist in validity, nor is validity exhausted
by truth; it is, rather, a consequence of truth.89
But when is a value utterance valid? Value utterances stay valid, if they are
derived from more general valid utterances or stem from practical abductions.
This reduces the problem of validity to ﬁnding valid axiomatic principles of
evaluation. These principles of evaluation cannot be grounded ultimately, but
must be deﬁned by experts. It is the task of ethics to give deﬁnitions of
the supreme good and of the moral.90 The validity of the deﬁnitions is not
absolute, but only conditional and hypothetical.91
5.5 Conclusion
According to Kraft, a value judgement could only be true, if in fact everyone
agreed on it. But this is an unreal scenario. Thus value judgements cannot
be true or false. On the other hand, Kraft objects to the thesis of the logi-
cal positivists that value judgements are cognitively meaningless. By showing
that value judgements have non-evaluative content, Kraft implicitly rejects the
criterion of the logical positivists that value judgements are cognitively mean-
ingless. According to Hegselmann, that would even be a refutation of this
87Ibid., 130.
88"Validity" concerning values is introduced by Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who ascribes
validity to values. Although values do not exist, they may be imagined as objective and,
therefore, they exist at least in some way. Cp. Sander: (2001), S. 45-46. Kraft does not
ascribe validity to values but to value judgements and dismisses Lotze's assumption that
values are valid because values are concepts and validity does not apply to concepts. Cp.
Kraft (1981 [1951], 143).
89Ibid., 142.
90Cp.ibid., 152.
91Cp. ibid., 170.
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criterion because it is inappropriate.92 The criterion needs to be modiﬁed. In
Der Wiener Kreis, Kraft says that the initial criterion is too tight and that
later on even Carnap admitted this.93
An important concession of Kraft is that genuine disagreements about evalua-
tions cannot be solved because they do not only depend on the state of aﬀairs
it assumes, but are also determined by the evaluating subject. Two persons
can only agree if they agree about both the state of aﬀairs and if they share
the same attitude towards this state of aﬀairs. If they do not share the same
attitude, even if agreeing on all relevant facts, then contradicting valuations
emerge that are not capable of resolution.94
A realist about values can resolve any genuine disagreement about evaluations
by assuming some kind of inability, such as a blindness or a consequence of de-
ception, to explain why individuals disagree in their evaluations.95 Yet, Kraft
rejects a realism about values because he does not think that values are genuine
properties of objects: "Value cannot be reduced to the nature of an object;
it is not possible to point to an objective property, attaching, as a value, to
other objective properties. An objectivistic interpretation of value judgements
is therefore untenable."96 Instead, Kraft points out that values consist in a
relation between an evaluating subject and the evaluated object:
Value, then, is connected with the relation between the subject who
adopts an attitude and the object of the attitude; this relation is es-
sential to value. Diﬀerentiation of value into the various categories or
classes of value depends upon diﬀerentiation within the object-subject
relation, inasmuch as it occurs between various kinds of objects and
various forms of attitude. Hence absolute value, in the sense of some-
thing independent of the evaluating subject and the evaluated object, is
impossible, meaningless, because self contradictory.97
On the other hand, Kraft also rejects a subjectivism about values because he
thinks that value judgements are more than the mere expressions of emotions
or feelings. Indeed, value judgements are cognitively meaningful:
92Hegselmann (1979, 92).
93Cp. Kraft (1950, 167-168).
94Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 135-136).
95Cp. ibid., 134.
96Ibid., 131.
97Ibid., 48.
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5.5. CONCLUSION
The meaning of value judgements depends upon the meaning of value
concepts, for these are the components that actually evaluate. The sense
of value concepts has already been clariﬁed: in addition to an actual
value attribute, they generally also possess a material content. Insofar
as an object naturally corresponds to the material content of the value
concept predicated, the value judgement also states something about
the nature of an object.98
Kraft's meta-ethical might be classiﬁed as a hybrid-expressivist anti-realism
which is determined by the following assumptions:
1. Moral and ethical sentences are neither empirical nor analytical sentences.
Thus they lack truth value. (Basic assumption of non-cognitivism)
2. "Values are concepts"99 and not properties of objects or abstract objects.
(Refutation of value realism)
3. Value judgements are diﬀerent from mere expressives because they are ex-
pressed from an inter-subjective point of view and have a demanding character.
(Refutation of emotivism)
4. Value judgements are dependent from the evaluating subject. (Basic assump-
tion of subjectivism)
5. Thick concepts have both a non-evaluative and an evaluative element. (Basic
assumption of separationism)
6. Value judgements are not primarily normative or prescriptive, but distinguish-
ing and evaluative. (Delimitation to Hare's prescriptivism)
7. Attitudes are not projected as though they were real properties, attitudes are
ascribed to objects. (Delimitation to Blackburn's quasi-realism)100
98Kraft (1981 [1951], 131).
99Ibid., 143.
100Though sometimes, a quasi-realist interpretation of Kraft cannot be denied. For in-
stance, he says that "[i]n common parlance, value judgements are interpreted as proposi-
tions concerning properties objectively attributable to objects, in just the same way as other
properties". Ibid., 130.
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Chapter 6
A Kraftian Approach To The
Thick
The last chapter of this study aims to establish an approach to the thick by
integrating Kraft's ideas into the debate about the thick. This Kraftian ap-
proach is a hybrid-expressivist anti-realist theory of the thick which integrates
the idea that T-evaluations are conventional implicatures. At the end of the
chapter, this approach will be combined with the considerations about non-
evaluative concepts from chapter 4.
Moral or evaluative thoughts, and moral or evaluative language have to be dis-
tinguished when disputing the thick: On the level of thought, it can simply be
spoken of moral or value thoughts which are expressed through value or moral
judgements on the level of language. This distinction demands the proposed
theory to have two dimensions: It needs to explain value thoughts on the level
of thought and value judgements on the level of language. In sections 1-4 it
will be started with the latter before it is turned to moral thoughts in section
5.
6.1 Semantics of Value Judgements
First of all, the Kraftian approach will appear to be a semantic view stating
that T-evaluations are conventional implicatures (CVIs). In order to defend a
semantic view, it is necessary to show that pragmatic views are questionable,
especially Väyrynen's theory which seems to be the most elaborated pragmatic
view so far.
6.1. SEMANTICS OF VALUE JUDGEMENTS
Hence, this study aims to show that i) Väyrynen's arguments against the CVI
view fail (section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), and ii) his own view is not as simple as
maintained (section 6.1.3). Afterwards a semantic view will be defended by
demonstrating that iii) a semantic view is much more convincing, and iv) the
CVI view which is both semantic and separationist is a promising approach to
the thick.
But ﬁrst of all, the argumentation starts with aﬃrming Väyrynen's thesis
that T-evaluations of T-sentences are not-at-issue in conversations because
this is also necessary for a CVI view. Not-at-issue content involves that a) T-
evaluations cannot be directly assented or dissented with, b) T-evaluations do
not address the question under discussion, and c) the relevant set of alternative
answers to a question is determined by the at-issue content.1 To show that T-
evaluations are not-at-issue, some remarks about T-evaluations of T-sentences
that involve paradigmatic thick concepts will be made ﬁrst. This secures that
the data also ﬁt paradigmatic thick concepts, and not just objectionable thick
concepts.
6.1.1 T-Evaluations and At-Issueness
Väyrynen's approach is based on thick concepts that are in principle open to
being regarded as objectionable. If someone is not religious, concepts arising
in religious contexts, such as lewd, chaste, or blasphemous are obviously ob-
jectionable. Showing that, e. g., cruel, or just are `principally open to being
regarded as objectionable' is a more diﬃcult task.2 Hence, imagine a radical
nihilist. The radical nihilist speaks German properly and, therefore, he or she
does not appear as a radical nihilist at ﬁrst sight. But he or she is some kind
of outsider regarding our moral community and is not even aware of it: The
radical nihilist objects to all the values shared by human beings, but since he
or she speaks German properly, his or her usage of good conveys a positive
evaluation and the usage of bad conveys a negative evaluation, although all
values are denied. The radical nihilist knows the values usually shared by hu-
man beings, but he refuses to value anything. As will become clear from the
following examples, the radical nihilist supports Väyrynen's view that every
thick concept is objectionable.
1These are the relevant tests to identify the intended at-issue-content of speech acts
described in Tonhauser (2012).
2Roberts (2015, 912) also emphasizes this criticism.
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Väyrynen's thesis that T-evaluations of thick concepts are a matter of pragmat-
ics rests on the assumption that T-evaluations are not-at-issue in conversations.
So, it should also be possible to show that T-evaluations of paradigmatic thick
concepts are not-at-issue, when the radical nihilist's point of view is taken.
To conﬁrm a) that T-evaluations cannot be directly assented or dissented
with, suppose that the radical nihilist takes part in a conversation between
paciﬁsts, but he or she is not aware that the participants of the conversation
reject any kind of violence. One participant says that (1):
(1) Foltern ist GRAUsam.3
`Torture is CRUel.'
The radical nihilist disagrees with the speaker that torture is cruel because
the nihilist objects to the negative evaluation which the use of cruel conveys.
Uttering (1a) the nihilist thus only denies that torture is cruel, but he or she
cannot express his or her point of view that torture should not be called cruel
because it conveys that torture is somehow bad in way. If the nihilist utters
(1a), the paciﬁsts participating in the debate might think that the radical ni-
hilist is a defender of torture which would be false likewise.
(1a) Nein, das stimmt nicht!
`No, that's not right!'
However, the radical nihilist does not want to imply that torture is not cruel.
Therefore, he or she must interpose (1b), in order to express his rejection of
the conveyed evaluation:
(1b) Augenblick mal, Foltern ist in keiner Weise gut oder schlecht!
`Wait a minute! Torture is neither good nor bad in any way!'
The radical nihilist cannot interpose (1a) because he or she cannot directly
dissent with the rejected evaluation. If he or she wants to show his or her ob-
jection of the negative evaluation concerning cruelty, he or she has to interrupt
the conversation by the Wait-a-minute-phrase as in (1b).
To conﬁrm b) that T-evaluations do not address the question under discussion,
suppose that the participants of the discussion are bewildered by the radical
3In this chapter I use German example sentences because German is my mother tongue.
A syllable is stressed to indicate the at-issue-content of the utterance.
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nihilist's interruption. One woman thinks that the radical nihilist might have
misunderstood the statement in (1). Instead, she asks the radical nihilist:
(2) WAS ist Foltern?
`WHAT is torture?'
The radical nihilist immediately comprehends the woman's confusion. Hence,
he or she explains his objection to the conveyed evaluation by uttering (2a):
(2a) ] Das absichtliche und wissentliche Zufügen von Schmerzen ist weder gut
noch schlecht.
] `Inﬂicting pain deliberately and knowingly is neither good nor bad.'4
This response, however, is not answering the question under discussion be-
cause it is not at-issue whether inﬂicting pain deliberately and knowingly is
good or bad. Rather, all participants  except from the nihilist  silently agree
that the deliberate inﬂiction of pain is bad in a way because they all are paci-
ﬁsts.
Finally, the following example also shows c) that the relevant set of alternative
answers to a question is determined by the at-issue content. A mediator wants
to skip the confusion with the radical nihilist by taking up the utterance in
(1). The mediator asks the other participants:
(3) Was meinen Sie? Ist Foltern GRAUsam?
`Want do you think? Is torture CRUel?'
Then, (3a) would be an adequate answer, whereas (3b) would be less ade-
quate. The nihilist's reply in (3c) would fail to answer the question under
discussion. Instead, the remark would bring a topic up for discussion the paci-
ﬁsts do not even have to discuss:
4The nihilist uses pain in a non-evaluative fashion.
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(3a) Ja, Foltern ist grausam, weil dem Opfer absichtlich und wissentlich
Schmerzen zugefügt werden.
`Yes, torture is cruel because pain is inﬂicted deliberately and knowingly
on the victim.'
(3b) ? Ja, weil Foltern etwas Schlechtes ist.
? `Yes, torture is somehow bad.'
(3c) ] Wie ich bereits erwähnt habe, ist das absichtliche und wissentliche Zufü-
gen von Schmerzen weder gut noch schlecht.
] `As I have already mentioned inﬂicting pain deliberately and knowingly
is neither good nor bad.'
This shows that the relevant set of alternative answers to a question is de-
termined by the at-issue content. So, all three tests support the assumption
that T-evaluations of T-sentences are not-at-issue.
6.1.2 T-Evaluations, Semantic Presuppositions, and Con-
ventional Implicatures
Yet, the not-at-issueness of T-evaluations is not suﬃcient for thick concepts to
be a matter of pragmatics because there are propositions that are not-at-issue
but are semantic implications of sentences. For instance, presuppositions and
conventional implicatures are also not at-issue, but they are widely held to be a
matter of semantics. So, pointing out that T-evaluations are not-at-issue does
not unravel the mystery whether T-evaluations are a matter of pragmatics or
not.
Väyrynen raises two objections against the view that T-evaluations are seman-
tic presuppositions: the `triggering problem' and the `appropriateness prob-
lem'. The former concerns the necessity to show that thick terms actually be-
have as presupposition triggers which might not be too problematic because it
could be examined individually for each thick term (there are not so many thick
concepts), if it works as a trigger. The latter problem is that T-evaluations
cannot always become common ground because they might be rejected (as in
the case of lewd). Here, it could be objected that not the T-evaluation be-
comes common ground, but rather the information that the speaker evaluates
the explicit display of sexuality negatively, when calling something lewd. Sup-
pose, ﬁve people who are complete strangers get to know each other because
they are in the same room and start to have a conversation. At the beginning
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of the conversation, there is only few information in the common ground, e.
g. information about the room or the building in which they are, the inten-
tion why they are in this room, or current happenings that are in the media.
The people might talk about trivial things and A might tell the others that
he or she is planing to go to Madonna's upcoming stage show. Thereupon, B
answers that he or she is not going to see the stage show because he or she
thinks that it is lewd. Thereby, it becomes common knowledge that B thinks
negatively about explicit sexuality. However, the others must not agree that
Madonna's stage show is bad in virtue of its explicit display of sexuality. The
presupposition which is triggered by thick terms is a proposition about the
values of the speaker. Therefore, it need not be agreed with Väyrynen that
the appropriateness problem is an actual problem.
Yet, there are three further problems concerning the presupposition view:
Firstly, it is diﬃcult to give the content of T-evaluations propositionally when
it comes to less objectionable thick concepts such as cruel. Cruelty might have
something to do with inﬂicting pain deliberately and knowingly, but it cannot
be reduced to it. This fact is not in favour of a presupposition view. Rather, it
advances a conventional implicatures view because, as Potts emphasizes, "the
alleged conventional implicature content is extremely hard to articulate"5.
Secondly, T-evaluations do less function as background information, but are
rather speaker-oriented side comments.6 Imagine, a person x inﬂicts pain de-
liberately and knowingly. Only if a speaker intends to evaluate x negatively,
he or she calls x `cruel'. Equally, only if a speaker intends to stress the dif-
ference between being poor and being pretty, he or she calls someone `poor
but pretty'. If the speaker does not assume that poor people usually are not
pretty, he or she would say that someone is `poor and pretty', but the speaker
would not apply `but'.
Thirdly, T-evaluations  contrary to presuppositions  do not survive embed-
ding in plugs because they are speaker-oriented. If embedded in belief reports,
presuppositions survive whereas conventional implicatures are blocked:
5Potts (2014, 30), cf. also Potts (2007, 172).
6Cf. Potts (2012).
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a. Jones believes that Carla stopped smoking, but I think she never smoked.
b. ] Jones believes that Madonna's lewd stage show is on Saturday, but I think
the show isn't bad in any way for its sexual display.
The T-evaluation in b. is not blocked since the speaker of the sentence must
necessarily be a lewd-user. If the speaker disagrees that Madonna's stage show
is lewd, he or she needs to say rather something like c.:
c. Jones believes that Madonna's stage show is lewd and that it is on Saturday,
but I think the show isn't bad in any way for its sexual display.
These evidence make it likely that T-evaluations are rather conventional im-
plicatures. Väyrynen maintains that T-evaluations cannot be conventional
implicatures because they behave contrarily when embedded in "whether-or-
not"-phrases. In what follows a counterexample will be given, in order to use
it as an argument for a conventional implicature (CVI) view of the thick.
Suppose, three friends, Peter, Martin and Greg, are talking about Madonna's
upcoming show. Peter and Martin are ultra-traditional Catholics, and, there-
fore, they evaluate the explicit display of sexuality negatively. To indicate their
displeasure, they call such explicit displays of sexuality `lewd'. Greg, however,
seems to be more liberal. He ﬁnds nothing condemnable in displaying sexuality
and rejects the value  the negative evaluation of sexual display  his friends
convey when calling something lewd. Suppose further that they are having
a dispute about going to Madonna's show. Peter and Martin disagree about
whether Madonna's stage show is lewd or not:
(1) Peter: Madonna's stage show is lewd.
(2) Martin: Madonna's stage show isn't lewd.
Their value judgements are contradictory, that is, they are having a genuine
disagreement. Peter might think that Madonna will only wear a mini skirt
and a bikini top. He might utter something like (3):
(3) Peter: Ich habe ein Foto von ihr auf der Bühne gesehen. Sie hat nur einen
kurzen Rock und ein Bikini-Oberteil getragen. Sie zeigt eindeutig
zu viel Haut!
`I've seen a picture of her at her stage show. She's only wearing a
mini skirt and a bikini top. She's deﬁnitely showing too much skin!'
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Martin might answer something like (4):
(4) Martin: Ich habe das Foto auch gesehen. Ihr Rock ist knielang und sie
trägt ein Tank-Top.
`I've seen that picture, too. Her skirt is knee-length and she's
wearing a tank top.'
Greg is annoyed by their dispute. He is looking for a possibility to interrupt
and convince them that they should go to the show nonetheless. He answers
(5):
(5) Greg: Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it would be in no way
bad for that.7
Further, he might add (6):
(6) Greg: Deshalb denke ich, dass wir auf jeden Fall hingehen sollten.
`That's why I think, we should go there anyway.'
Väyrynen says that a denial of the form of (5) is acceptable to a lewd-objector,
in this case, to Greg. Yet, a denial of the form of (7) is defective:
(7) ? Whether or not life is short but sweet, there would be no contrast between
life being short and life being sweet.8
He concludes that this is evidence against the view that T-evaluations are
conventional implicatures.
Both Matthew Bedke and Brent Kyle hold that (5) strike them as semanti-
cally improper.9 But, for the sake of argument, the acceptability of (5) will
be granted. Instead, examples of conventional implicatures will be alleged
where i) a "whether-or-not"-phrase like in (5) seems unacceptable, and ii) (7)
a "whether-or-not"-phrase like in (7) seems acceptable.
Let us consider the following situation: Peter and Martin are not only ultra-
traditional Catholics, but also racists. They are talking about a mutual friend,
Marco, who is half German half Italian. Peter utters (8) and Martin disagrees
by uttering (9):
7Väyrynen (2013, 104).
8Ibid.
9Cp. Bedke (2014) and Kyle (2015).
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(8) Marco ist ein Kraut.
`Marco is a Kraut.'
(9) Nein, ist er nicht.
`No, he isn't.'
Peter and Martin are disagreeing about whether being half German is suf-
ﬁcient for being a Kraut. Greg wants to intervene and says (10):
(10) ? Egal ob Marco ein Kraut ist oder nicht, er ist in keiner Weise schlecht
deswegen.
? `Whether or not Marco is a Kraut, he is in no way bad for that.'
Although there is still a controversy about the status of pejoratives, they are
widely held to be CVIs.10 Yet, if (5) is judged to be a proper objection, then
surely (10) is, too. (10) would then be an example of a CVI where the denial
is acceptable.
Still, someone could protest that (10) is unacceptable for a liberal person who
objects to racist values because it might be unacceptable that Greg even dares
uttering a racist word.11 Therefore, let us imagine that the radical nihilist
participates in a dispute about the slaughtering of animals. Both Peter and
Martin participate in the discussion. As usually, Peter and Martin disagree
about the slaughtering of animals:
(11) Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
`Slaughtering animals is cruel.'
(12) Martin: Nein, es ist nicht grausam, obwohl ich zugebe, dass das Schlachten
von Tieren nicht gut ist.
`No, it isn't cruel, though I admit that slaughtering animals isn't
good.'
The radical nihilist wants to object against both of their value judgements
and interposes:
10Cp. Potts (2007). Potts does not speak of `evaluative content', but of `expressive
content'. Yet, evaluative content seems to be intended. For instance, Potts says that the
expressive content of `The bastard Kresge is famous' is `Kresge is a {bastard/bad in the
speaker's opinion}'. Cp. Potts (2007, 168).
11Väyrynen (2013, 70, no. 43) also says that racial slurs in the form of (10) might be
unacceptable because slurs are taboo words.
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(13) ? Egal ob das Schlachten von Tieren grausam ist oder nicht, es ist in
keiner Weise schlecht deswegen.
? `Whether or not slaughtering animals is cruel, it is in no way bad for
that.'
The radical nihilist is justiﬁed to use the term `cruel' because he or she is
a competent speaker and is aware that the use of cruel conveys a negative
evaluation.12
But if someone thinks that (13) is odd, consequently, (5) should be unaccept-
able, too. So far, two things have been done. Firstly, in (10) an example of a
CVI has been introduced that seems acceptable. Secondly, in (13) an example
of a thick concept has been found that might be unacceptable. This is already
strong evidence that the "whether-or-not"-test is unreliable to test for CVIs.
An ultimate proof could be given, if a typical conventional implicature could
be found where the test fails. This is diﬃcult because hardly anybody would
ever take into consideration to deny that but expresses some contrast.
Let us take a case into consideration where an utterance is based on a false
belief. Imagine, Peter, Martin and Greg give a dinner party. As might not
be expected otherwise, Peter and Martin disagree about the amount of guests
being at their party. Peter is a self-centred person and he thinks that he is
popular and, therefore, he is disappointed about there being only ﬁve guests at
their party. Martin, however, seems to be more reﬂective. Indeed, he did not
expect anybody to join a party held by two ultra-traditional Catholic racists:
(14) Peter: Kaum jemand ist auf der Party.
`There is barely anybody at the party.'13
(15) Martin: Nein, das stimmt nicht. Es ist nicht nur kaum jemand auf unserer
Party.
`No, that's not true. There ist not only barely anyone at our
party.'
In the meantime, the ﬁve guests are annoyed because Peter and Martin quarrel
all the time. They decide to leave the party without telling anybody. Greg is
the only one to realize that they are leaving. Peter and Martin are too busy
12Väyrynen (ibid., 71) admits that Whether or not bullying is cruel, it's in no way worse
for knowingly inﬂicting much more substantial damage on others than is necessary is "at
least odd or questionable". He concludes that his account might not be generalized to all
thick concepts.
13This implicates that there is at least someone at the party.
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with ﬁghting to realize that all the guests left. Greg, too, is annoyed by Martin
and Peter and gives relieve to his anger:
(16) (Immer streitet ihr, aber) egal ob kaum jemand auf der Party ist oder nicht,
tatSÄCHlich ist niemand auf der Party.
`(You're always having a ﬁght, but) whether or not there is barely anybody
at the party, ACtually there is no one at the party.'14
In this situation, (16) might be an acceptable answer and it is also uncon-
troversial that barely gives rise to a CVI.15
So, (16) could be an example of a paradigmatic CVI where a "whether-or-
not"-answer is acceptable. Hence it is doubtful if the test gives evidence that
T-evaluations are not CVIs.
Besides from the considerations just made, the CVI view has also been chal-
lenged in section 3.4.1 because CVIs might not be detachable. Bedke who
supports the view that T-evaluations might be CVIs holds that "the test can-
not provide evidence against the conventional implicature view" because "[i]t
only goes one way: if detachable, that's some evidence of conventional im-
plication. If, by contrast, there are no truth-conditional substitutes for thick
terms, and so the global evaluations are non-detachable, that simply shows
something about the poverty of our language"16. So, the diﬃculty to show
that T-evaluations are detachable does neither hold against the CVI View. So
far, the study showed that Väyrynen's arguments against a CVI view are not
as eﬀective as he suggests.
6.1.3 The Problem of Generalization and its Consequences
Reservations might be appropriate that a pragmatic view is not suitable for
all thick concepts: Väyrynen's pragmatic view holds for thick concepts that
are in principle open to being regarded as objectionable, but it might not hold
for every thick concept or not even for thin concepts. This might be called the
problem of generalization. Väyrynen admits that the problem of generalization
poses a real threat to his view:
14That there is no one at the party is the negation of the conventional implicature of (14).
15Yet, responses to this example have been diﬀerent. Some agreed that (16) is an ac-
ceptable utterance, some did not. Hence it is left open to the reader's intuition to decide
whether (16) is acceptable or not.
16Bedke (2014).
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Suppose the Pragmatic View were plausible only with respect to ob-
jectionable thick terms and concepts, and the other sorts of terms that
fall into the class of thick terms and concepts required some other ac-
count. Wouldn't this mean (contrary to my claim in chapter 4) that the
Pragmatic View is in fact not simpler and more uniﬁed than rival expla-
nations of the data concerning objectionable thick terms and concepts
which are compatible with Inherently Evaluative?17
He tries to mitigate this objection by holding that even just is objectionable
and that any thick concept not regarded as being objectionable might still be
in principle open to being regarded as objectionable.18 However, this explana-
tion seems quite unsatisfactory. Yet, if paradigmatic thick concepts which are
not open to being regarded as objectionable must be treated diﬀerently from
objectionable thick concepts, then a pragmatic view is not a simpler explana-
tion at all. Even if any thick concept is at least in principle open to being
regarded as objectionable, thin concepts are still not even principally open to
being regarded as objectionable and must therefore be treated diﬀerently.19
Thus, a view that can explain thin and thick concepts, and maybe even pejo-
ratives and emotives is preferable, even if  contrary to Grice's razor claim 
semantic posits cannot be avoided.
Another advantage of a CVI view is that the evaluations conveyed by pejora-
tives are held to be CVIs, as well. If this is true, it would make the theory
consistent for any thick concept, but also for thin concepts, and pejoratives.
Regarding CVIs, Christopher Potts (2007) holds a multidimensional seman-
tic view about expressives. An expressivist version of the CVI view has been
proposed by Stephen Barker. His analysis of T is good is the following:
Implicature Theory (IT) If U asserts the sentence `T is good', then
U denotes a property F by `good' and:
17Väyrynen (2013, 149).
18Ibid., 150.
19Eklund (2011, 39-40) thinks that an account which treats thick concepts and epithets
in the same way unsatisfactory, but nevertheless thick concepts and epithets are still quite
diﬀerent. In section 6.3 it will be demonstrated that having a certain attitude is not concep-
tually conveyed by the use of the thick, whereas attitude and evaluation are deeply entangled
in the case of epithets. For instance, a book might be called `interesting' although it is ac-
tually boring. But one cannot call someone else a `Kraut', if he or she does not condemn
Germans. The use of Kraut would be defective, if the judge does not have the relevant
attitude towards Germans. Equally, Marco is a Kraut, and I despise Germans is redundant
which shows that the attitude is already contained in the use of epithets.
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(i) U expresses-as-explicature the content that T is F
(ii) U expresses-as-implicature the content that U is committed to ap-
proval of F-things
(iii) U conveys that she believes the contents in (i) and (ii)
(iv) U conveys that she approves of T.20
Barker's theory is a dual content theory because the sentence T is good has
both truth-conditional content (T is F ) and non-truth-conditional content (U
approves of T in virtue of its being F ). Since the expressivist content is CVI
content, x is good and x is F both have the same truth-conditions. Barker's
view might be taken as a ﬁrst starting point to establish a CVI view, although
an attentive reader might be sceptical about the determinate explicature con-
tent in his analysis.
As indicated above, the proposed account will be compatible with Kraft's ideas
about thick concepts. Naturally, CVIs do not matter in Kraft's account be-
cause they have not been `detected' and theoretically described at the time
The Foundations were published. But although Kraft never explicitly men-
tions that the evaluation is conventionally connected to value terms, this would
nicely ﬁt his view because it is not contradictory to anything he says and Kraft
even implicitly agrees that T-evaluations are not-at-issue because they cannot
be directly assented or dissented with. According to him, a direct negation
of a value judgement is a negation of the non-evaluative content and not of
the evaluative content: "Refutation of a value judgement concerns the state
of aﬀairs undergoing evaluation, which is the source of the error; it does not
concern the value characteristic"21.
6.2 Truth of Value Judgements
In the preceding section, the idea was evolved that both a semantic presuppo-
sition view and a CVI view might be hopeful candidates for an adequate theory
about the thick. One argument speaking in favour of a CVI view is that it is
hard to articulate T-evaluations propositionally. The view that the evaluation
is semantically linked to a value judgement containing a thick concept is neu-
tral concerning cognitivism and non-cognitivism. David Copp, for instance,
20Barker (2000, 271).
21Kraft (1981 [1951], 140).
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defends a CVI view that is compatible with cognitivism. However, based on
Kraft's thoughts it will be contended that value judgements are diﬀerent from
ordinary purely non-evaluative sentences and hence lack truth-conditions in
the sense of non-evaluative sentences. Here Kraft's idea will be adopted that
it is more reasonable to speak of the validity of value judgements, instead.
Reconsider Martin and Peter's disagreement in (1) about slaughtering animals:
(1) a. Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
`Slaughtering animals is cruel.'
b. Martin: Nein, das Schlachten von Tieren ist nicht grausam.
`No, slaughtering animals isn't cruel.'
According to cognitivism, the disagreement in (1) is genuine because Peter
and Martin are arguing about facts  moral facts. But from now on, a realist
interpretation of this disagreement will be dropped and an anti-realist inter-
pretation will be described.
Subjectivists about value judgements hold that the disagreement in (1) is a
faultless disagreement because subjectivists deny that one of them could be
wrong. Instead, both Peter and Martin only report their attitudes towards the
slaughtering of animals. A subjectivist interpretation, hence, does not pro-
mote our investigation.
Let us compare the disagreement in (1) with the disagreement in (2) assum-
ing that there are no moral or evaluative facts. Then the disagreement in (1)
seems to be diﬀerent from the disagreement in (2):
(2) a. Peter: Tiere werden nicht betäubt, bevor sie getötet werden.
`Animals aren't stunned before slaughter.'
b. Martin: Nein, das stimmt nicht. Sie werden betäubt, bevor sie getötet
werden.
`No, that's not true. Animals are stunned before slaughter.'
The diﬀerence between (1) and (2) is that the latter is a disagreement about
facts whereas the former is a disagreement about values.
Isidora Stojanovic (2012) formulates four assumptions about value disagree-
ments that cannot be true altogether22:
1. Peter in (1a.) and Martin in (1b.) disagree and contradict each other.
22These assumptions are held for value terms such as `it is sad that'. Yet, these assump-
tions also ﬁt for thick terms.
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2. Neither Peter in (1a.) nor Martin in (1b.) express falsehoods.
3. Both (1a.) and (1b.) have truth values.
4. For any two utterances u1 and u2: If u1 is true, then u2 is false, and if u1 is
false then u2 is true. ⇒ The utterer of u1 disagrees with the utterer of u2, and
they contradict each other.
Barely anyone would deny that either (2a.) or (2b.) must be true because their
truth value depends on facts. A subjectivist about values cannot say that ei-
ther (1a.) or (1b.) is true because these value judgements lack truth-value. A
non-cognitivist denies the third assumption, whereas a cognitivist argues that
both (1) and (2) are genuine disagreements because in (1) Peter and Martin
disagree about value facts and either Peter or Martin has the wrong attitude
concerning the slaughtering of animals. So, a realist about values rejects the
second assumption.
A test that is in favour of a subjectivist view of T-sentences is the German
ﬁnden23-test. According to this test, there is evidence that value judgements
containing thick terms behave more like subjective judgements of taste than
factual statements. Consider (3):
(3) a. Peter: Ich ﬁnde, das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
`I ﬁnd slaughtering animals is cruel.'
b. Peter: ] Ich ﬁnde, sie nicht werden betäubt, bevor sie getötet werden.
] `I ﬁnd animals aren't stunned before slaughter.'
Value judgements as in (3a.) can be combined with ﬁnden, whereas factual
statements cannot be combined with ﬁnden. So the ﬁnden-test is usually con-
sulted, in order to diﬀerentiate between matters of fact and matters of taste.
Value judgements seem to behave similar to subjective judgements of taste.
If both Peter and Martin use ﬁnden as in (4), their disagreement is faultless
because they only report their attitudes towards the slaughtering of animals:
23German ﬁnden is close to English ﬁnd, but according to Umbach, the latter is more
restricted in distribution. Sometimes German ﬁnden cannot be translated with English ﬁnd
and think or consider is a better option although it does not mean the same. Cp. Umbach
(2014, 2). The diﬀerence between English ﬁnd, think, and consider are also explained in
Kennedy (2012).
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(4) a. Peter: Ich ﬁnde, dass das Schlachten von Tieren grausam ist.
`I ﬁnd that slaughtering animals is cruel.'
b. Martin: Ich ﬁnde, dass das Schlachten von Tieren nicht grausam ist.
`I ﬁnd that slaughtering animals isn't cruel.'
This means that concerning ﬁnden value judgements containing thick concepts
behave similar to judgements of taste. This is an argument that value judge-
ments might be subjective. Admittedly, this is not a desirable consequence
because value judgements should not be equivalent to judgements of taste.
Instead, this section aims to show that the disagreement in (1) about the cru-
elty of slaughtering animals is a genuine disagreement and that one of their
judgements might be defective. Why should Martin deny Peter's judgement
in the ﬁrst place, if Peter's judgement was only subjective?
Kraft's account oﬀers a solution to this problem. According to him, a dis-
tinction "emerges for one particular person only (. . .), solely for the person
whose attitude is determined by the object that is distinguished"24. A dis-
tinction is only valid for the speaker, at the time and place of the speech-act.
Thus, distinctions are nondisplaceable which Pott also counts as a property
of emotives.25 But value judgements are diﬀerent from distinctions because
they are expressed from a diﬀerent point of view: Distinctions are expressed
from a personal standpoint, whereas general value judgements express an in-
tersubjective view. Value judgements are uttered to convince others also to
agree on the judgement. These two types of value judgements are close to
their linguistic form. When Peter says that he ﬁnds that slaughtering animals
is cruel, he may not intend to persuade Martin to agree with him. He only
expresses his own opinion. Also, Martin cannot directly dissent with Peter's
statement because he cannot deny that Peter ﬁnds this so. However, he can
directly dissent with Peter's statement, if Peter says that slaughtering animals
is cruel. In this case, Peter intends Martin to agree with him. If embedded in
German ﬁnden, the speaker expresses a distinction that is his own attitude. If
stated as a proposition, the speaker not only ascribes properties to the object.
Rather, he or she utters the judgement as if these properties really belong to
the object, as if these properties are real properties of the object. The speaker
kind of wants the proposition to be true, or at least acts as if it was true. This
is why Kraft says that "such judgements take on an objectivity analogous to
24Kraft (1981 [1951], 129).
25Cp. Potts (2007, 169-173).
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that of purely descriptive propositions"26. When uttering a value judgement
the speaker intends to convince the other to adopt his or her attitude towards
the non-evaluative content expressed in the statement. Thus, according to
Kraft, (1) is a genuine disagreement because both Peter and Martin want to
persuade the other that they base their utterance on false beliefs, or that their
attitude towards the slaughtering of animals is inappropriate.
The major diﬀerence between disagreements about matters of taste and dis-
agreements about value judgements concerns their pragmatics. Consider the
disagreements about liquorice in (5):
(5) a. Peter: This Liquorice is tasty.
b. Martin: No, that's not true. Liquorice isn't tasty at all.
This disagreement cannot be resolved because it rests on matters of taste
and not on questions about facts. The disagreement in (1), however, seems to
be resolvable because both Peter and Martin could try to convince the other
that the opposing judgement is based on false believes or that the other has
too less knowledge to be an adequate judge of the situation. Martin could
argue that animals are not stunned before slaughter. This fact could convince
Peter that Martin is right. However, Martin surely cannot change his taste
concerning liquorice because he has no inﬂuence on changing his taste. Even
if he knew that the ingredients of the liquorice are from controlled biological
cultivation, Martin would surely still ﬁnd that liquorice is not tasty. If the
disagreement in (1) cannot be resolved, despite a long debate, it is a question
about how they evaluate the assumed states of aﬀairs, that is, what kinds of
reactions are provoked in them by these states of aﬀairs. Peter is sensible to
the cruelty of slaughtering animals and Martin is not. Opinions and attitudes
often evade rational argumentations. But disagreements in attitude are less
often than disagreements in beliefs because most often it is disagreed about
the facts which are subject to the evaluation.27 Only if the disputants agree on
all relevant facts and still disagree in their value judgements, then they have
a disagreement in attitude.28
According to Kraft, truth is not the relevant criterion for value judgements:
26Kraft (1981 [1951], 130).
27Cp. ibid., 141.
28Stojanovic interprets such a disagreement as a practical disagreement because Martin
and Peter disagree about the extension of lewd.
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"Truth in the sense of ﬁtting the facts does not in any way constitute a vantage
point from which value judgements may be legitimized."29 More important are
the reasons in virtue of which a value judgement is held to be valid or invalid.
Only if these reasons are known, it can be debated about the evaluation of
the assumed states of aﬀairs. As in (1), either Martin or Peter might realize
that his value utterance is based on false beliefs. If someone utters a value
judgement which others would immediately refute, protesting that the other is
wrong has absolutely no argumentative force. Instead, one must show in virtue
of which reasons the stated value judgement is judged to be invalid. The claim
that value judgements lack truth does not necessarily result in a hard subjec-
tivism that there never are any `right' answers. Furthermore, it might even
be an unsatisfactory description to say that value judgements express moral
beliefs, if someone utters a value judgement containing thick concepts. If a
speaker utters a value judgements, he or she is doing way more than just giv-
ing information: Value judgements can tell us about the speaker's intentions,
attitudes, or desires. So, in conversations it might often be more important to
learn that one speaker thinks that Madonna's stage show is lewd, or that he
or she thinks that slaughtering animals is cruel because this tells us something
about the speaker. One of the most important things about ethics is that there
is a lively discourse about the good and the bad (and the lewd, or the cruel)!
According to Kraft, value judgements are neither true nor false, but valid.
Speaking with Barker, "the usual deﬁnitions of validity, which are applica-
ble to formal and purely truth-conditional languages, are not appropriate"30.
Hence Barker suggests the following alternative deﬁnition of the validity of
value judgements:
Val: An argument of the form S1 . . . Sn ` R is valid iﬀ the combined correctness-
conditions for {S1 . . . Sn} are not compossible with the non-obtaining of the
correctness-conditions for R.31
According to Barker, "the value (implicature) content enters signiﬁcantly into
the validity of the argument in accordance with Val"32 and, consequently, the
29Kraft (1981 [1951], 138).
30Barker (2000, 273).
31Ibid., 274. Ridge (2006, 326) suggests a similar deﬁnition of validity: "An argument is
valid just in case any possible believer who accepts all of the premises but at one and the
same time denies that conclusion would thereby be guaranteed to have inconsistent beliefs."
32Barker (2000, 274).
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Frege-Geach problem does not occur.
6.3 Pragmatics of Value Judgements
According to Kraft, persuasion is one function of value judgements. But as
section 5.3.2 showed, the use of value predicates provokes reactions in human
beings so that there often is a certain attitude towards the evaluated object.
However, having a certain attitude is not necessarily linked to the evaluation
in contrast to what some expressivists hold.
Hybrid-expressivist views have been discussed in detail recently.33 The central
claim is that value judgements express both beliefs and desire-like aspects34 and
that moral conversations might have other purposes besides from giving infor-
mation.35 In contrast to traditional expressivisist views, hybrid-expressivism
can also have a realist colouring36 and they can be both semantic or prag-
matic. Semantic versions hold that the attitudinal content is a conventional
implicature37, whereas pragmatic versions claim that it arises conversation-
ally38. Unlike the semantic view defended here these accounts hold that the
implicature does not consist of an evaluation, but rather of an approval or
disapproval of the stated non-evaluative content. Finlay and Strandberg argue
that the attitudinal content is only pragmatically linked to value judgements
because it can easily be cancelled.39 For instance, (1) is neither defective nor
contradictory:
33Barker (2000), Copp (2001; 2009), Finlay (2004; 2005), Ridge (2006; 2009), Strandberg
(2012; 2015). Michael Ridge rather uses the term `ecumenical expressivism'. The value
judgements in these views are judgements containing thin concepts. But since the diﬀerence
between thickness and thinness is rather a matter of degree than an absolute distinction,
their views can easily be transferred to the debate about the thick.
34Cp. Fletcher (2014, 848).
35Cp. Strandberg (2012, 102).
36Proponents of realist views are Copp, Finlay and Strandberg, whereas Ridge is a pro-
ponent of an anti-realist view.
37Barker (2000), Copp (2001; 2009)
38Finlay (2004; 2005), Strandberg (2012; 2015)
39Finlay gives the example of an amoralist who makes value judgements without moral
motivational attitudes. Cp. Finlay (2004, 209; 2005, 14-17). A second example from Finlay
(2004, 217-20) which is the following: Jim and Mary want to burn down their house for the
insurance money. They pay a detective to ﬁnd out the best way to betray the insurance.
The detective gives the advise that leaving a hot iron on a shirt is good, but that placing a
space heater by a curtain is even better. Hence, the detective calls the actions `good' in an
instrumental way, but the detective surely does not approve of them.
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(1) Madonna's stage show is lewd, but I don't want to imply that I disapprove
of it.
In (1) other aspects (e. g. Madonna's vocal talent) of her show could make
the speaker of (1) approve of it, or the evaluation might only be adopted. Or
else, suppose a spectator of the news watches a reporting about the ongoing
war in Syria. Thereupon, he or she utters (2):
(2) The war in Syria is horrifying.
(2) pragmatically conveys that the speaker feels horror, but this need not
necessarily be the case because the speaker might be too far away to be emo-
tionally aﬀected. Rather, he or she expresses the feelings he or she anticipates
to feel, if he or she really would be emotionally involved. So, when someone
has an attitude towards an object, he or she must evaluate it somehow. But an
evaluation could also only be adopted, or anticipated. It must be credited to
Kraft to have emphasized that "[i]t follows, however, that ascription of a char-
acteristic of value by means of value concepts occurs independently of whether
the object in question is actually considered valuable by the ascriber"40, and
further he says, "[t]hus two completely diﬀerent kinds of evaluation are dis-
tinguished: practical evaluation (Werthaltung)41 and the ascription of value
through value predicates, otherwise value judgement. Predication by means of
value concepts constitutes an impersonal, objective distinction"42.
According to Williams, the main characteristic of thick concepts is that they
are also action-guiding. If a T-utterance shall become action-eﬀective, the
speaker needs to have a corresponding motivation. This motivation is also
pragmatically conveyed by a T-utterance. For instance, by stating that Madonna's
stage show is lewd, the speaker often intends to express that he or she is not
willing to join the concert. People thinking that actions are wrong, cruel, bru-
tal, or lewd pragmatically do not want these actions to be performed. The
action-guidingness of thick concepts is linked pragmatically to value judge-
ments because, e. g., a sadist might call an action cruel and still, or maybe
even therefore, is motivated to perform that action. To conclude, by uttering
40Kraft (1981 [1951], 49).
41The English translation `practical evaluation' is infelicitous because `attitude' plays no
part, whereas `attitude' is part of `Werthaltung'.
42Ibid.
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a value judgement the speaker pragmatically
1. tries to persuade the hearer and inﬂuence the hearer's behaviour43
2. expresses approval and disapproval44
3. expresses a corresponding motivation45
4. gives moral reasons for action.46
Action-guidingness of the thick follows from this items: If a person approves
of an act and has a corresponding motivation, then it is likely that he or she
will perform that act.47
These pragmatic features distinguish value judgements from purely informa-
tional judgements.48 Thus, value judgements compensate the lack of truth-
conditions trough these mechanisms. The signiﬁcance of value judgements is
not solely to give information about the world, but rather to express attitudes,
intentions, desires, prescriptions, or motivations.49
6.4 Shapelessness, Context-Sensitivity and Flex-
ibility
6.4.1 Shapelessness
Section 2.2.2 dealt with the shapelessness-thesis, according to which thick con-
cepts are shapeless with regard to the non-evaluative. This section aims to
show that the proposed account is compatible with shapelessness. Thus shape-
lessness is assumed to be true.
As has been indicated above, shapelessness does not mean that thick concepts
lack any rough characterization  at least relative to a determined context.50
43Strandberg (2012, 103); Finlay (2004, 207).
44Cp. Finlay (2004, 206).
45Such a view is compatible with motivational internalism. Cp. Finlay (2004, 206).
46Cp. Strandberg (2012, 102-103).
47Strandberg (2012) calls an attitude which becomes action-eﬀective `action-guiding atti-
tude'.
48Certainly, informational judgements can also be used for persuasion purposes and the
like, but this function is not as obvious in informational judgements than in value judge-
ments. For instance, these pragmatic functions need to be supplemented by intonation,
gestures, or facial expressions.
49Andrew Payne (2006) also emphasizes that thick concepts are used to ascribe intentions,
desires, and beliefs.
50Cp. Roberts (2011, 511) and Ridge (2006, 314).
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So, suppose that there is at least a rough characterization of any thick con-
cept. Thick concepts might be deﬁned as follows: A term `T' represents a
thick concept iﬀ x is T conventionally (conceptionally) entails x is good in a
way (bad in a way).51 Similar to Elstein & Hurka's deﬁnition, S's utterance of
x is cruel means:
(i) S believes that x has properties
X,Y , and Z (not speciﬁed) of gen-
eral type A (speciﬁed with regard to
a determined context)52
(asserted at-issue content)
(ii) S ascribes negative valence to x in
virtue of X,Y , and Z of general type
A.
(asserted conventional implicature
content)
(iii) S tries to persuade the hearer and
inﬂuence their behaviour
(conversational implicature)
S expresses disapproval of x (conversational implicature)
S expresses a corresponding motiva-
tion
(conversational implicature)
S's utterance is reason-giving (conversational implicature)
This analysis guarantees the shapelessness of the thick because the ﬁlling
of the placeholders depends on the speaker S. The general type A is the
roughest non-evaluative characterization which is available in a determined
context, whereas X, Y , and Z need not be non-evaluative. An alert reader
might interject that this analysis is under attack of the disentanglement argu-
ment because the evaluation in b. is not part of the truth-conditions of `x is
cruel' and therefore does not even partly determine the extension of the con-
cept. But the non-evaluative characterisation is only rough and not any entity
to which this characterisation can be ascribed falls under the corresponding
thick concept. The classiﬁcation of a thick concept is driven by the provoked
reaction within the evaluating subject. Thus, the DA poses no challenge for
this analysis.
If it is assumed that thick concepts are shapeless and if a non-cognitivist view
is preferred, it must be assumed that thick concepts are vague and underde-
51Good in a way means roughly good pro tanto, to diﬀerentiate it from good in toto. For
a discussion on this matter cf. Tappolet (2004, 210-212.)
52X, Y , and Z are underspeciﬁed by the lexical meaning of cruel.
134
6.4.1 SHAPELESSNESS
termined by their lexical meaning. Therefore, ﬁrstly, Chris Barker's dynamic
perspective on vague concepts will be reiterated and, secondly, his thoughts
about the dynamics of vagueness will be transferred to shapeless thick pred-
icates as well.53 This shows that it can appropriately be dealt with thick
concepts, although they have no jointly suﬃcient and necessary application
conditions.
According to Barker's dynamic perspective, there are two diﬀerent modes to
use vague predicates: the descriptive and the metalinguistical usage, whereby
it depends on context which usage occurs. In the following, it will be demon-
strated that thick terms, too, can be used both metalinguistically and descrip-
tively.54
Suppose, A wants to tell B something about Feynman whom A recently got
to know. A might tell B:
(1) Feynman is tall.55
Thus, A adds information about Feynman to the common ground. If, for
instance, A tells B later on that Feynman hit his head on the door frame
when entering another room, then B knows that he hit his head because of his
body height. Barker calls this kind of use descriptive use because A uses (1)
to describe Feynman. According to Barker, there is another kind of usage 
the metalinguistic use. Imagine, A and B are at a party at Feynman's house.
Feynman and some of his friends are dancing in front of A and B, while A
and B are talking about men and A tells B that A ﬁnds tall men attractive.
Thereon B asks what A means by tall. A answers (1) and points in direction
of Feynman. In this situation, (1) is not used descriptively because no infor-
mation is added. Barker calls this a metalinguistic use. According to him, all
A has done is to give B guidance concerning what A's relevant standard for
tallness happens to be. Barker then argues that the metalinguistic update is
"part of the normal update potential of most vague predicates and present to
one degree or another in most (but not all!) uses"56.
Now, reconsider
53Typical vague predicates are `tall', `expensive', or `bald'.
54Cp. Barker (2002).
55Ibid.
56Ibid., 2.
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(2) a. Madonna's stage show is LEWD.
b. [MaDONna's stage show] is lewd.
Suppose, Peter joined Madonna's stage show and after that he tells Martin
(2a.). Since both of them are lewd-users, Peter's utterance is descriptive. He
tells Martin that sexuality was explicitly shown during her show. This infor-
mation is added to the common ground. If Peter says that all of Madonna's
dancers only wore a tiny bikini, this is no surprise to Martin because Peter
already told him that the show is lewd. Now imagine, both Peter and Martin
are at Madonna's stage show and all the dancers only wear tiny bikinis. Peter
is outraged and yells (2b.). Martin gets to know what Peter counts as lewd
concerning a stage show. Furthermore, the conversational implicature content
that Peter might disapprove of her show because of its lewdness or that he
might want to leave are also added to the common ground.
It is obvious that value judgements containing thin concepts have metalinguis-
tic usage, however, it seems to be more diﬃcult to explain their descriptive
usage.57 Imagine, A tells a friend that A's neighbour is a morally good person,
the friend might not understand what A is referring to unless A tells the friend
that the neighbour went to the supermarket to buy food when A's foot was
broken and he or she could not go to supermarket, or A and B have already
talked about morally good persons and have some common knowledge whom
to count as morally good and in virtue of which characteristics. According to
Michael Ridge, when uttering a value judgement, the speaker's belief makes
anaphoric reference to the properties which count as `morally good', or `lewd',
etc.58 So, if the participants in a talk have some kind of common knowledge
concerning the non-evaluative content of thin concepts, judgements containing
thin concepts also have a descriptive usage.
According to Carla Umbach, the descriptive and the metalinguistic (interpreta-
tional59) usage lead to diﬀerent modes of updating the common ground: "While
the former leads to updating worlds, the latter leads to updating interpreta-
57Umbach (2014, 16-17) solves this puzzle with the help of Hare. Suppose, A tells B on
the phone that A wants to buy a new car and has already inspected a car A wants to buy. B
replies that the car is a good car because B is a car mechanic. Even if B has no information
about the car in particular, B at least knows some accepted standard of the goodness of cars
from experience.
58Ridge (2006, 313).
59This is Umbach's term for the metalinguistic use.
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tions"60, that is, by uttering a subjective value judgement the speaker does not
want it to become common knowledge. Whereas a general value judgement is
supposed to become common knowledge because the speaker wants everyone
to agree. If no one disagrees, this value judgement is adopted to the common
ground.61
6.4.2 Context-Sensitivity
Closely linked to the idea of vagueness is the idea that thick concepts are
context-sensitive. That is, a man who is 1,90 m tall is tall with reference to all
other men, but small with reference to basketball players. Also, complaining
about food in a restaurant is not a courageous action for a self-conﬁdent person,
but might be courageous for sociophobic people. Or, not spending 100 $ is
selﬁsh for a millionaire, but not for poor people. Väyrynen concludes that
many thick terms are gradable.62 As has been mentioned in the introduction
the distinction between thick and thin concepts is a matter of degree. And
the thinner a value concept, the more it is i) shapeless with regard to the non-
evaluative and ii) context-sensitive: good can relate to very diﬀerent properties
dependent from context (good cook, good thief, etc.). The meaning of thin
concepts is, therefore, partly determined by the context. As Peter Geach points
out A is a good F is not equivalent to A is good and A is F.63 The standards
or norms to which `a good F' refers depends on F and the context in which it
is uttered.
6.4.3 Flexibility
In the introduction, it has been remarked that thick concepts are also ﬂex-
ible regarding the evaluation point which is conveyed. E. g., some football
fans like the brutality of football. Thus, brutality is rather positively coloured
in this context. An explanation in accordance with the proposed theory is
that thick concepts are globally evaluative in normal contexts (default use)64,
60Umbach (2014, 10).
61Cp. ibid.
62Evidence for gradability is that something can be too courageous, or too honest, etc. Cp.
Väyrynen (2013, 170).
63Cp. Geach (1956, 33) also Tappolet (2004, 209).
64Normal contexts are contexts where the utterance is not made with gestures or an
intonation that change the meaning of what is said, nor is it made ironically, or in the
inverted-comma-sense, or with modiﬁers such as too and not ... enough.
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but one might agree with Blackburn that there is no lexically signalled sin-
gle attitude connected with a thick concept. For instance, the usage of good
conveys a positive evaluation even when used in `good murderer'. `Good mur-
derer' means that the speaker thinks that the features of the murderer are
good-making, which means that the person is good in murdering. Still, the
speaker certainly disapproves of good murderers. Also, brutality conceptually
conveys a negative evaluation, but a football fan approves of brutal football.
One example65 for `evaluative ﬂexibility' from Väyrynen is Alan's positive use
of selﬁsh after the lecture of Ayn Rand. But, selﬁshness still has conventionally
negative colouring. Only Alan's attitude towards selﬁsh acts has changed. If
Alan tells a friend that his girlfriend acted selﬁshly, the friend may think that
his girlfriend is bad in a way because the use of selﬁsh conceptually conveys
a negative evaluation. So, Alan needs to add that his attitude towards selﬁsh
actions changed after the lecture of Ayn Rand and that he thinks that her
acting was good in a way, or at least not necessarily bad in any way, although
is was selﬁsh.
The proposed account can also accommodate the challenge posed by Väyrynen
that athletic or painful are often used for evaluative purposes.66 The meaning
of these concepts is purely non-evaluative, but in some contexts, the use of
these concepts pragmatically conveys the speaker's approval or disapproval,
his having a certain attitude or motivation. Athletic does not conceptually
convey that being athletic is being good in a any way, but if uttered in certain
circumstances, it becomes clear that the speaker approves of being athletic. To
conclude, the term `evaluative ﬂexibility' is improper and might be misleading
because not the conventionally conveyed evaluation is ﬂexible, but rather the
attitude towards the evaluated object. The use of a thick concept always con-
veys a certain evaluation, thus thick concepts are inherently evaluative. The
evaluation is conceptually tied to the use of thick concepts, whereas attitudes
are only pragmatically linked to the use of thick concepts.
The last challenge the account has to accommodate are objectionable thick
concepts. How can an objector handle the use of objectionable thick concepts
without also conveying the involved evaluation? According to our proposed ac-
count, Madonna's stage show is lewd conceptually implicates that Madonna's
65The proposed explanation is also valid for all other examples mentioned in the intro-
duction.
66Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 10).
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stage show is bad in a religious way. As has already been indicated an objector
must i) know that certain terms express concepts that convey certain evalua-
tions, and ii) he or she must object to these evaluations. The sincere objector
disapproves that those features in virtue of which they are judged to be lewd
are bad-making. To clarify this in more detail, it is helpful to distinguish four
cases concerning the use of lewd: 1) all speakers of a conversation share the
conveyed value, 2) not all speakers share the conveyed value, 3) not all speak-
ers except from one do not share the conveyed value, and 4) all speakers do
not share the conveyed value. Further, it is assumes that it is common knowl-
edge among the participants of the conversation, if someone is a lewd-user or
-objector. The ﬁrst case should be clear because there are no objectors tak-
ing part in the conversation. In the second case, the lewd-objectors are aware
that the use of lewd conceptually implicates a negative evaluation. Thus, they
cannot directly deny utterances as Madonna's stage show is lewd. But they
might interrupt with Wait a minute! I think that there is nothing wrong with
displaying sexuality explicitly, in order to attract the attention of the speakers
that religious values are not commonly shared in the conversation. In the third
case, the lewd-user might not even dare uttering that Madonna's stage show is
lewd, or else his utterance might be ignored. Rather, it is imaginable that the
lewd-user only expresses his attitude by uttering that he or she thinks/ﬁnds
that Madonna's stage show is lewd. In the last case, it might even happen that
one speaker says ironically or in the inverted-commas-sense that Madonna's
stage show is lewd to mimic those who would judge her show to be bad in
virtue of the explicit display of sexuality. Then, because of the ironic use the
utterance Madonna's stage show is "lewd" entails that lewd typically has neg-
ative colouring, but that the speaker does not share this religious evaluation
which is connected to the use of lewd.67 An objector cannot use a concept to
which he or she objects sincerely in its literal meaning.68
Having made these reﬂections objectionable thick concepts appear less impor-
tant for a theory about the thick. lewd, chaste, blasphemous, and the like
conceptually entail religious evaluations and if a speaker does not share any
67This strategy is also proposed by Hare: "He [the objector] might stop using the word
altogether, or he might use it `in inverted commas', to signify that a person had the de-
scriptive qualities expected by most people in those called kind." Hare (1997), 60-1. The
strategy is also reﬂected in the German expression `anzüglicher Witz' (`lewd joke').
68Kyle (2013) asserts that an generous-objector might claim `Nancy is generous, and she's
not good in any way' among generous-objectors. Yet, this might only be possible with a hint
of irony.
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religious values, he or she cannot use these concepts in their literal meaning.
Full stop.69
6.5 A Theory-Theory of the Thick
So far only moral or evaluative language has been in the focus of the study.
In this last section, an account is oﬀered of i) how moral concept's reference
might be determined and ii) how individuals classify entities in terms of thick
concepts. Thus, a psychological theory of thick concepts is outlined which
holds that thick concepts have theory structure which is relevant in proce-
dures of classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation. The idea that thick concepts have
theory-theory structure is supplemented by Kraft's considerations about the
psychological analysis of evaluation. Finally, some thoughts about thick con-
cept's reference determination are outlined.
Reconsider the disagreement about evaluation about slaughtering from section
6.1:
(1) Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
`Slaughtering animals is cruel.'
Martin: Nein, es ist nicht grausam.
`No, it isn't cruel.'
Let us suppose that Peter and Martin assent on all relevant facts. Suppose
also that their disagreement does not rest on an inability to apply the concept
cruel correctly because both possess this concept and they also know that ap-
plying the term `cruel' to an action conveys a negative evaluation. Then their
disagreement is a disagreement about the appropriate evaluation of these facts.
But since they agree on all relevant facts and the disagreement does not rest on
a misapplication of the concept, their disagreement must have something to do
with how they think about cruelty and what kinds of reactions are provoked by
these relevant facts. On the one hand, Peter and Martin seem to be diﬀerently
aﬀected by the facts and, on the other hand, they might simply have diﬀerent
mental conceptions of the concept cruel. The conception associated with a
thick concept is  as proposed by the theory-theory  a body of knowledge of
beliefs and judgements involving the thick concept and other concepts as their
constituents. These beliefs and judgements might not be explicit, but rather
69Cf. also Priest (1997) and Slote (1975).
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implicit tacit knowledge. This explains why it might be diﬃcult to explicitly
say what makes an action, e. g., cruel.
For instance, if Peter sees animals being slaughtered, this provokes horror in
him and he feels sympathy for the animals, whereas this is not the case concern-
ing Martin.70 The aﬀective reactions cause Peter to evaluate the slaughtering
of animals as bad-making. Alternatively, it could be said that Peter's concep-
tion of cruel involves the killing of any living beings, whereas for Martin a cruel
action must involve the killing of self-concious living beings. These two expla-
nations are mutually dependent because Peter's conception of cruel might be
the way it is because horror and sympathy are invoked in him when the killing
of any living being is concerned. Also, Martin feels horror and sympathy only
when self-concious living beings are killed and, therefore, his conception of
cruel includes the killing of self-conscious living beings. The application of a
thick concept is, therefore, not primarily guided by facts, but rather by the
reactions provoked within the evaluating subject. As Kraft points out, evalu-
ations are not only caused by emotions or feelings, but also by other sources
of distinction (pleasure and pain, natural drives, desires, habit, or adopted
evaluations lacking any aﬀective reactions). These sources of distinction are
the driving forces in classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation procedures, whereas in
classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation procedures concerning non-evaluative concepts
these sources do not matter because these processes are purely cognitive. A
desk is classiﬁed as desk even in the absence of any emotions, feelings, etc.
The theory structure is relevant concerning identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation
procedures. According to reference, there are two possibilities: Thick concepts
have stable and deﬁnable cores, or cores consisting of placeholder beliefs about
evaluative essences. As Plato's problem or the shapelessness-thesis suggest
thick concepts are not analysable in terms of non-evaluative concepts. This,
however, does not mean that thick concepts are not analysable at all. So,
the postulation of deﬁnable cores does not contradict the shapelessness-thesis.
The analysis outlined above presupposes that the general type A is supposed
to be the deﬁnable core of a thick concept. This core is spelled out in terms of
non-evaluative concepts. For instance, causing pain intentionally is the deﬁnable
core of cruel. The latter possibility is linked to the thesis that philosophical
concepts (ergo especially thick concepts) lack semantically constitutive cores
70According to FitzGerald and Goldie (2012), horror and sympathy are the appropriate
emotions concerning the application of cruel.
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altogether. This has inﬂuence on the stability:
In the case of concepts which lack cores altogether we may have to allow
for some extent of instability. For example, if one speaker believes that
punishing a scapegoat is just and another that it is unjust, and neither
would change her opinion upon reﬂection and discussion, then there
seems to be no alternative but to grant that they mean slightly diﬀerent
things by their concepts of justice.71
Value concepts might indeed be more unstable than natural kind concepts
and the non-evaluative meanings of thick concepts might vary more than the
meanings of natural kind concepts. But, alternatively, if one wants to avoid
such instability objections, one could suppose that thick concepts have a core
consisting of placeholder beliefs about evaluative essences, thus assuming rep-
resentational essentialism about morality and values. Representational essen-
tialism must be diﬀerentiated from metaphysical essentialism. The former is
about how people construe their reality, whereas the latter is a theory about
a realist ontology of values.72 The assumption of representational essentialism
also explains what moral realists commonly assume about our moral practice
and language. It is often held that value predicates are ascribed as if they were
non-evaluative predicates and thus act as if moral judgements are beliefs about
moral facts. It seems as if objective values are built into our moral language.
So even if thick concepts are non-natural kind concepts, one has the belief that
there is the good, although it can neither be observed nor explicitly spelled
out what the good is.
71Jylkkä (2008, 65).
72For the distinction of various kinds of essentialist theories see Gelman (2004, 405).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this study three main ways to explain thick concepts have been scrutinized:
separationist, non-separationist and pragmatic theories. The most compre-
hensive pragmatic approach to the thick is developed by Pekka Väyrynen. His
approach combines philosophical understandings of the thick with linguistic
methods. This way of proceeding has already oﬀered new perspectives on the
thick. However, Väyrynen's approach faces two challenges: Since his prag-
matic account is based upon the assumptions that i) all thick concepts are
principally open to be regarded as objectionable and ii) a pragmatic theory
about the thick is more simple because it avoids semantic posits, Väyrynen
must also contend that even thin concepts are principally open to be regarded
as objectionable. Else his account cannot accommodate and explain thin con-
cepts. But this suggests that his theory is not as simple as maintained. Yet,
to assume that thin concepts are objectionable is highly implausible. Further-
more, a pragmatic account is challenged with explaining the robustness of the
relation between thick concepts and evaluations. As has been pointed out his
explanation evokes semantic mechanisms. (See chapter 3.5)
In chapter 2 the beneﬁts of non-separationist views were compared with the
requirements of such views. Non-separationist accounts make reference to
cognitivism about values. The meaning of thick concepts is explained by pos-
tulating value properties which are picked out by thick concepts. Additionally,
thick concepts are held to be unanalysable. This, however, implies a concept
atomism. The concept atomism might be persuasive when it comes to nat-
ural kind concepts, with regard to thick concepts that are non-natural kind
concepts it appears less attractive because it presupposes a version of radi-
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cal nativism. (See chapter 4) By taking theories of non-evaluative concepts
into consideration it also became clear that the shapelessness-thesis, which is
one of the main arguments of non-separationists against separationists, cannot
be used to argue against analyses of thick concepts only, but against concept
analyses in general. Disproving classical concept analyses, however, does not
imply that concepts are not analysable. It only proves that concepts are not
analysable in a unique way. So, taking the considerations made in chapter 4
into account a separationist theory of the thick remains to be the most promis-
ing candidate in the ﬁeld.
Thus the non-cognitivist account suggested in the preceding chapter can be in-
terpreted as an attempt to establish a theory about the thick without evoking
any value realist assumptions, even if this account might as well be compatible
with cognitivism about values. Therefore, the study did not set out to refute
non-separationist theories.
Concerning separationist views any view appears to presuppose that the eval-
uations conveyed by the use of thick concepts are semantic entailments and
thus at-issue in conversations. But as was shown in chapter 3.4.1 the data
employed by Väyrynen suggest otherwise.
Thus, a revised version of a separationist analysis has been proposed in the
preceeding chapter which is based on Victor Kraft's thoughts concerning value
concepts. This analysis is compatible with the thesis that evaluations entailed
by the use of thick concepts are not at-issue.
According to Kraft, values are concepts and not properties of objects. Both
values and value judgements depend on the evaluating subject. Values are
ascribed to things or persons: "It invariably emerges for one particular person
only, existing, for the nonce, solely for the person whose attitude is determined
by the object that is distinguished. (...) Distinction (...) exists only subjec-
tively, for the individual."1
Value judgements are distinct from mere expressive judgements because  as
Kraft holds  value judgements are articulated from an inter-subjective per-
spective and by uttering a value judgement the speaker intends to persuade the
hearer. This distinguishes his theory from an emotivism about values because
value judgements are strictly diﬀerentiated from pronouncements expressing a
personal point of view. A subjective distinctions ﬁnds expression in the form I
think that..., whereas value judgements are articulated from an inter-subjective
1Kraft (1981[1951]), 129.
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point of view. By uttering The Mona Lisa is beautiful the speaker intends to
say more than just I think that the Mona Lisa is beautiful. The speaker intends
to persuade the hearer that his or her way to evaluate things is best, that he
or she is right and that the hearer should agree. In doing so, Kraft does not
maintain that value judgements can be right or wrong in the sense of "ﬁtting
the facts", that is value judgements do not ﬁt the criteria of veriﬁcation which
is in accordance to logical positivism. Instead, Kraft claims that value judge-
ments are valid or invalid just like rules or norms which ought to be recognised.
But recognition of validity is a personal act which cannot be demanded. In
contrast to Hare's prescriptivism, value judgements are primarily evaluative
and not prescriptive. Besides, Kraft's theory can be distinguished from quasi-
realism because value judgements do not project emotional attitudes as though
they were real properties, but values are ascribed to objects through subjective
distinction.
Thus, Kraft's theory is semantic and separationist. That evaluations conveyed
by the use of thick concepts are not at-issue in talks is not considered within
his theory, but can easily be accommodated by holding that evaluations are
lexically encoded in thick concepts and that the evaluations arising by the
use of thick concepts in value judgements are thus conventional implicatures.
Alternatively, one could try to prove that these evaluations are semantic pre-
suppositions, but there are mainly three serious obstacles: i) it is diﬃcult to
give the content of these evaluations propositionally (especially when it comes
to less objectionable concepts), ii) these evaluations do less function as back-
ground information, but are rather comments made by the speaker incidentally,
iii) these evaluations  contrary to presuppositions  do not survive embedding
in plugs. (See chapter 6.1.2.)
At the beginning of this study a thick concept was characterized as a concept
whose representing term `T' contains or entails `x is good in a way (bad in
a way)' iﬀ `x is T'. Subsequent results indicate further that thick concepts
are non-natural kind, complex but analysable concepts with vague reference.
Thick concepts are non-natural because there is no reference to value facts
because the postulation of objective value facts is avoided. However, thick
concepts have non-evaluative content in so far as they are world-guided and
contain factual information. This non-evaluative meaning is expressible in
non-evaluative terms. So, by uttering `x is cruel' some non-evaluative prop-
erties are ascribed to x and the hearer gains factual knowledge about x. For
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instance, a speaker calls torture cruel. This semantically entails that torture
involves deliberate and intentional inﬂiction of pain. But since evaluations also
depend on the evaluating subject, deliberate and intentional inﬂiction of pain
might not necessarily be cruel. To avoid the objection that communication
will not be possible, if everyone has only his or her own conception of cruel,
Chris Barker's account of the use of vague concepts has been transferred to
thick concepts. (See chapter 6.4.1.) These considerations yield the following
at-issue content:
S believes that x has properties X, Y , and Z (not speciﬁed) of
general type A (speciﬁed with regard to a determined context).
If `cruel' applies to x, then x involves the inﬂiction of pain (property of general
type A) and some properties X, Y , and Z which are not speciﬁed, such as
the deliberate and intentional inﬂiction of pain. It is the task of an ethical
theory to specify the necessary non-evaluative properties of the general type
A to which a thick concepts applies. This study leaves it as an open issue.
According to Kraft, if the assumed state of aﬀairs is false, that is if x does not
involve the inﬂiction of pain, the value judgement `x is cruel' must be false.
By uttering `x is cruel' the speaker also ascribes negative valence to x in virtue
of the inﬂiction of pain. The negative valence is conventionally implicated.
Additionally the value judgement conversationally implicates that the speaker
tries to persuade the hearer to agree that torture is something bad. Also it is
conversationally implicated that the speaker expresses his or her disapproval of
x, a corresponding motivation, and the value judgement might give the speaker
a reason to condemn, avoid, or refrain from x-ing.
In the opening chapter, nine questions have been raised which any consistent
account about thick concepts needs to answer:
1. Are thick concepts evaluative, or normative in the sense of action-guidingness?
Answer: Primarily thick concepts are evaluative, but can be used to
express norms because value judgements containing thick concepts con-
versationally implicate that one should, e. g., refrain from the action.
Otherwise, thick concepts can be used in subjective distinctions to only
express an evaluation without even trying to give guidance to action.
2. What exactly is this evaluative and non-evaluative element, if thick con-
cepts contain both?
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Answer: The non-evaluative element is deﬁnable in non-evaluative terms.
Nonetheless, it is not deﬁnable in a unique way. Only a `rough' descrip-
tion can be given depending on the subjective conception in question.
The evaluative element is non-cognitive and unanalysable.
3. How are these two elements connected or related to each other?
Answer: The evaluative element is conventionally encoded in the mean-
ing of thick concepts and gives rise to a conventional implicature. There-
fore, a speaker refrains from applying a thick concept, if the assumed
state of aﬀair is not evaluated positively/negatively.
4. How is the phenomenon of evaluative ﬂexibility explained?
Answer: Football is brutal can express both a negative and a positive
valence depending on context, at least it seems as if this could be the case.
However, `brutal' always expresses negative valence because the negative
valence is encoded conventionally in the meaning of brutal. By uttering
Football is brutal the speaker might nonetheless express his approval
to the brutality of football by saying the utterance enthusiastically or
smilingly. The utterance Football is brutal, and this is what I love about
it is not contradictory because the approval in the second conjunct can be
cancelled easily. The speaker might like football because of its brutality,
although brutality is somehow bad.
5. How can objectionable thick concepts be included in the theory?
Answer: An objector cannot apply a thick concept because this would
implicate the evaluation which the objector actually rejects. Instead, the
objector might use a thick concept ironically or in inverted commas to
indicate that he or she objects to the conveyed value.
6. Can the theory explain why evaluative concepts are sometimes used in
a nonevaluative fashion? Can it also explain the use of non-evaluative
concepts in an evaluative way?
Answer: Thick concepts can be used without negative or positive colour-
ing, if the relevant values are common to all participants of a talk. For
instance, a judgement might be called blasphemous without evoking an
evaluation, if all participants know that religious values are not shared
by anyone. blasphemous then is neutral due to its conventional meaning
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within the conversation. Non-evaluative concepts might be used evalua-
tively due to facial expressions, gestures, or emphasis.
7. Is the diﬀerence between thick and thin concepts a diﬀerence of degree
or a diﬀerence in kind?
Answer: In this study it is assumed that even thin concepts are a bit
thick. Thus the diﬀerence is a diﬀerence of degree and both thin and
thick concepts can be treated equally. The speciﬁcation of the non-
evaluative content of thin concepts depends on the context in which the
thin concept is uttered. (See Hare's discussion of a `good motor-car'
which is set out in chapter 2.2.4.)
8. Is the theory connected to any meta-ethical theories?
Answer: The proposed account is based on Kraft's meta-ethical thoughts
which is non-cognitivist.
9. Are presumptions on the basis of this theory justiﬁable? Are the possible
implications of this theory desirable?
Non-cognitivist theories are often criticised for its relativistic tenden-
cies. But, according to Kraft, non-cognitivism is compatible with con-
ventionalism. Moral standards might be deﬁned within a society. The
proposed account avoids value realist assumptions which is an unde-
niable beneﬁt. Also the fact-value dichotomy is held up because val-
ues are mind-dependent and not disentangeably amalgamated with non-
evaluative facts or properties.
In this study, Kraft's third way in between subjectivism and realism has been
elaborated and appended so that a reasonable account of thick concepts could
be proposed which answers the challenges raised in the introduction. It is a
pity that Kraft's account has not been noticed and integrated into the debate
about the thick, especially since Kraft combined thoughts about thick concepts'
reference with classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation procedures of thick concepts by
investigating conceptual analyses and scrutinizing psychological processes in
classiﬁcation procedures linked to thick concepts. Especially the connection
between thick concepts and emotions which is mentioned only brieﬂy (see
chapter 5.3.3) is an interesting point which would be worth of further study.
This study gave consideration to Kraft's theory by showing that even today
his thoughts are still worth reﬂecting.
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